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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
THE PUBLIC SECTOR, MIGRATION, AND HETEROGENEITY
Questions on the optimal  size of  government  always provoke intense political 
debate.   At  the  center  of  this  is  the  public  goods problem,  where  certain  goods  and 
services  are  “under-provided”  by  the  market  due  to  problems  with  rivalry  and 
excludability.   These  goods  are  usually  provided  by  the  public  sector  and  financed 
through  taxes.   Questions  emerge  over  the  optimal  level  of  provision,  as  different 
individuals value these goods differently.  This dissertation consists of two studies which 
address preferences for the size of government from different perspectives.
The first study provides a method that can be used to estimate demand for changes 
in levels of public provision.  Using individual level Census data on migration from 1990 
and  2000,  I  demonstrate  how  preferences  are  revealed  through  migration  responses. 
Though  policy  convergence  precludes  the  estimation  of  optimal  levels  for  different 
demographic groups, I find that balanced-budget increases in education expenditures tend 
to  attract  most  demographic  groups  while  other  expenditures  tend  to  repel  most 
individuals.  Young, college educated, relatively high-income individuals tend to be more 
responsive to, and therefore appear to have higher preference intensity for, fiscal changes. 
This is true even when controlling for their increased propensity to migrate.  Evidence 
inconsistent with welfare migration is found, suggesting that policies intended to address 
the race-to-the-bottom in welfare benefits may be counterproductive.  In addition, the 
ability  of  the  Tiebout  migration  process  to  homogenize  a  jurisdiction  is  limited  by 
relatively  small  fiscal  changes  among  jurisdictions  and  similar  migration  responses 
among demographic groups.
The  second  study  empirically  explores  the  effect  of  ethnic  heterogeneity  on 
government  size  for  countries  throughout  the  world.   In  the  developed  world, 
heterogeneity  is  found  to  reduce  the  size  of  budgetary  government,  consistent  with 
previous studies and predictions in the literature.  In the undeveloped world, however, 
heterogeneity  is  found  to  increase  the  size  of  non-budgetary  government  and  may 
increase the overall size of government.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Results  from the  recent  2010 U.S.  congressional  elections  have  generated  the 
largest number of seat changes in the House of Representatives since 1948.  While this is 
the largest recent change,  Table 1.1 provides data on US Congressional elections since 
1930.  This table shows that large swings and changes in power have been relatively 
common throughout history.  In order for such changes to take place, a relatively large 
portion of the voting population must be dissatisfied with the representatives who they 
previously voted into office.  
There are a number of possible explanations.  One possibility is that a myopic 
voting base changes its preferences depending on the state of the economy (Alesina and 
Rosenthal,  1995).   GDP growth  data  included  in  Table  1.1 provides  evidence  from 
congressional elections consistent with this idea.  GDP growth is negatively correlated 
with Democratic gains and positively correlated with Republican gains.1
A second possibility is that politicians are not responsive to the demands of voters 
(Besley and Case, 1995; Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000).  In the long-run, this could generate 
a voting base that views elections with apathy and chooses not to participate.
I  provide  an  additional  explanation.   Voters  may be  rationally  ignorant  when 
deciding which policies to support.   Due to high information costs,  voters have little 
incentive  to  educate  themselves  about  each  politician's  political  platform,  especially 
considering the possibility that candidates may change their position once elected.  On 
the  other  hand,  individuals  are  more  likely  to  have  credible  information  about,  and 
1 d=
−0.29
 p=0.07
, r=
0.27
 p=0.09
1
therefore more likely to form a strong opinion about, incumbent politicians and policies 
that were actually enacted.  Ceteris paribus, when faced with two policy options given by 
two different candidates, voters may find it difficult to form a strong preference for one 
versus the other.  However, voters may find it easier to evaluate the performance of a 
particular policy after it has been enacted, or a politician who has been in office.  
In this  sense, voters are less likely to cast  a vote for than against a particular 
policy or  politician.   Therefore,  elections may not  necessarily give us an idea of the 
politicians and policies that voters want, but rather an indication of how strongly voters 
do not want the politicians and policies they already have.  
Under  the  first  explanation,  election  outcomes  depend  on  the  state  of  the 
economy.  Under the other explanations, policies enacted by elected politicians do not 
necessarily represent the preferences of the voting base.  Regardless of the explanation, if  
voters are consistently dissatisfied with the policy proposals of elected representatives, 
then  election  outcomes  will  provide  a  questionable  estimate  of  demand  for  public 
provision.  Alternative methods are likely to provide more efficient indicators of demand 
for public provision.
Demand Estimation Techniques
A functioning market for true public goods does not exist due to problems with 
rivalry and excludability.  In addition, public provision of private goods crowds out some 
private  transactions  in  the  affected  markets.2  Due  to  these  problems,  demand  for 
publicly-provided goods cannot be estimated directly from observed market transactions. 
As  a  practical  matter,  these  goods  are  provided  through  the  political  process,  and 
2 See Tullock (1969) and Barzel (1969).  Barzel (1973) demonstrates this empirically for education.
2
individuals  must  attempt  to  express  their  preferences  through  this  process.   In 
democracies, this involves supporting the candidate whose platform most closely matches 
the individual's  preferences,  though limited information can be inferred from election 
outcomes.
Ciriacy-Wantrup (1947) suggested that individuals could be directly asked how 
much they would be willing to  pay for additional quantities of the publicly-provided 
good.   This  approach  became  known  as  the  contingent  valuation  method,  and  uses 
surveys to elicit demand for public provision.
Hotelling (1947) suggested another method that estimates demand indirectly by 
observing  transactions  involving  related  goods.   Individuals  who  engage  in  certain 
observable  behaviors  are  assumed to  have  revealed  their  preference  for  these  related 
goods.   For  example,  the  value  of  publicly-provided  recreational  facilities  can  be 
estimated by observing transportation expenditures incurred by individuals to reach a 
park.  Methods based on this approach are known as revealed preference methods, since 
actions taken by individuals are assumed to reveal their demand for goods and services.  
This study provides a framework for a revealed preference demand estimation 
method  based  on  interjurisdictional  competition  for  mobile  labor.   Tiebout  (1956) 
theorized that under specific conditions, an efficient market-based solution to the public 
goods  problem does  exist.   Perfectly  mobile  individuals  with  full  information  about 
policy  mixes  in  a  large  number  of  jurisdictions  will  migrate  to  the  jurisdiction  that 
provides the levels and types of provision they desire.  In equilibrium, individuals will 
sort,  and  preferences  in  each  jurisdiction  will  become  homogeneous.   In  reality, 
3
individuals are not perfectly mobile and there are a limited number of jurisdictions.  This 
prevents migration from producing a perfectly efficient outcome.  However, this type of 
migration can still provide information about preferences for public provision.
Under theories of fiscal competition, jurisdictions can compete with one another 
for  these  mobile  residents  because  individuals  compare  their  demand  for  publicly 
provided goods and services to fiscal policy in different jurisdictions when making these 
migration decisions.  These migration decisions are observable at the individual level. 
This  study  uses  data  on  these  migration  decisions  and  fiscal  policies  in  competing 
jurisdictions  to estimate demand for publicly provided goods.   I  argue that migration 
outcomes are potentially a better  indicator  of policy preferences  than that of election 
outcomes or survey responses for several reasons.  
First,  the  probability  that  one  vote  will  have  a  decisive  effect  on  an  election 
outcome is small.  In addition, policy changes are subject to institutional constraints, and 
the election of a particular politician does not guarantee that a specific policy will change 
in  any particular  way.   Because the  expected benefit  from voting is  relatively small, 
rational voters have few reasons to inform themselves about the issues.  Similarly, survey 
respondents  have  little  incentive  to  truthfully  reveal  their  preferences  or  collect 
information.  Potential migrants know that they will leave behind the fiscal regime of 
their  initial  jurisdiction,  and  subject  themselves  to  the  policies  of  their  destination 
jurisdiction.  Because the costs and benefits of migration are more certain, migrants have 
greater incentives to research available options.
Secondly, elections and survey responses are unlikely to produce a stable set of 
4
preferences that can be used to guide fiscal policy.  Kramer (1973) notes that “a very 
modest  degree  of  heterogeneity  of  tastes”  can  produce  Condorcet  cycling  in 
multidimensional policy space.  Put differently, voters in a majoritarian system may not 
be able to rationally determine where to spend an additional dollar because there may not 
be a product that voters would prefer to all others in pairwise contests, especially when 
there are a wide range of tastes and preferences.  This is because preference intensity is 
usually not addressed by voting systems or surveys.   If results indicate that voters prefer 
education  to  police  protection  to  anti-poverty  programs,  but  also  prefer  anti-poverty 
programs to education, then these responses are of questionable use.  We could not use 
them to decide where to spend the next dollar, or if the next dollar should even be spent. 
In  contrast,  migrants  consider  their  preference  intensity  across  all  dimensions  before 
making decisions, thus negating the possibility of cycling.
In addition, the platforms of winning political parties do not provide the detailed 
information  needed to construct demand schedules for specific types of public provision. 
Voters in the US traditionally perceive that the probability they will affect the outcome of 
an election is greater if they vote for one of the two leading political parties and believe 
that they must “choose the lesser of two evils.”  By doing so, voters limit their choices of 
policy combinations.  These individuals may act as “single-issue” voters who cast their 
vote based on the one policy dimension they feel is most important.  It would be difficult 
to estimate preferences for fiscal policy from election outcomes and exit polls because it 
would be erroneous to assume that an individual agrees entirely with the platform of the 
candidate that he or she voted for.    Surveys tend to similarly “pigeonhole” responses.
5
In contrast, migrants have a multitude of potential destinations to choose from. 
This allows them more options to search for a better match between their preferences and 
policy outcomes.  As all of these jurisdictions have pre-existing policy mixes, migrating 
to one of them will are guarantee that migrants have some direct control over the policy 
mix they are exposed to in the short run.  For these reasons, migration decisions may be a  
better indicator of demand for public provision of goods and services.  Policies that are 
most likely to attract mobile residents can be deduced from migration outcomes.
There are some potential shortcomings from using migration.  In general, low-
income individuals have lower migration rates, and this may make them appear to be 
more satisfied with public policies than high-income individuals.  In reality, it is difficult 
to  determine whether  those who did not  migrate  are  satisfied migrants  or  unsatisfied 
individuals who face relatively high moving costs.  In addition, Tiebout-style migration is 
thought to be more likely at the local level because information and migration costs are 
lower.  However, both of these costs have been falling over time due to technology and 
we might expect more interjurisdictional migration at the state level (Rhode and Strumpf, 
2003).  Also, information on competing jurisdictions may be easier to obtain at the state, 
rather than local level.  In addition, Tax Foundation data from 1902-2001, shown in Table
1.2, suggests that centralization at the state-local level has continued through 2001.  This 
suggests that policies of higher levels of government are becoming more relevant, and 
state-level Tiebout migration should be more apparent in recent data.
6
Public Provision, Heterogeneity, and Political Institutions
Tiebout migration cannot provide a completely efficient solution to the public 
goods problem by matching preferences to policy mixes.  It also cannot completely 
homogenize jurisdictions.  In reality, individuals with different preferences will reside in 
the same jurisdiction.  This preference heterogeneity might be expected to affect public 
provision.
A number of empirical studies have documented an inverse relationship between 
ethnic heterogeneity and some types of government spending.3  Many studies attribute 
this  relationship  to  a  relatively  efficient  transfer  of  information  within  tight-knit 
homogeneous groups that increases both the prevalence of group norms and the costs of 
violating these norms.  Under these “technology” and “strategy selection” mechanisms, 
individuals are more likely to express preferences closer to the group mean because they 
are  more  likely  to  be  aware  of  and  consider  group  interests  when  expressing  their 
political opinion, and the penalties for defectors may be considerably greater.4  It may 
also be possible that  individuals in  certain groups genuinely have similar  preferences 
because of shared experiences, and these preferences differ between groups.  Under this 
“preference” mechanism, a diversity of groups will imply a diversity of preferences, and 
the lack of political consensus may produce lower levels of public provision.5  
Any observed homogeneity of within-group preferences can be attributed to either 
actual preferences or the homogenizing effect resulting from the technology or strategy 
3 Poterba (1997), Easterly and Levine (1997), Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999), LaPorta et al (1999), 
Tanzi and Schuhknecht (2000).
4 Glaeser et al (2000), Alesina and LaFerrara (2000), Costa and Kahn (2003),  Miguel and Gugerty 
(2005), Habyarimana et al (2007), Lyall (2010).
5 Mueller and Murrell (1986), Alesina and LaFerrara (2000), Alesina and LaFerrara (2005)
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selection  mechanisms,  making  it  difficult  to  distinguish  between  these  mechanisms. 
Experimental methods provide evidence of the technology and strategy mechanisms by 
demonstrating  that  individuals  will  change  their  behavior  depending  on  their  ethnic 
similarity to other players, but find less evidence of the preference mechanism.
An  analysis  of  migration  decisions  can  provide  evidence  consistent  with  the 
preference mechanism by estimating preferences separately for individuals in different 
demographic groups.  As these individuals are migrants, the bonds between them and 
their new community may be relatively weak, and may be less aware of or responsive to 
group norms.  Because these individuals can more effectively sever group ties, they also 
face reduced costs for defecting from group norms.
In democracies, all of these mechanisms have the ability to affect fiscal policy 
because individuals can express their political views.  If individuals in developing nations 
find themselves subject to a non-democratic government, they may have less political 
power,  and these mechanisms will  be less likely to  affect  policy outcomes.   In these 
cases, the standard relationship between government and heterogeneity may not apply.
In some cases, a positive relationship between heterogeneity and government size 
may  emerge.   Alesina  et  al  (2000)  find  a  positive  relationship  between  ethnic 
fragmentation and government employment.  They conclude that politicians can create 
public  employment  opportunities  for  members  of  interest  groups.   By  doing  so, 
politicians can disguise redistributive efforts and consolidate political power.  Glaeser and 
Saks  (2006)  show  that  racial  fractionalization  is  correlated  with  corruption.   Annett 
(2001) shows that if ethnic fractionalization leads to political instability, higher levels of 
8
government consumption will result, as politicians in power attempt to appease opposing 
political forces.  
Boettke (2001) argues that the Soviet Union used regulations and restrictions on 
market activity as an alternative to conventional taxation to extract resources from the 
economy.   Brennan  (2002)  suggests  that  in  some  cases,  regulation  can  act  as  an 
alternative to Pigouvian taxes and subsidies.  He notes that regulation is more efficient 
because it avoids the excess burden problems by taxes and “provides greater degrees of 
freedom in focusing  behavioural  adjustment  on  those individuals  whose  performance 
generates external benefits.”  On the other hand, regulation may be less efficient because 
it is likely to involve higher enforcement costs, and more information is required to find 
socially efficient quantities.  Regulations would be expected to appear if governments 
perceive that these benefits outweigh these costs.  If fiscal policy is ultimately a series of 
Pigouvian taxes and subsidies, regulation becomes a substitute for fiscal policy.
If  regulation  and  fiscal  policy  are  substitutes,  then  budgetary  measures  will 
understate government size, especially in developing countries.  Musgrave (1969) states 
that  countries  with  a  relatively low level  of  development  are  more  likely to  rely on 
indirect  taxes  (e.g.,  sales  taxes)  than  direct  taxes  (e.g.,  income  taxes)  because 
administration of the latter is too costly.  Even indirect taxation may be less useful in 
countries with undeveloped financial systems and large undergound barter economies.  In 
these  cases,  regulations  may be the  most  viable  alternative.   Tanzi  (1998)  finds  that 
developing nations cannot collect taxes as efficiently as developing nations can, and find 
it  more  difficult  to  engage in  budgetary redistribution.  Governments  in  these  nations 
9
would be more likely to enact regulations and engage in quasi-fiscal activities.6  Gupta et 
al  (2003)  empirically  find  that  transition  economies  have  reduced  government 
expenditures  as  a  share  of  GDP,  but  relatively  high  overall  levels  of  government 
involvement  in  the  economy.   When  non-budgetary  government  is  taken  into 
consideration,  the  relationship  between  heterogeneity  and  government  size  may  be 
different.
Outline of Dissertation
The remainder of this study consists of four additional chapters.  Chapter 2 uses 
standard public finance literature to provide a background for a review of three strands of 
literature.  First, the standard models of tax competition are contrasted with the Leviathan 
model.  Alternative models of tax competition are discussed briefly.  Empirical tests of 
these theories are also examined.  Second, indirect methods of demand estimation and 
revealed preference techniques are briefly explored.  Finally, I review empirical studies 
that link migration trends with taxation and publicly provided goods and services.  
Chapter  3 is  an  empirical  study  of  migration  patterns,  fiscal  policy  and 
heterogeneity.  This study focuses on interstate migration in the United States from 1985-
2000.  Individual migration decisions are interpreted as preferences for relative changes 
in fiscal policies between states.  This study differs from previous migration studies in 
that it uses individual, rather than aggregate data.  Because individuals do not consider 
the effect of their migration decision on the fiscal policy of their  state of origin,  this 
approach avoids some problems faced by aggregate studies.  While this is not the first 
6 Quasi-fiscal activities are activities that simulate fiscal policy using implicit taxes and subsidies, but do 
not affect conventionally measured budget deficits.  Examples include subsidized lending and exchange 
rates guarantees (Mackenzie and Stella, 1996).
10
study that uses individual level migration data, it is to my knowledge the first revealed 
preference analysis that is not limited to one specific fiscal policy or demographic group.
Chapter  4  reviews  the  literature  on  the  relationships  between  heterogeneity, 
government size, and political institutions, while Chapter 5 examines these relationships 
empirically.  Specifically, the effect of heterogeneity is examined in both democratic and 
non-democratic countries,  and particular  attention is  given to non-budgetary forms of 
intervention.   Chapter  6  summarizes  the  conclusions  of  the  previous  chapters  and 
explains their contributions to the literature.  Policy implications are discussed, as are 
avenues for future research.
11
Table 1.1: Seat Changes, U.S. Congressional Elections
Election Year
House of Representatives Senate
GDP Growth
Democratic Republican Democratic Republican
1930 -16 +19 -8 +8 -8.6
1932 +97 -101 +12 -12 -13.1
1934 +9 -14 +9 -10 10.9
1936 +12 -15 +5 -6 13
1938 -72 +81 -7 +6 -3.4
1940 +5 -7 -3 +3 8.8
1942 -45 +47 -8 +9 18.5
1944 +20 -18 -1 +1 8.1
1946 -54 +55 -11 +12 -10.9
1948 +75 -75 +9 -9 4.4
1950 -28 +28 -5 +5 8.7
1952 -22 +22 -2 +2 3.8
1954 +19 -18 +2 -2 -0.6
1956 +2 -2 0 0 2
1958 +49 -48 +16 -12 -0.9
1960 -20 +21 -1 +1 2.5
1962 -4 +2 +3 -3 6.1
1964 +36 -36 +2 -2 5.8
1966 -48 +47 -3 +3 6.5
1968 -4 +5 -5 +5 4.8
1970 +12 -12 -2 +1 0.2
1972 -13 +12 +2 -2 5.3
1974 +49 -48 +3 -3 -0.6
1976 +1 -1 0 +1 5.4
1978 -15 +15 -3 +3 5.6
1980 -35 +34 -12 +12 -0.3
1982 27 -26 0 0 -1.9
1984 -16 +16 +2 -2 7.2
1986 +5 -5 +8 -8 3.5
1988 +2 -2 +1 -1 4.1
1990 +7 -8 +1 -1 1.9
1992 -9 +9 0 0 3.4
1994 -54 +54 -8 +8 4.1
1996 +2 -2 -2 +2 3.7
1998 +5 -5 0 0 4.4
2000 +1 -2 +4 -4 4.1
2002 -7 +8 -2 +2 1.8
2004 -3 +3 -4 +4 3.6
2006 31 -30 +6 -6 2.7
2008 24 -24 +8 -8 0
2010 -68 +64 -6 +6 N/A
Source: Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives, BEA
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Table 1.2: State and Local Centralization Over Time
Expenditures Revenues
Year State Share (%) Local Share (%) State Share (%) Local Share (%)
1902 12.42 87.58 17.46 81.87
1913 13.16 86.84 17.73 81.67
1922 19.2 80.80 23.87 74.04
1932 24.13 75.87 28.83 68.23
1942 32.65 67.35 45.73 47.75
1952 34.96 65.04 46.21 45.52
1962 36.14 63.86 43.34 43.34
1972 38.06 61.94 44.22 39.36
1982 40.32 59.68 47.79 36.28
1992 43.37 56.63 48.41 36.45
2001 44.01 55.99 39.33 30.64
Source: Tax Foundation, Inc., Facts and Figures on Government Finance, 38th ed.,
(Washington D.C.: Tax Foundation, Inc., 2005), Table D1, pp. 143-144
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Modern  economic  analysis  of  public  finance  began to  emerge  in  the  late  19th 
century when Pantaleoni  (1883) conceptually applied the marginal theory of value to 
public economics, suggesting that public funds should be distributed in such a way as to 
receive the highest total utility.  Sax (1884, 1887) noted a conflict between resources that 
are employed to produce goods intended to benefit the “collective,” and those employed 
to produce “individual” goods.  De Viti De Marco (1888) stated that an individual's share 
of  the  cost  of  a  publicly provided good should  depend on that  individual's  marginal 
utility, though he pointed out that finding these marginal utilities would be impractical. 
Wicksell (1896) suggested that the questions of taxation and spending be combined into 
one, and that government expenditures should only increase as long as the value of the 
goods and services supplied exceed the value of the resources needed (e.g., tax revenue) 
to supply them.  Theoretically,  efficient public provision of goods and services could 
occur without forcible taxation if the state would charge individuals according to their 
demand for goods and services.  This would result in unanimous agreement on the level 
of government expenditures.  
The Preference Revelation Problem
Lindahl (1919) formally depicted the equilibrium that would result when these 
individual tax prices are set,  and described a method that could be used to find these 
prices.  Individuals could be asked to reveal the quantity of goods they would prefer at a 
given price, then individual prices could be altered until all individuals desired an equal 
quantity of  the public  good.   Assuming that  individuals  would truthfully reveal  their 
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preferences,  finding the optimal  quantity would still  be  problematic,  as  suggested  by 
Musgrave (1939), since this process only provides for an equitable distribution of tax 
burdens.
Samuelson (1954) provided a complete theory and described the efficient level of 
publicly-provided good as one that sets the marginal social utility equal to the marginal 
social cost, and assigns Lindahl taxes to individuals according to the benefit received. 
This would result in agreement on tax rates and a level of publicly-provided good that is 
neither inefficiently large nor small.  
Samuelson  acknowledged  Wicksell's  earlier  point  that  individuals  would  have 
strong  incentives  to  under-represent  their  preferences  for  publicly  provided  goods  in 
order to decrease their tax burden and free-ride.  This “preference revelation problem” 
prevents the practical implementation of a Pareto optimal allocation of resources.  
In  the  absence of  unanimous  consent,  the  function and size  of  government  is 
ultimately determined by political  institutions.   These political  processes  spark  fierce 
debate  over  policy  changes  that  produce  both  winners  and  losers,  with  individuals 
preferring different levels of government involvement in a number of policy dimensions. 
Because of inefficiencies in tax systems and difficulties assessing each individual's true 
preferences  for  government,  it  becomes  difficult  to  determine  whether  levels  of 
government are in general inefficiently large or small.7
In most cases, individuals can choose to participate in these political processes.  In 
his popular treatise on individual responses to organizational inefficiencies, Hirschman 
7 One proposed solution involves complicated voting mechanisms that provide incentives for individuals 
to truthfully reveal their preferences, such as the Groves-Clarke mechanism.  However, the costs to 
implement these mechanisms generally exceed the inefficiencies associated with second-best solutions.
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(1970) referred to two options.  The first of these is “voice.”  In democracies, individuals 
who are dissatisfied with policy formulations can voice their preferences by contacting 
their  representatives  or  voting  in  elections.   Though  the  probability  that  a  single 
individual  will  have  an  effect  on  a  political  outcome  is  relatively  low,  the  cost  of 
exercising these options is also relatively low.  
Hirschman referred to another option as “exit,” where an individual chooses to 
leave the group.  Barone (1912) observed that individuals who face large enough burdens 
may emigrate from the jurisdiction.  By doing so, they can migrate to another jurisdiction 
with a more favorable policy mix.  While this option is more costly, it avoids the political  
process and gives individuals some direct control over the fiscal policies to which they 
are exposed.  
Tiebout Migration and Fiscal Competition
Tiebout (1956) suggested that migration in response to fiscal policy could provide 
an efficient decentralized solution to the public goods problem, at least at the local level. 
If individuals with complete information could freely migrate among a large number of 
jurisdictions,  each with different mixes of publicly provided goods and services,  then 
they would choose to locate in the jurisdiction that best suits their interests.  In this world, 
residents  would  be  matched  with  their  desired  levels  of  government,  and  the  fiscal 
preferences  of  the  population  within  each  community  would  become  relatively 
homogeneous. 
While Tiebout's solution may provide a welfare-enhancing outcome, it alone is 
unlikely to provide a completely efficient solution to the public goods problem because 
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the assumptions are too restrictive.  In reality, migration is not costless, and if moving 
costs are high enough, mobile residents may choose to remain in an area, even if they 
would be better off in another jurisdiction.  There are a limited number of jurisdictions to 
choose from.  Individuals may not be able to find a location with policies that perfectly 
suit  their  needs,  and may have  to  settle  for  some inefficiencies.   Information on tax 
burdens  and  policies  in  different  jurisdictions  can  only  be  acquired  at  a  cost,  and 
individuals may not have complete information when making decisions.
In addition, those who do migrate may impose externalities on others.  Weisbrod 
(1964) argued that  the costs  of  publicly-provided education accrue to  the jurisdiction 
where students currently reside, while benefits from publicly-provided education accrue 
to  jurisdictions  where  individuals  ultimately  reside.   Buchanan  and  Goetz  (1972) 
described two types of fiscal externalities that are generated as an individual migrates 
into a jurisdiction.  The individual provides a benefit to the destination jurisdiction by 
providing additional tax revenues.  The individual may impose a cost if publicly-provided 
club goods are consumed.8
Some individuals can provide net benefits or net costs to a jurisdiction.  High-
income individuals tend to contribute more to the tax base than low-income individuals, 
and are therefore more likely to provide net benefits.  If these high-income individuals 
are  also  likely to  emigrate  out  of  a  jurisdiction  in  order  to  avoid relatively high tax 
burdens, the tax base in the original jurisdiction may begin to erode, forcing a subsequent 
reduction  in  expenditures.   Benefits  from  redistribution  programs  enacted  in  other 
jurisdictions may spillover into the original jurisdiction.  To the extent that low-income 
8 Goods and services that are partially rival, or congestible in consumption.  See Buchanan (1965).
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individuals are mobile, they may emigrate in search of greater benefits.  As high-income 
individuals flee from low-income individuals, a cycle begins.  This cycle, along with the 
possibility  that  governments  may  preemptively  reduce  welfare  benefits  to  prevent 
emigration  of  high-income  residents,  contributes  to  a  “race  to  the  bottom”  in 
redistribution programs.  Stigler (1957) provides this as justification for centralization of 
redistributive  efforts.   Regardless  of  the  level  of  centralization  of  redistribution,  a 
Tiebout-style equilibrium is prevented.
In the absence of complete centralization, jurisdictions may begin to bid against 
one another in order to attract mobile individuals and capital.  The idea that jurisdictions 
compete for  mobile  factors was noted as early as  Hayek (1939) in  his  discussion of 
interstate  federalism.   Oates  and  Schwab  (1988)  suggest  that  interjurisdictional 
competition  involves  three  potential  sources  of  inefficiencies,  including  conflicts  of 
interest within heterogeneous groups, access to efficient tax instruments, and differences 
between the will of the electorate and policy.  A large amount of theoretical work covers 
the relationship between this competition and these inefficiencies.  
Tiebout's original article suggested that the homogenizing effect of competition 
would soften any conflicts of interest over time as individuals sort themselves.  Wallis 
and  Oates  (1988)  suggest  that  heterogeneity  is  a  mechanism  through  which 
decentralization reduces the size of the public sector.  With homogeneous preferences, 
the public sector is likely to be larger as the marginal cost of public provision is relatively 
low due to economies of scale.  Decentralization enhances efficiency only to the extent 
that local governments can better accommodate small geographically sorted groups.  
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Oates (1972) suggested that tax competition may be harmful because the ability of 
mobile factors to flee from tax burdens forces governments reduce rates in order to attract 
capital, thereby undermining the efficiency of tax instruments.  Wilson (1986), Gordon 
and  Wilson  (1986)  and  Zodrow  and  Mieszkowski  (1986)  provide  formal  theoretical 
foundations for this view.  These models, collectively referred to as “tax competition” 
models, assume that benevolent governments attempt to finance the provision of goods 
and services through the use of distortionary taxes.  Any distorting taxes will reduce the 
net of tax return on capital and cause an outflow of mobile capital.  The tax base in the 
initial jurisdiction erodes as tax revenue from the migrating capital is lost.  In addition to 
this, migrating capital may provide positive externalities for the destination jurisdiction. 
In order to attract mobile capital, provision is reduced to an inefficiently low level.  These 
theories exemplify the standard Pigouvian view of interjurisdictional tax competition for 
mobile factors (Besley and Smart, 2002).  
Other  theories concentrate  on  the  principal-agent  problem  between  the 
constituency  and  politicians, and  generally  find  this  competition  to  be  beneficial. 
Rauscher (1996, 1998) formalized the Leviathan theory, concluding that if politicians are 
not  perfectly  altruistic  and  distortionary  taxes  are  used,  then  competition  for  mobile 
factors will serve to increase the efficiency of the public sector and eliminate bureaucratic 
waste.  This is because the inefficiencies that result when politicians create unwanted 
programs will tend to drive mobile constituents away.  Ceteris paribus, decentralization 
helps  facilitate  this  competition  by  decreasing  moving  costs  and  giving  mobile 
individuals more alternative jurisdictions to choose from.  
19
Another  mechanism  by  which  decentralization  may  affect  the  principal-agent 
problem is  through  changes  in  tax  structure.   Puviani  (1896)  noted  that  certain  tax 
instruments may be less noticeable to taxpayers, causing them to underestimate the tax 
price they pay for goods and services.  Winer (1983) suggested that centralized revenue 
collection  along with  intergovernmental  grants  may serve  a  similar  purpose.   If  less 
complex tax  systems decrease taxpayer  information costs,  and local  governments  are 
likely to use fewer and less complex tax instruments, then decentralization of revenue 
collection can also reduce waste by decreasing the negative effects of fiscal illusion.  In a 
Pigouvian  twist  on  this  argument,  decentralization  could  also  reduce  the  size  of 
government as jurisdictions with few tax instruments becomes more vulnerable to the 
effects of fiscal stress.  For example, in a jurisdiction that relies solely on sales taxes, 
revenues may be more vulnerable to the effects of business cycles.9
Besley and Smart (2002) find that the ability of competition to improve welfare 
under  Leviathan  ultimately  depends  upon  the  political  environment.   Competition  is 
welfare improving only if it increases the ability of voters to detect “bad” incumbents. 
This would be possible if there are a sufficient number of  “good” politicians for voters to 
observe.  In contrast, if most politicians are wasteful, then voters will be unable to detect 
such  behavior  with  yardstick  measures.   Under  this  theory,  competition  can  reduce 
limited amounts of bureaucratic waste, but is ineffective if waste is widespread.
Both  the  Pigouvian  and  Leviathan  models  predict  that  increased  competition 
resulting from decentralization will reduce the size of the public sector, though they make 
9 For a detailed discussion, see Buchanan (1967), Wagner (1976), Breeden and Hunter (1985), and 
Misiolek and Elder (1988).
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different predictions about the welfare effects of fiscal competition.  Edwards and Keen 
(1996) consider both the positive and negative welfare effects by modifying the Zodrow 
and Mieszkowski model to allow for self-interested behavior by policy makers.  In this 
model,  decentralization  increases  the  ability  of  fiscal  policy  to  induce  capital  flight, 
thereby increasing the size of the deadweight losses that result from taxes.  On the other 
hand, if policy makers coordinate or centralize tax collection, incentives for bureaucratic 
waste may emerge.  The net welfare effect of centralization depends on both the costs of 
deadweight  loss  and  the  propensity  of  policy  makers  to  waste  tax  revenue. 
Decentralization  is  more  likely  to  be  welfare-enhancing  if  policy  makers  are  more 
wasteful.  
Other theories suggest that tax competition may actually increase the size of the 
public sector.  Williams (1966) suggests that if positive fiscal externalities, or “spillins” 
are used as inputs to production, then it is conceivable that the public sector may over-
provide some of these goods in the aggregate.  Aaron (1969) theorized that because the 
marginal  cost  of  providing  a  pure  public  good  to  another  individual  is  zero,  public 
provision can be increased to levels that are inefficiently high as a type of investment in 
order to attract migrants.  As additional residents move into the jurisdiction the average 
tax bill will fall and the marginal social benefit will rise, ultimately resulting in a greater 
efficient quantity of public goods for all residents.  Lee (1997) uses a two-period model 
to  show  that  jurisdictions  may  over-provide  goods  and  services  in  order  to  attract 
imperfectly mobile capital.  Black and Hoyt (1989) suggest that there can be positive 
welfare implications when jurisdictions offer direct payments to attract capital.  Wilson 
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(2005)  shows  that  if  publicly-provided  goods  and  services  can  attract  capital  by 
improving  its  productivity,  and  taxes  are  levied  on  capital,  then  welfare-improving 
“expenditure” competition may increase the size of government.   Because conflicting 
theories make different predictions about the overall welfare effects of tax competition, 
this question is fundamentally empirical.
Empirical Tests of Fiscal Competition
Empirical tests of fiscal competition date back to Adams (1965), who examines 
per capita spending on a number of publicly-provided goods in a cross section of 478 
counties  in  1957.   He finds  that  as  the  number of  government  jurisdictions  within a 
county  fall,  per  capita  expenditures  rise.   Oates  (1972)  finds  little  evidence  of  a 
relationship  between  centralization  and  tax  revenue  for  a  cross  section  of  countries. 
Giertz  (1981) finds  a  positive relationship in  a  study of  state  and local  governments 
within the U.S. and concludes that these relationships are more important in subnational 
governments.  This may be because individuals have greater freedom to migrate to other 
states within the United States than they do to migrate to other countries, making tax 
competition more relevant at lower levels of government.  Sjoquist (1982) finds evidence 
of  an  inverse  relationship  between  the  level  of  expenditures  and  the  number  of 
jurisdictions  in  a  1972  cross  section  of  metropolitan  areas  in  the  southern  U.S. 
DiLorenzo  (1983)  constructs  Herfindahl-style  measures  of  competition  in  taxes  and 
expenditures  for  local  governments  within  large  counties  in  the  US  in  1975,  and 
concludes that competition is generally associated with a reduction in the level of public 
fiscal activity.
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Oates (1985) may have been the first to explicitly mention the Leviathan model in 
an empirical test.  In this study he examines two cross-sections of countries and US states 
but  is  unable  to  find  any evidence  of  a  link  between  centralization  and  the  size  of 
government.  Nelson (1986) finds little evidence of Leviathan behavior in a cross section 
of  US  states,  though  he  points  out  that  such  studies  cannot  definitively  confirm  its 
existence.  In a later study, Nelson (1987) suggests that the type of government service 
must also be considered.  If state government expenditures are frequently for different 
services than local government expenditures, then differing levels of publicly provided 
goods may be explained by different preferences.  If, for example, citizens in a particular 
jurisdiction preferred higher expenditures on a service that is more likely to be provided 
by local governments, such as education,  then higher expenditures on these programs 
would be correlated with decentralization.  By controlling for the type of expenditure, 
Nelson finds evidence consistent with Leviathan behavior using data similar to that used 
by  Oates.   By  considering  education  spending  separately,  Bell  (1988)  finds  that 
expenditures are associated with a higher share of funding being collected at the state 
relative  to  the  local  level,  providing  evidence  of  a  positive  relationship  between 
centralization and the level of spending.
Schneider  (1986)  examines  the  relationship  between  fragmentation  and 
government growth using a sample of U.S. suburbs.  Using data taken from the Census of 
Governments in 1972 and 1977, he finds that an increase in the number of municipalities 
in a standard metropolitan statistical area is associated with a reduction in the growth of 
expenditures per capita.  Eberts and Gronberg (1988) use a larger cross section from 1977 
23
and find that spending falls as the number of general-purpose governmental units increase 
in metropolitan areas.  They find no evidence of a connection, however, at the state level. 
Forbes and Zampelli (1989) and Zax (1989) point out that there will theoretically 
be  greater  mobility  at  the  local  level  simply  because  moving  costs  between  local 
jurisdictions  are  lower  than  moving  costs  between  larger  states.   By comparing  the 
number  of  competing  county governments  in  various  metropolitan  areas,  Forbes  and 
Zampelli  find  evidence  of  increasing  county  budget  size  as  the  number  of  counties 
increases.   These  results  appear  consistent  with  an  inverse  relationship  between 
centralization and government size, however this study does not directly control for local 
government  expenditures.   Using  data  from  1982  and  focusing  on  smaller  local 
governments, Zax finds that as the number of local governments per square mile increase 
within  a  county,  or  the  county  share  of  the  county-local  budget  decreases,  total 
government revenue tends to fall, providing evidence consistent with the decentralization 
hypothesis.  In a study of Canada, Kneebone (1992) finds that decentralization at the 
local level is negatively related to expenditures while decentralization at the provincial 
level is not, and attributes this to Tiebout effects.
In a  time-series  analysis  of  the  U.S.  from 1946-1985,  Marlow (1988)  finds  a 
positive relationship between centralization at the federal level and total government size. 
Joulfaian and Marlow (1990) use similar total  government  expenditure data for cross 
sections in 1981 and 1984.  They find that the level of centralization and the number of 
separate  governments  within  a  state  are  both  inversely  related  to  total  government 
expenditures.  
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Raimondo (1989) disaggregates public expenditures using repeated cross sections 
from 1960,  1970,  and  1980.   He finds  evidence  consistent  with  the  decentralization 
hypothesis  for  aggregated  expenditures  and welfare  expenditures,  and finds  evidence 
partially consistent with the decentralization hypothesis for expenditures on hospitals and 
highways.  He finds evidence contrary to the decentralization hypothesis for expenditures 
on  education,  though  this  is  the  expected  result  according  to  Nelson's  preference 
argument.  Eberts and Gronberg (1990) also disaggregate expenditures, and use different 
measures of local government structure.   They also find evidence consistent with the 
decentralization hypothesis.  In a working paper version,  Eberts and Gronberg (1989) 
also conclude that increased mobility is associated with a general reduction in the size of 
the local public sector as a share of personal income, though the particular relationships 
differ depending on the type of good and the migrating group.
Heil  (1991)  suggested  that  the  observed  positive  relationship  between 
centralization and government size may be mainly due to interjurisdictional competition 
for  mobile  factors.   Because  mobility  is  essentially  restricted  by  national  borders,  a 
relationship between centralization and government would be less obvious in a cross-
section of countries.  He found no evidence of a relationship between centralization and 
government size in a 1985 cross section of countries.  Stein (1999) finds evidence of an 
inverse relationship between centralization and the size of the public sector in a cross 
section of South American countries, and concludes that this may indicate relatively large 
gains from economies from scale.
25
Feld, et al. (2003) examine decentralization using a panel of data from 1980-1998 
from Switzerland.  They find an overall negative relationship between centralization and 
the size of the public sector, though this is tempered by the ability of local governments 
to export taxes through user fees.  They find no evidence that jurisdictional fragmentation 
has an effect on government size, concluding that the overall effect is mainly attributable 
to  competition  between  competing  jurisdictions.  Campbell  (2004)  suggests  that  the 
vertical relationship between municipalities and counties must be considered, and finds 
no  evidence  that  municipal  and  county  expenditures  are  substitutes.   She  finds  that 
decentralization  decreases  municipal  expenditures  but  has  no  effect  on  county 
expenditures,  while  jurisdictional  fragmentation  as  measured  by  the  number  of 
governments  per  capita  reduces  county  expenditures  but  has  no  effect  on  municipal 
expenditures.   In  a  study  using  data  from  China,  Zhu  and  Krug  (2006)  find  that 
decentralization  from the  central  to  the  province  level  is  associated  with  an  overall 
increase in government expenditures, while further decentralization to the local level is 
associated with a decrease in expenditures.  
Grossman  (1989)  and  Grossman  and  West  (1994)  find  a  positive  relationship 
between intergovernmental grants as a share of local revenue and expenditures and find 
evidence of the “collusion hypothesis.”  They conclude that vertical tax collusion reduces 
the level of competition between governments.  Citizens cannot flee, for example, from 
taxes  collected  by a  central  government,  and local  governments  may concede taxing 
authority to a central government in exchange for the ability to increase expenditures. 
Ehdaie  (1994)  uses  international  data  from  1977-1987  and  finds  that  simultaneous 
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decentralization of revenue and expenditure functions is associated with a reduction in 
the  size  of  government.   Shadbegian  (1999)  studies  a  panel  of  US states,  and finds 
evidence  consistent  with  both  the  decentralization  hypothesis  and  the  collusion 
hypothesis.   Lalvani  (2002)  finds  similar  evidence  for  a  panel  of  Indian  states,  also 
finding  that  intergovernmental  transfers  serves  to  reduce  the  relationship  between 
centralization and the size of the public sector.  Jin and Zou (2002) use panel data from 
32 countries to find that revenue decentralization is negatively related to spending.  They 
find no evidence of a relationship between spending and expenditure decentralization.  
Rodden (2003) uses a large panel of international data to study the growth of 
governmental units.  He notes that the budget-share measures of centralization may be 
misleading because certain programs are funded and administered at the local level due to 
a federal mandate, and the level of fiscal autonomy in these countries may be overstated. 
Scandanavian countries, for example, are highly decentralized according to this measure, 
but  have  relatively large public  sectors.   For  this  reason,  he uses  an error-correction 
model with country fixed effects to isolate long-term changes in fiscal autonomy.  He 
finds  that  decentralization  is  correlated  with  a  smaller  public  sector  and  that  this 
relationship depends upon democratic governance and local revenue collection.  While 
local  fiscal  autonomy  is  a  plausible  explanation,  he  notes  that  results  are  mainly 
attributable to  data  from Canada,  Switzerland,  and the U.S.   It  is  possible  that  other 
factors such as racial or linguistic heterogeneity could be relevant.  
Fiva (2006) improves on previous studies by using data that controls for revenues 
over  which  local  governments  have  complete  discretion  (Stegarescu,  2005).   By 
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examining  18  countries  from  1970-2000,  he  finds  that  revenue  decentralization  is 
inversely related while expenditure decentralization is positively related to the size of the 
public  sector.   Prohl  and  Schneider  (2009)  find  that  both  revenue  and  expenditure 
decentralization are negatively related to growth of the public sector, though expenditure 
decentralization  has  a  stronger  association.   In  addition,  they  find  that  local  fiscal 
autonomy and democratic institutions are inversely related to public sector growth.
These types of studies can only document a relationship between some measure of 
centralization or fragmentation and government size.  Hoyt (1995) points out that any 
association between centralization and spending would be expected by various alternative 
theories of tax competition, and these types of studies are unable to differentiate between 
them.  This is further complicated by the possibility that multiple theories are valid, and 
various types of inefficiencies coexist.
A more interesting question is whether tax competition is welfare-enhancing or 
welfare-impeding on net.  However, the concept of overprovision or underprovision is 
complex.  Some individuals will always feel that certain goods and services are over-
provided, even in a purely Pigouvian world.   Similarly,  even when facing Leviathan, 
certain groups will still feel that public provision of some service is too low.  Rodden 
(2003) states that “Leviathan will always be a dangerous beast for some and a figment of 
the  imagination  for  others.”   Any attempt  to  empirically  document  overprovision  or 
underprovision  is  necessarily  a  restatement  of  the  public  goods  problem,  since  the 
optimal provision level must first be established.  
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Demand Estimation
In democratic societies, we assume that the election process produces politicians 
who pursue the interests of voters.  Levels of public provision ultimately emerge from the 
political process through elections.  Some studies have analyzed election outcomes in 
order to extract the preferences of the underlying population.  Kim and Fording (1998, 
2003) match political party platform data to election outcomes to estimate the median 
voter's preferences for a set of western democracies.  This type of study does not examine 
any  deviation  from  party  platforms,  and  therefore  does  not  allow  exploration  of 
preference heterogeneity.  Also, because these type of analyses restrict voter ideology to a 
one-dimensional left-right spectrum, it becomes difficult to disentangle preferences for 
one  type  of  publicly  provided  good  from  another.   For  this  reason,  these  types  of 
estimates are better suited to answer questions of aggregate voter preference for overall 
macroeconomic  policy  than  they  are  to  questions  about  the  optimal  provision  of 
individual publicly-provided goods.  
The analysis  of  election outcomes can be thought  of  as  a  special  case  of  the 
contingent valuation method.  More commonly, this method uses more detailed surveys 
to establish preferences for public provision.  While this method was originally used to 
value environmental goods (Davis, 1963), it has been extended to other publicly-provided 
goods including roads (Hensher and Sullivan, 2003), theaters (Hansen, 1997) and crime 
prevention (Cohen et al, 2004).  
Lyons  and  Lowery  (1989)  and  Teske  et  al.  (1993)  use  this  method  to  elicit 
satisfaction with local government provision of goods and services.  While these studies 
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will be covered in more detail below, individuals who respond to hypothetical questions 
in  surveys  have  little  incentive  to  provide  an  accurate  description  of  their  true 
willingness-to-pay for a  particular  good.   However,  if  survey responses guide policy, 
respondents may begin to engage in strategic behavior.  If individuals perceive that their 
responses may affect their tax liabilities, they will have less incentive to truthfully reveal 
their  preferences  and  may  attempt  to  “free-ride”  on  the  tax  contributions  of  others 
(Wicksell, 1896).
Even  if  strategic  bias  were  eliminated,  and  respondents  did  not  attempt  to 
intentionally mislead survey administrators, contingent valuation methods may still be 
unreliable.   Diamond and Hausman (1994) suggest that survey responses are plagued 
with problems and are useless as a tool to predict demand for publicly-provided goods. 
Of these problems, the most notable is the “embedding effect,” popularized by Kahneman 
and Knetsch (1992).  As an example, when different groups are asked to value “public 
goods,” responses for larger quantities may not be significantly different than responses 
for lower quantities.  All else equal, we should assume that rational individuals would 
place higher values on larger quantities of goods.  When survey responses violate this 
non-satiation assumption, the results become suspicious.  One explanation attributes this 
to  responses  elicited  from disinterested  individuals  with  limited  information.   These 
Individuals may be reporting a perceived moral value of contributing to these goods, 
rather than their  economic valuation of the goods,  and may be answering a different 
question than the survey administrator intended to ask.  
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Other  approaches  attempt  to  value  demand indirectly from observed behavior. 
These are generally known as “revealed preference” methods because individuals reveal 
their preferences for certain goods and services as they engage in certain behaviors.  One, 
referred  to  as  the  Hotelling-Clawson  travel  cost  method,  estimates  demand  for 
recreational goods by observing travel costs incurred by visitors.  Clawson (1958) and 
Trice and Wood (1958) implemented this  method by collecting data  on the distances 
traveled to a particular attraction, then estimating the cost incurred by these individuals. 
As  fewer  visitors  are  willing  to  travel  greater  distances,  a  demand  curve  can  be 
constructed.  
In another  application,  Oates (1969) estimates  demand for  public  provision of 
education by observing relationships between levels of provision and property values.  In 
this study of the New York metro area, he found that property taxes negatively affected 
home values, while education expenditures had a positive effect.  The combined effects 
suggested,  however,  that  a balanced budget increase in  education expenditures would 
have  a  much  smaller  effect  on  property  values.   Anderson  and  Crocker  (1971)  and 
Harrison  and  Rubinfeld  (1978)  also  use  hedonic  housing  price  models  to  estimate 
willingness-to-pay for pollution abatement.  
Goldstein and Pauly (1981) point out that estimates of demand for local publicly-
provided goods that do not control for sorting behavior suffer from “Tiebout bias.”  In an 
empirical  example  of  this,  Brookshire  et  al  (1982)  compare  pollution  values  from a 
hedonic housing price model to those reported in a survey that asked individuals to report 
their willingness to pay for pollution abatement in Los Angeles.  They hypothesize that 
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housing prices  will  report  higher  values  for  pollution  than  survey responses  because 
individuals  who  are  relatively  pollution  averse  will  incur  a  cost  to  move  to  a  low-
pollution  neighborhood,  and  this  will  reduce  housing  prices  in  high  pollution  areas. 
Because pollution-averse individuals now live in a neighborhood with lower pollution, 
they will not be willing to pay as much for a second marginal drop in pollution and they 
will be less likely to express strong opinions.  They find that survey responses report 
lower  values  for  pollution  abatement  than  property  values  do,  providing  evidence 
consistent with their theory and the Tiebout hypothesis.10  In this  case,  the difference 
between revealed preference estimates and contingent valuation estimates gives us an 
idea of the extent of Tiebout bias.  
Rubinfeld et al. (1987) suggest that this type of bias is also present in studies of 
income heterogeneity and private school enrollment.  Communities with greater degrees 
of income heterogeneity are observed to have a larger percentage of students enrolled in 
private schools.  While this could mean that high-income parents are more likely to send 
their children to private school to avoid a negative peer effect, it could also mean that  
communities with large numbers of private schools attract those with higher incomes. 
Bergstrom  et  al.  (1988)  devised  a  method  to  test  for  efficient  public  provision  of 
education that involves the usage of an instrumental variables procedure to correct for 
Tiebout bias.
10 In a meta-analysis of 79 studies, Carson et al (1996) also find that contingent valuation studies report 
lower values than revealed preference studies.
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Migration
Migration studies date back to Ravenstein (1876, 1885, 1889) who examines the 
1861, 1871, and 1881 censuses of the United Kingdom.  He constructs migration patterns 
by comparing an individual's birthplace to their current residence, and observes a number 
of patterns that he refers to as the “laws of migration.”  Within these laws are the ideas 
that  migration  is  more  likely  to  to  occur  over  relatively  short  distances,  with 
technological improvements in transportation, and when there are economic costs and 
opportunities that differ between jurisdictions. 
Barone  (1912)  suggests  that  fiscal  policy  can  affect  migration  decisions,  as 
individuals compare the cost of their tax burden to the cost of migration when deciding 
whether to emigrate from their current jurisdiction.  Sjaastad (1962) provides a formal 
theoretical  basis  for  this  view  by  modeling  migration  as  investment  decisions.   He 
concludes  that  individuals  will  migrate  if  the  net  present  value  of  the  benefits  of 
migration exceed the net present value of the costs, and uses this to explain why younger 
individuals are more likely to migrate.  He suggests that the relationship between these 
costs and benefits depend on, among other things, the “revenue policies of state and local 
governments.”  Todaro (1969) theorized that individuals would consider employment risk 
when considering a move from a rural to urban area.  These ideas sparked numerous 
empirical  studies  that  attempt  to  document  various  predictors  of  migration.11  The 
majority of these are beyond the scope of this study, which focuses specifically on fiscal 
policy as a predictor of migration.
11 For extensive reviews, see Greenwood (1975, 1985, 1993), Greenwood et al (1991), Charney (1993), 
Dowding et al (1994), and Brueckner (2000).
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Adams (1965) studies a panel of U.S. counties from 1957, and uses the percent of 
households that had recently migrated into a jurisdiction as a predictor of demand for 
different types of expenditures.  He finds a positive relationship between in-migration and 
per  capita  expenditures  on  police,  fire,  sanitation,  recreation,  street  maintenance,  and 
general administrative expenditures.  He interprets this as evidence that these services are 
underprovided by the public sector.  While he attributes this to an undervaluation of the 
“preferences and tastes for public services of newcomers,” this is also consistent with a 
strain on existing levels of public provision in growing jurisdictions.  Jurisdictions may 
find it more politically feasible to wait until the tax base grows before increasing the level 
of public provision.  Attempts to do this proactively would place a relatively large burden 
on the existing tax base.  
Cebula, et al (1973) and Cebula (1974) find that high levels of per capita spending 
on welfare programs are associated with relatively high gross immigration of low-income 
minorities over the migration period from 1965-1970.  Though other studies confirm this 
relationship,  these  early  studies  suffer  from data  aggregation  problems.   Cebula  and 
Avery  (1983)  find  no  significant  relationship  from  1970-1975,  and  attribute  this  to 
problems using race as a proxy variable for low-income individuals.
Cebula (1977) finds that migration patterns are endogenously determined with 
education  spending  for  the  same  time  period,  in  that  education  expenditures  attract 
individuals  who are most interested in  public  provision of education,  and these same 
individuals  affect  education  policy when they become residents.   These early studies 
generally focused on one type of expenditure or program.
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Schneider and Logan (1982) estimate the effect of different categories of revenue 
and  expenditure  policies  on  economic  growth.   They use  growth rates  for  particular 
groups as a proxy for migration, and find no evidence that expenditures or tax rates are 
related to growth, though they do find that average tax receipts per capita are positively 
associated with growth of rich households and negatively associated with growth of poor 
households.   In  a  similar  study,  Helms  (1985)  introduces  the  idea  that  taxes  and 
expenditures should be considered jointly to find the net effect on growth.  He finds that 
taxes are negatively associated with growth in general, but some types of taxes can have a 
positive  association  when  used  to  finance  expenditures  on  education,  health  and 
highways.   He also finds  that  taxes used to  finance transfer  payments  are  negatively 
associated with growth.
Sharp (1984) was one of the first studies to use individual-level micro data in a 
migration study.  In this study, the HUD's 1978 quality of urban life survey was used to  
compare the likelihood of  moving to  statements  about  government  in  an open-ended 
question  about  “problems.”   Though  nationally  representative,  relatively  few  usable 
observations were found to be usable from this sample data,  and limited evidence of 
Tiebout sorting was found.  Sharp points out the complexity of migration decisions and 
the difficulty of attributing migration to a single factor.
Later  studies  used  surveys  that  specifically  asked  about  satisfaction  with  the 
public sector and migration.  These studies had the advantage of using data less subject to 
interpretation,  although  samples  were  restricted  to  a  select  few  cities  and  were  not 
nationally  representative.   Lyons  and  Lowery  (1989a,  1989b)  use  micro  data  from 
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telephone surveys to study citizen response to dissatisfaction with tax and expenditure 
policy  at  the  local  level.   They  compare  data  from  Louisville,  KY,  which  was 
decentralized at the time, to that from Lexington, KY, which has a consolidated county-
local  government.   They  find  no  evidence  that  residents  from  Louisville  are  more 
satisfied with the public sector than are residents from Lexington, and contest the idea 
that citizens in decentralized jurisdictions are more satisfied with the public sector.  They 
also find little evidence of Tiebout sorting, and attribute this to high information costs 
about  competing policies.   They conclude that  there are  not  enough individuals  with 
detailed knowledge of the local public sector relative to that in competing jurisdictions to 
promote  efficiency-enhancing  Tiebout  migration.   Further,  in  areas  where  sufficient 
competing jurisdictions exist, those who are likely to migrate due to dissatisfaction with 
the public sector represent a relatively small subset of the population who are likely to 
have less invested (both socially and financially) in their current residence.  
In contrast, Percy and Hawkins (1992) conduct a similar study using survey data 
from  the  Milwaukee  area,  finding  results  consistent  with  the  Tiebout  thesis.   They 
attribute this to MSA-wide data used in their study, as opposed to data from a single 
county in the Lyons and Lowery study as well as unobservable characteristics that differ 
between Milwaukee and Louisville.
Teske et al (1993) suggest that changes are driven more by competition for new 
residents than attempts to retain current residents.  Because of this, a subset of marginal 
individuals can promote efficiency through Tiebout sorting.  They support this view with 
a  survey  of  individuals  from  eastern  Long  Island  used  to  determine  the  level  of 
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information that individuals possess.  They find that overall,  only 21% of individuals 
have  accurate  information  about  local  school  expenditures  relative  to  competing 
jurisdictions.  On the other hand, high-income individuals with children in school are 
more likely to  have accurate  information,  especially if  they are recent  movers  to the 
jurisdiction.  They suggest that policies are more likely to be responsive to the interests of 
these relatively-well-informed incoming individuals.  This idea is supported by Conway 
and Rork (2006), though their study is based on aggregate data.
Other studies use nationally representative public micro samples.  These surveys 
are  broader  in  scope,  and  normally  do  not  ask  individuals  if  they are  satisfied  with 
different specific functions of government.  Studies that rely on this data must infer this 
information from responses to other questions.  While this poses the problem of assuming 
that these responses are related to preferences for government, it avoids the problems that 
result from assuming that individuals are interested in and have information about the 
goods and services in question.  In addition, respondents have less of an incentive to 
intentionally  provide  inaccurate  information,  as  they  are  less  likely  to  perceive  that 
responses  about  migration  could  be  used  to  guide  policy.   Herzog  and  Schlottmann 
(1986)  use  data  from the  1980 Census  to  estimate  the  probability  that  an  individual 
migrated out of an MSA in response to fiscal policy.  They find that education quality and 
recreational  opportunities  reduce  the  probability  that  an  individual  will  leave  the 
jurisdiction,  while  crime  and  taxes  increase  this  probability.   Fox,  Herzog  and 
Schlottmann (1989) confirm this result, but find no evidence that education and welfare 
expenditures  attract  individuals.   They  also  find  that  property  taxes  increase  the 
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probability  that  individuals  will  leave  a  jurisdiction,  and  income  taxes  reduce  the 
probability that individuals will move into a jurisdiction.
Blank  (1988)  uses  micro  data  from  the  1979  Current  Population  Survey  to 
determine the effect that welfare benefits have on locational decisions of female-headed 
households.  She then uses these estimates to simulate the effect of benefit changes in 
different jurisdictions.  Cushing (1993) uses 1980 Census data to examine the impact of 
welfare programs on the metropolitan migration decisions of multiple groups, finding 
support for the hypothesis  that these programs attract low-income and female-headed 
households.
Enchautegui  (1997)  performed  a  similar  study also  using  data  from the  1980 
census.  She compared wage and benefit differentials across states to migration decisions 
to estimate the responsiveness of female migrants to benefit levels.  She found the effects 
of welfare differentials to be larger than that of wage differentials and also found the 
largest effects to be on single mothers and those on public assistance.  Overall effects, 
however, were relatively small,  as a 10% increase in welfare gains corresponds to an 
increase in the probability of migration by approximately 0.2%.
Clark  and  Hunter  (1992)  and  Conway  and  Houtenville  (2001)  used  Census 
aggregate  migration  data  to  examine  characteristics  that  attract  the  elderly,  finding 
evidence that these individuals are attracted by expenditures on health and hospitals and 
repelled by estate taxes and welfare expenditures.
Clark et al.  (1996) use a 1/1000 sample from the 1990 Census to examine the 
determinants  of  elderly  migration  with  individual-level  data.   They find  that  elderly 
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individuals react to fiscal variables in different ways, depending on their age.  The major 
contribution of this article is the introduction of the “difference” model of migration that 
compares  5-year  changes  in  fiscal  variables  to  migration  decisions.   For  those  who 
migrated, 5-year changes represent differences in destination state characteristics from 
characteristics in the state of origin.  Compared to the “push” and “pull” models that 
solely use characteristics of origin and destination states respectively, the “difference” 
method is theoretically superior because it captures the effects of both.
A potential source of bias exists with these types of studies.  Due to transportation 
infrastructure or other factors, areas that have greater opportunities for migration will 
have greater levels of both immigration and emigration regardless of preferences and 
jurisdictional characteristics.  Migrants to and from these areas will be over-represented 
in the data.  
Synthesis
This  study aims  to  make  contributions  to  each  of  these  strands  of  literature. 
Specifically, this study explores the extent to which migration data can be used to answer 
questions  of  optimal  public  provision.   Though  migration  cannot  yield  a  completely 
efficient solution to the public goods problem, migration decisions still provide useful 
information.  Assuming similar levels of tax progressivity, the average individual would 
not be willing to migrate to a jurisdiction with a larger public sector unless they were 
actually willing to pay for additional provision.  
If individuals do “vote with their feet,” then migration outcomes provide some 
indication of what these people are voting for, and preferences that are revealed through 
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migration  outcomes  can  provide  some  indication  of  willingness  to  pay  for  public 
provision.   If  certain  groups  of  individuals  respond  positively  to  balanced  budget 
increases in certain types of expenditures, then this would be consistent with the idea that 
these groups feel that this good is under-provided, and are willing to pay for increases in 
provision.   Conversely,  if  individuals  are  migrating  away  from  increases  in  certain 
expenditures, then this would be consistent with the idea that these individuals feel that 
these expenditures are over-provided.
On the other hand, results  from this study cannot necessarily settle the debate 
between harmful  and beneficial  tax  competition.   This  is  because  some theories  that 
suggest  tax  competition  is  harmful  focus  on  the  idea  that  migrants  who  leave  a 
jurisdiction impose external costs  on those who remain in the initial  jurisdiction,  and 
these external costs are not considered in this study.  If results indicate that individuals 
are  migrating  to  jurisdictions  with  higher  levels  of  public  expenditures,  this  may be 
consistent with some theories of harmful tax competition.  However, it is also possible 
that some individuals will move to jurisdictions with lower levels of public expenditures 
because they feel that the level of provision in their initial jurisdiction is too high, while 
at  the same time still  eroding the tax base in  the initial  jurisdiction.   This would be 
consistent with some models in both camps, and the net welfare effect would be unclear.
Results from this study contribute to the tax competition literature by providing 
estimates of individual responses to changes in fiscal policies.  This is not the first study 
of migration responses to public policy, as most of the studies reviewed in the migration 
section provide some estimates.  However, the majority of these studies are limited in 
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scope or use aggregate data.  If the policy goal is to attract certain types of residents, the 
estimates produced in this study provide a blueprint for the most efficient way to do so.
This study also contributes to the empirical literature that tests for the presence of 
Tiebout migration by providing an explanation for Rhode and Strumpf's (2003) lack of 
evidence of homogenization among jurisdictions as a result of falling transportation and 
information costs.  Coughlin et al (2006) document convergence in fiscal policies across 
US states from 1977-2002.  While certain policies may attract one group of individuals, 
this  study  finds  that  the  same  policies  can  attract  other  groups  as  well.   If 
interjurisdictional differences in fiscal policy are small, then jurisdictions would be less 
likely to become homogenized over time.
Chapter 3 compares migration outcomes to relative changes in fiscal policy to 
generate estimates of willingness-to-pay for changes in fiscal policy.  Clark, Knapp and 
White's  (1996)  difference  model  of  migration  is  combined  with  the  alternative  state 
weighting scheme used in Enchautegui's (1997) study.  This study is larger in scope than 
these  previous  studies,  as  a  larger  dataset  is  used  to  consider  effects  on  the  overall 
population as well as a number of demographic subsamples.   Similar to Helms (1985), a 
wide  range  of  fiscal  policies  are  used  as  explanatory  variables,  though  migration 
outcomes are being modeled instead of economic growth.
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Chapter 3: Fiscal Policy and Migration
Net-migration data from the 2000 Census generally highlights large movements to 
the southern and western states in the US.  One explanation for these movements is that 
strong  regional  economic  growth  provided  more  opportunities  to  potential  migrants. 
Another set of explanations suggest that technological advances such as improvements in 
air conditioning and transportation have also contributed to this outcome.
More recently, Glaeser and Tobio (2007) suggest that the regulatory environment 
in the south promotes a relatively elastic housing supply and in turn, low housing costs, 
which  encourage  migration  to  the  south.   While  these  theories  explain  large  general 
movements, outliers suggest there may be more to the story.  A closer look at the same 
data shows that Louisiana experienced a relatively large net outmigration of residents 
over the 5-year period from 1995-2000 while neighboring states experienced large net 
inmigration.   Despite  favorable amenities,  few individuals are  migrating to  this  state. 
Similarly, and in constrast to surrounding states, Minnesota experienced a relatively large 
net inmigration, despite having a relatively harsh climate.
Graves and Linneman (1979) suggest that state-specific characteristics, such as 
crime rates, can affect migration.   Public policies can affect these characteristics, and 
therefore influence migration.  Academic research has examined and generally confirmed 
the existence of a connection, though the majority of these studies have focused primarily 
on  the  effect  of  one  particular  policy,  and  many  do  not  consider  the  effect  of 
expenditures.   Helms  (1985)  connects  multiple  categories  of  public  expenditures  to 
economic growth in a balanced-budget setting.  This chapter conducts a similar study that 
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connects multiple categories of balanced-budget expenditures to migration decisions.  If 
citizen  mobility  in  response  to  government  behavior  is  the  mechanism  underlying 
intergovernmental  competition,  as  unsatisfied  individuals  move  to  more  favorable 
jurisdictions, then migration decisions may serve as indicators of the level of satisfaction 
with government.  This paper will examine migration responses to fiscal activity for a 
number  of  demographic  groups.   This  information  is  used  to  provide  estimates  of 
revealed preferences for public provision among these groups.
This study examines Tiebout migration across state lines in response to changes in 
fiscal policy.   Tiebout migration is theoretically more likely at the local level,  due to 
lower moving and information costs.  However, because of the centralization of state and 
local governments, state fiscal policies should be relatively more important.  According to 
the Census Bureau, 15.9 percent of the population moved between 1998 and 1999.  While 
the majority (59.3 percent) of these were moves within the same county, 19.8 percent 
were intrastate moves between counties, and 17.6 were interstate moves.  These statistics 
are relatively stable over the years,  with roughly 3 percent of the population moving 
intrastate between counties, and another 3 percent moving interstate in a given year.
In general, the majority of interstate moves are to metropolitan areas, and these 
moves are motivated by something other than fiscal characteristics (e.g.,  employment 
growth).  However, individuals who migrate to a multi-state MSA must choose where to 
reside.  While fiscal characteristics may not explain the majority of migration decisions, 
they are still important on the margin, and the greater availability of data on state level 
migration decisions has driven the choice of states as the geographic level of observation.
43
Theoretical Model and Empirical Specification
The government in jurisdiction  j  chooses a combination of tax and expenditure 
policies in order to maximize a utilitarian social welfare function, which is defined as:
max
 j ,G j
∑
i
V j
i x j
i ,G j , A j  (3.1)
where Vij represents the indirect utility of individual i in jurisdiction j.  Similar to 
Enchautegui  (1997),  Conway  and  Houtenville  (1998)  and  Gale  and  Heath  (2000), 
consumption of private goods is represented by x, public provision is represented by G, 
and A refers  to  a  vector  of  jurisdictional  amenities.   Consumption  of  private  goods 
depends on disposable income, which is a function of wages (wij), taxes (τij), and housing 
prices (hj) in jurisdiction j.
x j
i =x j
i w j
i , j
i , h j (3.2)
where 
∂ x j
i
∂w j
i 0,
∂ x j
i
∂ j
i 0 and 
∂ x j
i
∂ h j
0.   While previous models examined aggregate 
effects, this model examines the effect of different expenditure and tax combinations on 
different  individuals.   Therefore,  G and  τ represent  vectors  of  expenditure  and  tax 
categories respectively.  Earnings, tax rates, and housing prices are considered exogenous 
to the individual, as are public expenditures and amenities in each period.  Wages depend 
on  the  number  of  laborers  in  a  particular  jurisdiction  as  well  as  the  exogenously 
determined level of physical capital.  Housing prices depend on the number of individuals 
in a jurisdiction.  Governments can alter the population in their jurisdiction by attracting 
individuals (or inducing them to leave) with fiscal policy.  The inelasticity of land and 
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physical capital  ultimately constrain the government's ability,  as wages fall  (rise) and 
housing prices rise (fall) as individuals enter (leave) the jurisdiction.  Governments also 
face a balanced budget constraint that requires expenditures to be financed with taxes. 
Individuals  are  not  subject  to  a  balanced  budget  constraint,  as  some  consume  more 
publicly provided goods than they pay for in taxes and vice-versa.
In  a  two-period  model,  individuals  begin  at  equilibrium  in  one  of  48  initial 
jurisdictions at  time  t.   Individuals are assumed to initially be in the jurisdiction that 
provides the highest available level of utility net of moving costs.  Some will have chosen 
this  jurisdiction because the fiscal policies most closely suit  their  preferences.  While 
fiscal policy changes may still benefit these individuals, no other jurisdiction will provide 
a higher level of utility.  Other individuals may realize that they would receive a higher 
level of utility in another jurisdiction, but choose to stay because of high moving costs. 
In both cases, individuals are at equilibrium as they initially have no incentive to move 
from the beginning jurisdiction.  This condition is formally described in equation  (3.3) 
below:
max V 1
t ,. . . ,V j−1
t , V j1
t , . . . , V 48
t −V j
t −C i0  (3.3)
where Ci represents moving costs which differ for each individual i and follow a 
random distribution.  By letting  ΔV=Va-Vj, where  Va=max(V1, …   , Vj-1, Vj+1, …  ,  V48), 
condition (3.3) can be simplified as V t−C i0.
The  assumption  that  individuals  begin  at  equilibrium  may  introduce  some 
Tiebout bias.  Individuals who have already moved prior to the beginning of the observed 
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migration  period may face  different  costs  for  a  second move.   This  may affect  their 
propensity to migrate during the migration period.
Exogenous shocks simultaneously occur in all jurisdictions, causing amenities and 
levels of physical capital (and therefore wages) to change.  In addition, fiscal policies in 
each  jurisdiction  change,  as  governments  attempt  to  increase  aggregate  utility. 
Government policy responses will  exhibit  random variation for several reasons.  One 
source of variation is competition between political groups.  These groups have different 
levels  of  power  across  juridictions  and  may cater  to  a  certain  demographic  or  have 
differing  ideas  about  policies  intended  to  raise  social  welfare.   A second  source  of 
variation may arise  due to legal institutions that limit  policy responses.12 In addition, 
variation in transfers from a higher level of government may can contribute to variation 
in policy response.13
In  response  to  these  changes,  residents  must  then  choose  to  remain  in  their 
original state or migrate to another state.  In period t+1, individuals maximize utility by 
choosing which state to reside in, and will migrate out of jurisdiction j if the following 
condition holds:
max V 1
t1 , . . . , V j−1
t1 ,V j1
t1 , . . . ,V 48
t1−V j
t1−C i0  (3.4)
which simplifies to: V t1−C i0
12 For example, Kentucky's HB44 (1979) places an upper limit on annual increases in revenue collected 
via property tax to a nominal 4% above last year's receipts..
13 For example, states that successfully compete for “Race to the Top” funds will have more fiscal policy 
options than those that do not receive these transfers.
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If individuals were assumed to be living in the utility maximizing state in period t, 
inter-jurisdictional migration will  only occur if changing conditions increase expected 
utility  in  a  different  jurisdiction  enough  to  justify  incurring  moving  costs.   For  this 
reason, fiscal changes in alternative states relative to those in the initial state are the main  
determinants of migration.  In order for an individual to move, both equations (3.3) and 
(3.4) must hold, and the gain as a result of moving to another state must be sufficient to  
offset moving costs.  A necessary condition for this is that changes in at least one of the 
alternative jurisdictions must be more favorable than changes in the initial jurisdiction j. 
That is, ΔVt+1>ΔVt.  
For individuals that did migrate,  ΔVt+1 exceeded  ΔVt.  That is,  Vat+1-Vjt+1>Vat-Vjt. 
Rearranging yields  Vat+1-Vat>Vjt+1-Vjt, which states that the utility change from the fiscal 
policy change in  the  alternative jurisdiction  exceeded the  utility change in  the  initial 
jurisdiction j.  Specifically, 
∂V
∂ A
 Aa
∂V
∂G
Ga
∂V
∂
a
∂V
∂P
 Pa 
∂V
∂ A
 A j
∂V
∂G
G j
∂V
∂
 j
∂V
∂P
⋅ P j  (3.5)
where ΔAa represents the change in amenities in the alternative jurisdiction.  This can be 
rewritten as
∂V
∂ A  Aa− A j 
∂V
∂G G a−G j 
∂V
∂
a− j 
∂V
∂P Pa− P j  0  (3.6)
For migrants, equation (3.6) is assumed to hold.  By observing migration patterns 
in  response to  changes  in  the state  of origin relative to  changes  in  alternative states, 
utility-increasing changes in fiscal policy can be observed.  If individuals are observed to 
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migrate in response to relative balanced-budget increases in education, then this implies 
positive  marginal  utility  with  respect  to  education.   Ceteris  paribus,  if  education 
expenditures  increase  in  the  alternative  jurisdiction  relative  to  jurisdiction  j,  then  an 
individual living in jurisdiction j who desires greater public provision of education will 
move to the alternative jurisdiction if the increase in utility exceeds the moving costs.
The probability that a mobile individual will migrate in period  t+1 is formally 
described by the following equations:
Pr  X =01 X i2T j3G j4 A j  (3.7)
T j=a
t1−a
t − j
t1− j
t   (3.8)
G j=g a
t1−g a
t −g j
t1−g j
t   (3.9)
A j=aa
t1−aa
t −a j
t1−a j
t   (3.10)
where Xi is a vector of demographic characteristics.  ΔTj is a vector of weighted changes 
in alternative state taxes, relative to state of origin,  ΔGj is a vector of similarly weighted 
relative changes in expenditures, and  ΔAj is a vector of weighted relative changes in 
amenities.  Amenities include jurisdictional characteristics that may affect moving costs 
(Berger  and Blomquist,1992)  as  well  as  measures  of  the quality of  public  provision. 
These changes will be positive if increases in alternative states exceed increases in state j. 
The vectors of fiscal variables τj, gj, and aj, represent values from jurisdiction j, while τa, 
ga, and aa are weighted averages of values from potential destination states:14
14 An alternative specification assigns τa , ga , and aa  values from actual destination states for migrants, and 
is used in models (1) and (2) below.  
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ga
t = j
t  (3.11)
a
t = j
t  (3.12)
aa
t = j
t  (3.13)
Γt,  Θt,  and  Φt are matrices containing measures of expenditures, taxes, and amenities 
respectively for each state at time t, and Ωj is a weighting matrix specific to jurisdiction j.
Five-year changes in the state of origin are compared to changes in alternative 
states to create a measure of relative fiscal policy changes.  Relative changes are the 
change during the migration period in state levels of taxes and expenditures subtracted 
from weighted nationwide average changes in state taxes and expenditures.  Weighted 
nationwide averages differ for each state, as alternative states weighted differently for 
each state.  The weighting matrix is similar to that used by Enchautegui (1997) and the 
migration “flow” matrix used by Conway and Rork (2004).  This weighting scheme uses 
the actual number of migrants to destination states to create  weights.  Fiscal values for 
alternative states are weighted by migrants to each alternative state as a fraction of total 
outmigration from the home state  j.   Figure 3.1 illustrates this  calculation.   Potential 
alternative states containing no immigrants originating from jurisdiction j are assigned a 
weight of zero.  Weighted values of each alternative state are summed to then generate τa , 
ga,  and  aa,  which represent taxes,  public  provision,  and amenities,  respectively.   This 
“flow”  method  has  the  advantage  of  making  no  assumptions  about  determinants  of 
migration or moving costs, as it  uses actual decisions made by individuals to predict 
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alternatives.   For  migrants,  actual  values  for  destination  states  are  used  in  one 
specification while predicted values are used in another specification.
Figure 3.1: Migration Weights
4 Out-Migrants 2 Out-Migrants
3 Out-Migrants
In this example, the tax increase in the theoretical next-best alternative state would be:
4⋅2%2⋅5%−3⋅3%
423
= 2%
These specifications allow examination of fiscal changes in other states relative to 
changes in the state of origin, and can be used to determine which changes are likely to 
induce migration.  These models are estimated using a logit procedure.  Marginal effects 
are calculated according to Anderson and Newell (2003).
Sonstelie and Portney (1978) suggest that municipalities can alter property values 
with public provision and Brueckner (1982) describes a test that can be used to determine 
provision levels that maximize property values.  By constructing a relationship between 
fiscal  policy  and  the  probability  of  attracting  mobile  individuals,  this  idea  can  be 
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modified to create a test for optimal provision.  In order to determine what fiscal policies 
will  maximize  the  probability  that  individuals  will  locate  in  a  given  jurisdiction,  a 
quadratic can be estimated.  
Pr  X =01T j2T j
23G j4G j
2  (3.14)
12⋅2T j  (3.15)
32⋅4G j  (3.16)
Equation (3.14) will produce estimates of the effects on migration for a marginal 
change in state characteristics.  Equations (3.15) and (3.16) represent the marginal effect 
of  taxes  and  public  provision,  respectively.   Figure  3.2 shows  this  relationship 
graphically.  P(Q) represents the probability that a mobile individual will reside in the 
jurisdiction  at  the  end  of  the  migration  period,  either  because  they  decided  not  to 
emigrate, or they immigrated from another jurisdiction.  Q represents balanced budget 
public provision, since provision must be financed with taxes.  Q represents g = τ for a 
particular jurisdiction.  
In reality, political rent and bureaucratic inefficiencies cause the total amount of τ 
to exceed the value of g provided, and individuals will prefer a lower level of provision 
than they would in a purely Pigouvian world with no inefficiencies.  Q* represents the 
optimal  quantity  of  public  provision  when  government  inefficiencies  are  considered, 
while QP represents that in a Pigouvian world.  This study assumes that any inefficiencies 
remain constant  and similar  across jurisdictions  throughout  the migration period,  and 
therefore have no bearing on individual migration decisions.
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At extreme levels of Q, individuals will find the jurisdiction undesirable, either 
due to low levels of provision or high taxes.  Q* represents the level of Q that maximizes  
the probability of attracting mobile residents.  This also represents the optimal level of Q, 
or “bliss point” according to mobile individuals.  This relationship can be modeled with a 
quadratic.  At levels near Q*, marginal changes in Q will have little effect on P(Q).  At 
levels above (below) Q*, marginal increases will decrease (increase) P(Q).  By observing 
the changes in P(Q) associated with a given change in Q, we can observe the slope of 
P(Q) for a particular value of Q.  Using this information, Q* would be the level of Q for 
which the slope would be zero for a marginal change in Q.  
Figure 3.2: Migration and Public Provision
P(Q)
    Q*         QP Q
While Figure 3.2 represents the aggregation of the migration response curves for 
all individuals in an economy, the relationship between P(Q) and Q is different for every 
subgroup.  Figure 3.3 shows this  relationship for an economy with 2 subgroups.  QH 
52
represents the quantity of public provision that coincides with the bliss point for high-
income individuals,  while  QL represents  the  quantity  that  coincides  with  low-income 
individuals.   When individuals  are  aggregated,  the  economy-wide migration response 
curve  emerges.   In  general,  fiscal  policy may have a  greater  effect  on the migration 
decisions of high income individuals simply because they are more mobile to begin with. 
If this is true, then the provision of QH will have a greater effect on the probability of 
migration for high-income individuals than the provision of QL will have on low-income 
individuals.  
Figure 3.3: Disaggregated Migration and Public Provision
        P(Q)
 High Income Migrants
      Low Income Migrants
           QH       Q*       QL         Q
If high-income individuals do prefer less public provision, then provision levels 
below Q* will tend to attract a higher percentage of these individuals, ceteris paribus.  In 
certain cases this can change the demographic makeup of the population.  At the most 
extreme example  with  perfect  mobility,  provision  levels  would  have  a  homogenizing 
effect  on  the  population  (Tiebout,  1956).   In  the  absence  of  perfect  mobility,  the 
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population may remain heterogeneous  (Rhode and Strumpf, 2003).  If QH is provided, 
this will maximize the probability that mobile high-income individuals will locate in the 
jurisdiction in question.  This probability is represented by PH(QH).  PL(QH) represents the 
probability that a low-income individual will locate in the jurisdiction in question under 
QH.  Marginal increases from QH would be expected to increase the probability that low-
income individuals will locate in the jurisdiction.  Through disaggregation, estimates will 
produce preferred levels of provision for different subgroups. 
In aggregate studies, the number of individuals that migrate to a certain state will 
affect the fiscal policies of that state.  If fiscal policy can attract migrants, but migrants 
also affect fiscal policy, estimates will suffer from endogeneity bias.  Because this study 
uses micro data, endogeneity is assumed to not be present.  Individuals do not take into 
consideration  the  effect  of  their  migration  decision  on  the  fiscal  policies  of  their 
destination state.  Because migrants represent a minority of the overall population, it is 
assumed that their decisions will have a relatively small effect on overall fiscal policies. 
To the extent that policy change can be driven by mobile individuals, an aggregation 
issue may still exist.
Data
As is common practice in migration studies, the analysis is restricted to the 48 
contiguous U.S. States.  State-level fiscal data from 1985-1990 and 1995-2000 are taken 
from the Census Bureau.  Measures of various taxes collected from own sources and 
expenditures  are  converted  to  dollars  per  $1000  of  personal  income and  dollars  per 
capita.  These are then used to construct data on fiscal changes over the two migration 
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periods.  Table 3.1 provides the average initial values of these fiscal measures for these 
48 states.  
These measures represent average levels of taxes and expenditures, and may not 
represent actual levels experienced by a particular individual.  While individual-level tax 
estimates are available through NBER's Taxsim, it is more difficult to obtain accurate 
individual-level estimates of burdens for other tax instruments.  For this reason, estimates 
of individual responses created from this data represent responses to average changes in 
taxes rather than responses to changes in taxes for a particular subgroup.
Expenditures exceed state tax receipts since a large degree of expenditures are 
financed with debt or federal funds.  If the sum of changes in expenditures is equal to the 
sum of changes in revenues,   equations  (3.7) and  (3.14) will be unidentified.  For this 
reason, intergovernmental transfers are excluded as a source of revenue.  Average 5 year 
changes are provided in Table 3.2.  
On  average,  real  per  capita  total  taxes  rose  by  $511.59,  from  $1,768.73  to 
$2,280.32,  an increase of  29 percent.   Similarly,  expenditures  rose by $995.05, from 
$3,691.83 to $4,686.88, an increase of 27 percent.  Relative changes are created from 
these original fiscal changes by comparing the changes in the initial state to the changes 
in  the  “next  best”  state.   Fiscal  policy changes  in  a  theoretical  “next-best”  state  are 
computed using the weighting method discussed in the previous section.  For migrants, 
relative changes are constructed using two different methods.  The first method, used by 
Enchautegui (1997), compares changes in the initial state to changes in actual destination 
states, while the second method assigns the same imputed values as with nonmigrants.   
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Individual-level  data  was  taken  from  the  decennial  census.   Demographic 
information  includes  age,  race,  education,  income,  and  number  and  age  of  children. 
Table 3.3 provides summary demographic statistics by education and household income.  
Data  on  migration  is  also  taken  from the  decennial  census,  and  results  from 
geographic location at the time of the census and a question asking individuals where 
they lived 5 years ago.  Those who lived in a different state are classified as migrants, 
while those in the same state are considered non-migrants.    Kaplan and Schulhofer-
Wohl (2010) find that  in 2000,  previous  state  locations  were imputed by the Census 
Bureau for individuals who did not respond to questions in the Current Population Survey 
about migration.  This process was more likely to assign alternative previous states to 
those who did not migrate across state lines than to assign the same previous state to non-
respondents who actually did.  Because of this, the data tends to overstate the number of 
individuals who migrated.  They find that from 1999-2005, the interstate migration rate 
for the 10 to 12 percent of CPS respondents with imputed data is 3 to 5 times greater than 
that of those with actual data.  A lower 2 percent of the data in the 2000 decennial census 
was imputed, and this bias will therefore be less prevalent in the decennial census (Nash, 
2001).  However, imputations that do exist in the decennial census could cause this study 
to overstate the propensity of individuals to migrate in response to fiscal policy, as this 
analysis relies heavily on migrant data.  
Table  3.4 shows  the  average  5-year  real  changes  experienced  by individuals, 
broken down by migrant status, education, and age.  Ceteris paribus, younger individuals 
and those with more years of education tend to be more likely to migrate.  In all cases, 
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migrants  experienced  smaller  increases  in  taxes  and  expenditures  than  nonmigrants. 
While  this  is  consistent  with the idea that  migrants  are  moving away from balanced 
budget fiscal activity, this is also consistent with the idea that migrants are moving to 
dense areas that experience economies of scale in public provision.  Increases per capita 
along with decreases as a share of personal income suggest that, for migrants, personal 
income increased at a faster rate than taxes and expenditures.  
In order to control for the quality of public provision, per capita violent crimes 
data is taken from the Bureau of Justice Statistics.  Average college entrance exam scores 
by state are taken from ACT to be used as a proxy for school effectiveness.  Average 
energy costs by state are taken from the Energy Information Administration.
Results
Table 3.5 presents marginal effects for the logit models of equation (3.14) using 
overall taxes and expenditures, per capital fiscal measures and the full sample.  Models 
(1) and (2) use imputed fiscal measures for alternative states for nonmigrants.  Actual 
alternative state values are used for migrants.  Model (2) introduces quadratic terms for 
taxes and expenditures.  Models (3) and (4) are analogous, but use imputed values for 
alternative states for all individuals.  In general, taxes repel individuals and expenditures 
attract individuals.  For models (1) and (3), Wald tests reject the hypothesis that the net 
effect of taxes and expenditures is zero with a confidence level in excess of 99%.  As the 
effects of taxes are larger in magnitude than the effects of expenditures, and the net effect 
of additional fiscal activity is to reduce the probability that an individual will locate in a 
particular jurisdiction.  This suggests that mobile individuals are choosing to locate in 
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areas where fiscal government is growing at a slower rate.  A $1000 per capita increase in 
expenditures  financed  with  state  or  local  taxes  would  reduce  the  probability  that  an 
individual will locate in the jurisdiction by 0.58 percent in model (1), and 2.29 percent in 
model (3).
The quadratic specification in models (2) and (4) can be used to find estimates of 
critical points for relative changes in taxes and expenditures.  In model (2), the critical 
point for tax changes is $0.65.  In model (4), the critical tax change is -$1.70.  The critical 
expenditure change is $0.48 in model (2) and $1.30 in model (4).  These estimates may 
be of questionable use.  Theoretically, all these critical points should represent maxima, 
however, only relative taxes for model (4) represents a maxima.  In the other cases the 
estimated coefficients on the quadratic terms are positive, and the critical points derived 
from these estimates represent minima.  The models in these cases are fitting quadratics 
that are convex with respect to the origin, suggesting that the data does not follow the 
shape predicted in  Figure 3.2.  For the ranges of fiscal variables in the data, migration 
responses could follow a shape similar to that of high income individuals at a high level 
of public provision shown in Figure 3.3.  In other words, over the range of fiscal changes 
in the data, migration responses could be convex with respect to the origin because we 
are in the tail of the normal distribution.
Another  explanation  is  that  groups  may  be  polarized  politically  within 
demographically homogeneous groups.  There may be considerable divergence between 
Democrats and Republicans, for example, within a relatively homogeneous community. 
Some may care more about increasing expenditures while others may care more about 
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reducing  taxes.   This  could  generate  a  situation  highlighted  by  Alesina,  Baqir  and 
Easterly (1999), where the average individual's preference is, on average, considerably 
different than that of the “median voter,” though policies are still dictated by the median 
voter.  In these cases, the data points may be following more extreme versions of the 
subgroup migration response curves shown in  Figure 3.3.  This is illustrated below in 
Figure 3.4.  In this case, a median level of Q is set as a compromise between low levels of 
provision  and  high  levels  of  provision  that  would  be  preferred  by  one  of  the  two 
subgroups.   This  median  level  is  not  considered  optimal  by  most  individuals. 
Consequently, marginal changes will attract one group but repel the other.  A marginal 
increase from Q* would repel some individuals who desire lower levels of provision, but 
may attract substantially more individuals who desire higher levels of provision, and vice 
versa.  Q* may actually appear to minimize the probability that all individuals locate in 
the jurisdiction.  This probability, which is the sum of the probability curves for both 
groups, is represented by the dotted line in Figure 3.4.  If we never empirically observe 
Q* falling below QL or above QH, then we might expect a quadratic model to fit a convex 
curve.   However,  even when relatively small  subsamples  are  considered in  quadratic 
models, minima persist.  
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Figure 3.4: Within-Group Polarization
           P(Q)
        QL Q*   QH
  Other explanations question the existence of Tiebout migration at the state level. 
Scully (1991) documents convergence in fiscal policy between states in the US through 
1986.  This convergence would reduce the benefits available to any potential migrant, and 
is used to explain why Tiebout migration would be less likely as a result.  However, states 
may still differ considerably in their mix of taxes and expenditures.  
Another  explanation  suggests  that  Tiebout  migration  is  less  likely  to  exist  in 
response to aggregated fiscal policies.  To illustrate this point,  Table 3.6 presents the 
standard deviation for each fiscal measure for each of the states.  With the exception of 
elementary education,  disaggregated tax and expenditure categories have considerably 
greater variation than aggregate categories.  Those of us who return from the grocery 
store are more likely to have paid a similar amount for our purchases than we are to have 
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purchased a similar basket of goods.  In the same way, individuals are more likely to 
prefer different types of public provision than they are to prefer different expenditure 
levels.   Consequently,  it  may be  more difficult  to  observe Tiebout-style  migration in 
response to aggregate expenditures than in response to individual expenditures.
Table 3.7 presents estimates using fiscal measures as a share of every $1000 in 
personal income.  Models (5) and (6) use actual values for migrants, while models (7) 
and (8) impute values for migrants.  The income share models differ from the per capita 
models  in  that  they  suggest  that  individuals  are  migrating  toward  balanced  budget 
increases  in  provision.   Model  (5)  suggests  a  $1  increase  in  expenditures  financed 
through additional taxes will  increase the probability that an individual locates in the 
jurisdiction by 0.097 percent, while model (7) suggests only 0.009 percent.  Model (6) 
fits a quadratic, and suggests critical relative decreases of $0.34 and $2.20 on taxes and 
expenditures respectively.  Model (8) also fits a quadratic, and suggests a decrease $6.00 
for every $1000 of personal income in expenditures will  maximize the probability of 
location in a jurisdiction at the end of the migration period.  Model (8) fits a convex 
quadratic for taxes and suggests that a decrease of $6.25 will minimize the probability of 
location in a jurisdiction.  These quadratic estimates would also be subject to the caveats 
discussed above.
The per capita measures are common in the literature, but can be criticized as the 
cost of living varies across jurisdictions.  Expenditures, while nominally greater in one 
jurisdiction, may represent a lower level of public provision.  Measures as a share of 
personal income may overcome this limitation but may be subject to other weaknesses. 
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Because many of the goods in question are at least partially nonrival, relatively large 
jurisdictions may realize significant economies of scale.  If states with larger tax bases 
can take advantage of economies of scale, expenditures as a share of personal income 
may be lower than in a competing state even if the actual level of provision is higher.
A third specification uses per capita measures of expenditures in combination with 
taxes as a share of personal income.  The intuition is that individuals care about their tax 
liabilities in proportion to their income, but do not consume publicly-provided goods in 
proportion to their income.  Estimates using this specification are also shown in  Table
3.7.  The marginal impact of balanced budget fiscal activity was calculated at the mean 
income for all individuals.  In a quasi-R2, the estimated coefficients from this model have 
a predictive ability of somewhere between 2.59 and 6.33 percent greater than the constant 
term alone (Shtatland et al,2000).
Table 3.8 provides results using data from the 1990 census for comparison.  The 
linear models produce evidence that individuals are moving away from taxes and towards 
expenditures.  On net, individuals are moving towards balanced budget increases in fiscal 
activity.  All four quadratic models in Table 3.8 fit convex functions, suggesting that the 
critical tax increases and expenditure decreases appear to minimize the probability that 
individuals will locate in a jurisdiction.
Table 3.9 reports income and tax coefficients for models (1) through (8) estimated 
using a restricted sample that excludes individuals nearing retirement age.  Results are 
generally similar, with the exception of model (1) which suggests the relative balanced 
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budget increases in fiscal activity is positively associated with locational decisions.  In 
general, the imputed data provides smaller estimates of the effect of expenditures.
Table 3.10 presents the 2000 and 1990 results of linear models estimated with 
disaggregated taxes and expenditures.  Alternative state data is imputed for all individuals 
in these models.  These models allow the marginal effect of a balanced budget increase in 
specific types of expenditures to be calculated.   New expenditures are assumed to be 
financed using different  tax instruments in  proportion to  their  original  distribution as 
shown in Table 3.1.
With the exception of corporate income taxes in the 1985-1990 migration period 
and estate taxes for the 1995-2000 period, these models generate negative coefficients for 
all taxes.  Though the coefficient on estate taxes appears large, a $1 increase would more 
than double estate taxes from the 1995 level of .73 for every $1,000 of personal income, 
while a $1 increase in other taxes would be relatively small.  
In general, education expenditures are positively related to migration decisions, 
while expenditures in other categories are negatively related.  This is consistent with the 
conclusions of Evans and Karras (1994), who find that public expenditures on education 
are productive and contribute to economic growth, but other expenditures do not.  For the 
1990  Census,  welfare  expenditures  are  positively  related  and  higher  education 
expenditures are negatively related to migration decisions.   
It seems counterintuitive that individuals would migrate away from increases in 
safety,  highway,  and  utility  spending,  given  the  theoretical  idea  and  empirical 
confirmation in Table 3.7 that individuals are attracted by public provision.  This may be 
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attributable to characteristics of specific types of provision and unobservables.  Spending 
on  public  safety  programs  is  valued  in  order  to  protect  individuals  from  crime,  a 
characteristic  that  would  tend  to  drive  away mobile  individuals,  and  for  this  reason 
violent  crime is  included in the model  as  a control  variable.   Beyond crime control,  
however, police and corrections services are of questionable value.  Individuals may be 
migrating away from areas with relatively large public safety programs but relatively 
little  crime.   Additional  expenditures  in  this  case  would  be  relatively  ineffective, 
compared to areas with high crime and low police expenditures.
Ceteris  paribus,  individuals  should  prefer  additional  spending  on  highways, 
though  individuals  appear  to  migrate  away  from  it.   If  spending  on  roads  follows 
disrepair,  traffic congestion and need for new construction,  a measure of this  type of 
spending may be a proxy for poor transportation infrastructure.
Certain types of provision, such as public utilities are commonly privatized.  In 
these  cases,  public  spending  on  these  programs  will  fall  dramatically,  though  the 
programs  themselves  remain  in  place.   If  inefficiencies  provided  incentives  for 
privatization, which in fact resulted in more efficient provision, then  the public would be 
more satisfied with the program, even though public spending on the program fell.  This 
may also be the case with highways, as toll roads in some states are privatized.
Table 3.11 presents the marginal effect of balanced budget changes for a variety of 
demographic subsamples.  Results are provided for subsamples in order to examine the 
interaction  effects  of  income,  age  and  education.   These  subsamples  demonstrate 
considerable heterogeneity in willingness to pay for public provision.  Most surprising is 
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the negative sign on balanced budget increases in welfare expenditures for low income 
individuals.   Results  are  similar  for  single-female-headed  households  at  the  bottom 
quintile of the income distribution, a group that has traditionally had a strong empirical 
link with welfare migration.  These results require explanation.
When taxes are not considered, the marginal effect of relative changes in welfare 
expenditures is positive for these individuals.  This suggests that these balanced-budget 
effects are being driven by individual responses to taxes.  Low-income individuals have 
different tax burdens than high-income individuals and are likely to pay the majority of 
their  taxes  through  different  instruments.   Low-income  individuals,  for  example,  are 
likely to pay less through property and individual income taxes than are high-income 
individuals.  In addition, they are not likely to bear the full burden of additional welfare  
expenditures with additional taxes.  Therefore, these balanced-budget results should be 
interpreted  as  the  average  individual's  willingness-to-pay  for  additional  quantities  of 
public  provision,  and  do  not  conflict  with  previous  empirical  studies  that  document 
welfare migration.  Low-income individuals may not be “willing to pay” for additional 
quantities of welfare expenditures,  though they may still desire additional quantities and 
may  even  be  willing  to  engage  in  welfare  migration,  as  evidenced  by  the  positive 
coefficients  on  welfare  expenditures.   In  both  cases,  results  indicate  a  negative 
willingness-to-pay for all types of public provision.
Another puzzling result is the positive sign on balanced budget expenditures on 
welfare and migration for the top income quintile.  As would be expected,  there is a 
negative  relationship  between  migration  outcomes  and  welfare  expenditures  for  this 
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group when taxes are not considered.  Therefore, this result is driven solely by positive 
coefficients on some of the tax variables.  Only selective sales and corporate income 
taxes generate negative coefficients for this group.  As this group is more likely to receive 
income from investments, they may prefer certain forms of taxes because the burden is 
primarily borne by others.  The relatively large coefficients on sales taxes may be positive 
because sales taxes are thought to be more regressive, and these taxes are less likely to be 
borne  primarily  by  high-income  individuals.   Another  explanation  is  that  these  tax 
measures  may be  correlated with  expenditure  categories  that  high-income individuals 
have strong preferences for.  For example, relative changes in property taxes as a share of 
personal income have a correlation with relative changes in expenditures on elementary 
education of 0.36.  Relative changes in individual income taxes have a correlation with 
expenditures on higher education of 0.31. High income individuals may in fact dislike 
taxes, but may value expenditures on education more.  If this is the case, the coefficients 
on  property  and  income  taxes  will  be  upwardly  biased,  while  the  coefficients  on 
education will be downwardly biased.  However, these two biases will tend to cancel 
each  other  out  when balanced  budget  changes  are  considered.   These  two examples 
highlight the problem of examining individual group responses to aggregate tax changes. 
Single-female-headed households in the bottom 20% if the income distribution do 
not  appear to  be unsatisfied with the level  of spending on safety programs including 
police, fire, and corrections.  These results differ from those of the full sample, which 
migrate away from these expenditures.  Perhaps these individuals are more likely to use 
these  services  as  they are  more  likely to  live  in  low-income neighborhoods  that  are 
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inherently  more  dangerous.   On  the  other  hand,  income  constraints  make  these 
individuals less likely to migrate, and they may be unable to escape from states with 
increasing crime rates and increasing expenditures on these programs.
Policy  makers  may  be  most  interested  in  attracting  young  college-educated 
individuals.   Estimates  suggest  that  balanced-budget  expenditures  on  elementary and 
secondary  education  have  the  strongest  positive  relationship  with  migration  for  this 
group.  Expenditures on health programs have a smaller positive relationship, while other 
expenditures have a negative relationship.  
The  final  four  columns  in  Table  3.11 provide  estimates  of  the  elasticity  of 
migration  with  respect  to  increases  in  fiscal  categories  broken  down by educational 
attainment.   Individuals  without  a  high-school  diploma  are  less  likely  to  migrate  in 
response to increases in expenditures on higher education.  Similarly, individuals with a 
high-school diploma but no college are likely to migrate away from increases in all fiscal 
categories.  Both of these results may partially be driven by the fact that these individuals  
are unlikely to bear the full burden of any increases in taxes, and should be interpreted as 
their willingness-to-pay for public provision, rather than their political preferences for 
public provision.  Those with some, but less than 4 years of college are migrating toward 
balanced-budget increases in education expenditures.  Interestingly,  those with college 
degrees seem willing to pay for increases in multiple types of expenditures, including 
education, safety, and health.
Because different groups have different responses to changes in fiscal policies, 
any changes to fiscal policy will have distributional implications.  With the exception of 
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spending on higher education,  fiscal policy changes are  unlikely to attract  one group 
while repelling another.  In most cases, all individuals would be attracted (or repelled) by 
the same fiscal changes, but at different rates.  These fiscal changes can have a larger 
effect on individuals from a particular group.  
Table 3.15 simulates the impact on the population of the average state of a $1 
increase in each expenditure category financed with taxes.  The data used to produce 
these estimates is from a 1 in 20 sample of the underlying population, and results were 
multiplied  by 20 to  produce simulated  impacts  on the  underlying  population.   These 
estimates use the mixed specification, and assume that individuals with larger incomes 
will bear a larger share of the tax burden.  Simulated impacts are calculated for various 
demographic  subcategories,  including  education,  age,  and  income.   In  most  cases, 
education expenditures have a positive 5-year impact on population, while expenditures 
in other categories tend to have a negative impact on population.  Expenditures on higher 
education tend to have a negative impact on the population with a high school diploma or 
less education, as well as a negative impact on the population in the lower half of the 
income  distribution.   These  same  expenditures  on  higher  education  tend  to  have  a 
positive impact on young individuals, those in the top half of the income distribution and 
those with some college experience.  
Higher education expenditures may in some cases attract those who wish to raise 
their relatively low levels of education.  Individuals respond to the Census survey with 
their income and education levels at the end of the migration period, and some will have 
had lower levels of income and education at the beginning of the migration period.  In 
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some  cases,  individuals  will  have  been  attracted  by  states  with  higher  education 
expenditures that provide greater opportunities for individuals wishing to increase their 
level of education.
Given  that  there  are  171,421,060  individuals  from  the  48  continental  states 
represented in this study, there are approximately 3,571,272 individuals in the average 
state.   A $1 relative increase in expenditures per capita would therefore equate to an 
annual increase of $3,571,272 in fiscal activity.   Estimates of migration responses for 
various  demographic  subgroups  are  presented  in  Table  3.12.   These  estimates  are 
produced  using  the  number  of  individuals  who actually  moved  during  the  migration 
period as a base.  A $1 increase in higher education expenditures per capita would attract 
approximately 98 individuals to the average state over 5 years.  In this case, the annual 
cost  to  attract  one  of  these  individuals  with  higher  education  expenditures  would  be 
approximately $36,441.55.
On  the  other  hand,  a  $1  relative  decrease  (i.e.,  an  annual  reduction  in  fiscal 
activity of $3,571,272) in expenditures per capita on police, fire, and corrections would 
attract  approximately 193 individuals  in  over  years.   In  this  case,  approximately one 
individual  would  be  attracted  for  each  $18,504.00  annual  reduction  in  expenditures. 
While this policy may increase the overall population, it may not be desirable as it also 
slightly decreases the population of college-educated individuals and those in  the top 
income decile.   Reductions  in  other  programs,  such as  welfare and utilities,  seem to 
attract all individuals, but require larger annual reductions of $62,653.89 and $21,007.48 
respectively, to attract one individual.
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The  estimates  in  Table  3.12 represent  the  average  state,  though  there  can  be 
considerable variation among states.  For example, between 1995 and 2000, Florida was 
more likely to attract individuals of retirement age, while Nevada was more likely to 
attract  young,  single,  college  educated  individuals.   It  is  interesting  to  note  that 
individuals of retirement age do not appear to be affected by fiscal characteristics, though 
a relatively large number are migrating to Florida.  Many of these retired individuals are 
likely migrating in search of unique amenities, and fiscal characteristics have relatively 
little impact on their choices.  
Tables 3.13, 3.14, and 3.15 provide estimates for Florida, Nevada, and Kentucky 
respectively.   Simulation estimates suggest that individuals can be attracted to Florida 
with annual increases in higher education expenditures of $27,556.77, while Nevada can 
attract individuals for $15,258.19.  Because individuals are more likely to travel to these 
states, marginal individuals can be attracted by these states with relatively low levels of 
fiscal policy changes.  On the other hand, individuals are less likely to travel to other 
states.  For example, Kentucky would have to spend approximately $40,229.06 in higher 
education expenditures in order to attract or retain a mobile individual.
If individuals can be attracted with fiscal policy, then fiscal policy can also affect 
the tax base in a jurisdiction.  According to the Tax Foundation, the average state resident 
in Florida, Nevada, and Kentucky paid $1,846, $1,423, and $1,183 respectively in state 
taxes in 2000.  While migrants are more likely to be high-income individuals who pay 
higher than average taxes, it seems unlikely that tax receipts from these individuals would 
be large enough to offset the cost to attract any of them with fiscal policy.
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Conclusion
This chapter uses migration decisions to create revealed preference estimates of 
willingness to pay for public provision.  In general, high-income individuals and those 
with  a  college  education  are  more  likely  to  be  willing  to  pay for  public  provision. 
Specifically, these individuals appear to be willing to pay for increases in expenditures on 
education, and perhaps to a lesser extent, expenditures on healthcare.  Most individuals 
appear to be satisfied with the current level of spending on utilities, though those with a 
college education seem to migrate away from it.  This may be because they are migrating 
into areas that are privatizing these functions.  No one appears to be willing to pay for the 
provision of highways.  Expenditures on highways appear to have a positive benefit only 
to low income individuals with less than a high school education.  Perhaps high-income 
individuals are migrating to areas with developed transportation infrastructures.  These 
areas may benefit from economies of scale and may be less likely to report an increase in 
their per capita expenditures on roads.  
Individuals are attracted to decreases in welfare spending.  This also includes low-
income individuals who are more likely to benefit from such programs.  While this may 
seem  counterintuitive,  this  result  does  not  necessarily  suggest  that  all  low-income 
individuals demand reductions in these programs, since there may be some unobservable 
difference between low-income individuals who migrate and low-income individuals who 
do not.  However, this does suggest that welfare migration is not a significant problem, 
and should not be used as a justification to reduce welfare spending and engage in a race-
to-the-bottom with other states.  
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According to these results, states that wish to attract (or create) young, relatively 
high income, college educated individuals should increase spending on higher education 
or  health  programs  and  finance  this  spending  with  reductions  in  spending  on  other 
programs.  
The ability of fiscal policy to homogenize a jurisdiction appears to be limited by 
preexisting  heterogeneity  within  the  overall  population.   Young,  educated  and  high 
income individuals display higher intensity of preference.  However, expenditures that 
attract individuals from one group will  likely attract individuals from other groups as 
well.   More  radical  changes  in  fiscal  policies  and/or  other  forms  of  government 
intervention in the economy would likely produce more sorting and homogenization.
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Table 3.1: Average Level of Taxes and Expenditure in 1995 (in 2000 Dollars)
Per Capita Per $1000 of
Personal Income
Level Percentage Level Percentage
Total Taxes $1,768.73 - $69.96 -
Property Taxes $614.54 34.74% $23.70 33.88%
General Sales Taxes $394.12 22.28% $16.01 22.89%
Selective Sales Taxes $239.80 13.56% $9.52 13.61%
Individual Income Taxes $266.50 15.07% $10.50 15.02%
Corporate Income Taxes $93.73 5.30% $3.67 5.25%
Estate Taxes $4.96 0.28% $0.18 0.26%
Other Taxes $155.08 8.77% $6.37 9.10%
Total Expenditures $3,691.83 - $146.29 -
Elementary Education $706.28 19.13% $28.32 19.36%
Higher Education $277.88 7.53% $11.29 7.72%
Police, Fire, and 
Corrections $182.75 4.95% $7.02 4.80%
Health and Hospitals $309.81 8.39% $12.47 8.52%
Highways and 
Transportation $240.01 6.50% $9.63 6.58%
Welfare $565.34 15.31% $22.26 15.21%
Utilities $234.16 6.34% $9.31 6.36%
Interest on Debt $211.08 5.72% $8.31 5.68%
Other Expenditures15 $964.52 26.13% $37.68 25.76%
15 Includes all other expenditures.  Values for this category are calculated by subtracting all other 
categories from total expenditures.
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Table 3.2: Average 5-Year Change (2000 Dollars)
Per Capita Per $1000 of
Personal Income
Total Taxes $511.59 $20.19
Property Taxes $92.62 $3.69
General Sales Taxes $135.61 $5.42
Selective Sales Taxes $41.97 $1.73
Individual Income Taxes $193.31 $7.50
Corporate Income Taxes $3.04 $0.11
Estate Taxes $11.35 $0.44
Other Taxes $33.69 $1.30
Total Expenditures $995.05 $40.52
Elementary Education $245.63 $9.69
Higher Education $106.11 $4.36
Police, Fire, and 
Corrections $106.88 $4.34
Health and Hospitals $42.59 $1.84
Highways and 
Transportation $85.83 $3.60
Welfare $97.45 $4.13
Utilities $38.00 $1.50
Interest on Debt $17.40 $0.67
Other Expenditures $255.17 $10.38
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Table 3.3: Demographics and Migrants by Group, 2000 Census
Education Full Sample Less than HS High School Some College College
N 8,571,053 1,671,182 2,579,283 2,341,035 1,979,553
Migrants 0.074 0.047 0.053 0.078 0.118
Household Income $63,494 $39,120 $51,640 $64,187 $98,699
Never Married 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.16
Female 0.53 0.52 0.54 0.55 0.50
Black 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.06
Hispanic 0.09 0.22 0.07 0.07 0.04
Avg Number of Children 0.65 0.61 0.61 0.73 0.69
Children (<6 yrs) Present 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.17
Older Children Present 0.28 0.25 0.27 0.31 0.28
Income Quantiles Bottom Income 
Quartile
25%-50% Income 
Quartile
50%-75% Income 
Quartile
Top Income
Quartile
Top 5% Income 
Quantile
Top 1% Income 
Quantile
N 2,146,114 2,142,355 2,139,874 2,142,710 428,550 87,116
Migrants 0.065 0.073 0.074 0.084 0.093 0.092
Household Income $15,464 $37,810 $62,018 $138,760 $269,346 $432,130
Never Married 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.08
Female 0.60 0.52 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.49
Black 0.15 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.04
Hispanic 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.05
Avg Number of Children 0.51 0.67 0.76 0.71 0.70 0.81
Children (<6 yrs) Present 0.11 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.16
Older Children Present 0.21 0.27 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.34
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Table 3.4: Average 5-Year Tax and Expenditure Changes by Group (Real 2000 Dollars)
Education Age N Migrants Fraction of Migrants
Real Tax Increase 
Experienced by 
Migrants
Real Expenditure 
Increase Experienced 
by Migrants
Real Tax Increase 
Experienced by
Non-migrants
Real Expenditure 
Increase Experienced 
by Non-migrants
Per 
Capita
Per 
$1000
Per Capita Per 
$1000
Per Capita Per 
$1000
Per Capita Per 
$1000
<HS
25-34 261,788 21,758 0.08 214.08 -0.44 943.68 19.25 422.09 2.74 1301.14 23.53
35-49 431,360 23,856 0.06 186.69 -1.11 924.63 19.25 404.50 2.30 1291.59 23.68
50-64 384,817 14,736 0.04 88.63 -2.72 828.10 19.42 376.05 1.57 1279.07 24.00
65+ 593,217 17,465 0.04 131.62 -3.05 874.11 17.37 361.53 1.08 1272.31 23.89
Total 1,671,182 77,815 0.05 163.42 -1.66 900.34 18.86 385.02 1.76 1283.15 23.81
HS
25-34 469,821 39,877 0.08 253.71 -0.41 1061.39 20.79 369.55 1.27 1277.26 23.79
35-49 908,028 48,764 0.05 207.84 -1.04 1005.97 20.81 359.69 0.91 1275.18 23.73
50-64 642,446 27,983 0.04 75.64 -3.18 822.90 19.09 354.22 0.72 1274.02 23.73
65+ 558,988 20,442 0.04 95.25 -3.81 826.85 16.47 357.34 0.59 1267.68 22.89
Total 2,579,283 137,066 0.05 177.40 -1.71 958.00 19.81 359.53 0.85 1273.60 23.56
HS+
25-34 531,414 63,368 0.12 285.41 -0.42 1112.41 20.30 388.30 1.61 1293.04 23.52
35-49 946,602 69,979 0.07 243.57 -0.68 1049.15 20.42 388.52 1.51 1290.79 23.19
50-64 551,836 34,765 0.06 136.83 -1.72 915.32 20.87 389.49 1.62 1289.76 23.30
65+ 311,183 15,444 0.05 102.35 -3.04 841.61 17.96 388.17 1.62 1281.22 23.08
Total 2,341,035 183,556 0.08 225.91 -0.99 1028.18 20.26 388.66 1.57 1289.72 23.27
College
25-34 443,495 100,831 0.23 377.12 -0.51 1258.96 18.95 394.54 1.34 1283.08 22.02
35-49 778,229 82,694 0.11 294.31 -0.90 1112.23 18.76 396.32 1.35 1276.83 21.73
50-64 503,452 36,115 0.07 163.68 -1.90 970.03 20.38 396.97 1.43 1279.20 21.92
65+ 254,377 14,445 0.06 64.21 -4.26 805.15 16.55 391.69 1.46 1274.31 22.20
Total 1,979,549 234,085 0.12 295.63 -1.09 1134.54 18.95 395.51 1.39 1278.34 21.90
Totals 8,571,053 632,522 0.07 233.51 -1.27 1036.61 19.51 380.47 1.35 1280.94 23.17
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Table 3.5: Logit Estimation, Probability of Migration, Per Capita Fiscal Measures
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-Imputed Migrant Data Imputed Migrant Data
total taxes -0.000025      (0.000003)***
0.000065
      (0.000002)***
-0.000003
(0.000003)
-0.000017
      (0.000003)***
total taxes2 0.000002      (0.000000)***
-0.0000002
      (0.0000000)***
total expenditures 0.000043      (0.000001)***
0.000019
      (0.000001)***
0.00001
      (0.000001)***
-0.000013
      (0.000002)***
total expenditures2 0.0000008      (0.0000000)***
0.0000002
      (0.0000000)***
age -0.022357      (0.000145)***
-0.019048
      (0.000048)***
-0.02246
      (0.000147)***
-0.022529
      (0.000145)***
age2 0.000145      (0.000001)***
0.000124
      (0.000000)***
0.000146
      (0.000001)***
0.000146
      (0.000001)***
female -0.000839(0.000667)
0.000405
(0.000594)
-0.000847
(0.000666)
-0.000948
(0.000667)
hispanic -0.029108      (0.001311)***
-0.04419
      (0.001168)***
-0.037706
      (0.001315)***
-0.038418
      (0.001315)***
black -0.049961      (0.001226)***
-0.007126
      (0.00108)***
-0.053417
      (0.001227)***
-0.053389
      (0.00123)***
highschool 0.000634(0.001189)
0.003947
      (0.001052)***
0.002098
  (0.001188)*
0.002304
  (0.001188)*
somecollege 0.086423      (0.001149)***
0.06586
      (0.001165)***
0.08601
      (0.001146)***
0.085761
      (0.001149)***
college 0.199108      (0.001128)***
0.161148
      (0.001522)***
0.198909
      (0.001125)***
0.198413
      (0.001129)***
single -0.02041      (0.001003)***
-0.025278
      (0.000852)***
-0.02044
      (0.001004)***
-0.021157
      (0.001003)***
child < 6 -0.00349      (0.00124)***
-0.002434
    (0.0011)**
-0.004201
      (0.001239)***
-0.00445
      (0.00124)***
child > 5 -0.078228      (0.00131)***
-0.067246
      (0.001241)***
-0.078612
      (0.001309)***
-0.07872
      (0.00131)***
number of children 0.005701      (0.000636)***
0.00505
      (0.000567)***
0.006028
      (0.000636)***
0.00617
      (0.000636)***
unemployment -0.03117      (0.000674)***
-0.066637
      (0.000763)***
-0.019398
      (0.000706)***
-0.011568
      (0.000773)***
poverty 0.001236      (0.00018)***
0.000002
(0.00017)
0.003263
      (0.000186)***
0.005166
      (0.00019)***
energy prices 0.019845      (0.000953)***
-0.0186
      (0.000927)***
0.027814
      (0.000996)***
0.038261
      (0.001039)***
test scores 0.012907      (0.001289)***
-0.000765
(0.001198)
0.045585
      (0.001365)***
0.041223
      (0.001366)***
violent crime -0.008492      (0.000418)***
-0.011206
      (0.000383)***
-0.002827
      (0.000442)***
-0.005612
      (0.000445)***
population density -3.53e10    (1.76e10)**
-1.26e12
      (1.73e10)***
9.85e10
      (1.83e10)***
-5.43e11
      (2.16e10)***
* , **, and *** indicate p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01, respectively.
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Table 3.6: Relative Standard Deviation, Fiscal Measures
Tax Category Relative Standard Deviation Expenditure Category
Relative Standard 
Deviation
Per Capita Per Income Per Capita Per Income
Property Taxes 52.20 47.64 Elementary Education 30.08 27.55
General Sales Taxes 52.66 52.98 Higher Education 40.61 45.75
Selective Sales Taxes 67.92 68.24 Police, Fire, and Corrections 36.93 36.91
Individual Income Taxes 72.21 62.98 Health and Hospitals 104.30 101.82
Corporate Income Taxes 301.55 276.42 Highways and Transportation 71.15 69.33
Estate Taxes 122.94 124.96 Welfare 72.75 77.56
Other Taxes 311.83 287.55 Utilities 105.94 97.78
Other Expenditures 58.35 55.08
Total Taxes 39.91 34.17 Total Expenditures 25.54 28.79
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Table 3.7: Logit Estimation, Probability of Migration, Per Capita, Per Income, and Mixed Fiscal Measures
2000 Census
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Per Capita
Relative Changes in Per Capita Tax and Expenditure 
Categories
Per Income
Relative Changes in Tax and Expenditure Categories for 
each $1000 of Personal Income
Mixed 
Relative Changes in Tax Categories as a Share of Mean 
Personal Income Combined with Relative Changes in 
Expenditure Categories Per Capita
Non-Imputed Migrant Data Imputed Migrant Data Non-Imputed Migrant Data Imputed Migrant Data Non-Imputed Migrant Data Imputed Migrant Data
total taxes -0.000025 (0.00000)***
0.000065
(0.00000)***
-0.00003
 (0.00000)***
-0.000017
(0.00000)***
-0.0003
   (0.0001)***
0.0017
   (0.0001)***
-0.00009
  (0.00008)
-0.0005
   (0.0001)***
-0.0001
  (0.0001)
-0.0043
   (0.0001)***
0.00039
(0.00008)
0.00004
(0.00009)
total taxes2 0.000002(0.00000)***
-0.0000002
(0.00000)***
0.0022
   (0.0000)***
-0.00007
 (0.00000)***
-0.0021
 (0.00001)***
-0.00012 
(0.00000)***
total 
expenditures
0.000043
 (0.00000)***
0.000019
(0.00000)***
0.00001
 (0.00000)***
-0.000013
(0.00000)***
0.0010
   (0.0000)***
0.0022
   (0.0000)***
0.0004
   (0.0000)***
0.0006
   (0.0000)***
0.00004
 (0.00000)***
0.00004
 (0.00000)***
0.0000059
(0.0000017)
0.00001
   0.00000)***
total 
expenditures2
0.0000008
(0.00000)***
0.0000002
(0.00000)***
0.0005
   (0.0000)***
0.00005
 (0.00000)***
8.64e-7
(5.63e-9)***
-1.7e-7
(3.37e-9)**
net impact, 
additional $1 
fisc
0.002% -0.002% 0.07% 0.031% 0.03% 0.04%
critical tax 
change $0.65 -$1.70 -$0.32 -$0.28 -$1.02 $0.17
critical 
expenditure 
change
$0.48 $1.30 -$2.20 -$0.17 -$23.15 $29.41
Table 3.8: Logit Estimation, Probability of Migration, Per Capita and Per Income Fiscal Measures, 1990 
1990 Census
N=7,628,856
(Imputed Migrant Data)
(3) (4) (5) (6)
Per Capita
Relative Changes in Per Capita Tax and Expenditure Categories
Per Income
Relative Changes in Tax and Expenditure Categories for each $1000 of 
Personal Income
total taxes -0.00004      (0.00000)***
-0.00015
      (0.00000)***
-0.00003
      (0.00000)***
-0.00198
      (0.00088)***
total taxes2 0.0000002      (0.0000000)***
0.000031
      (0.000001)***
total expenditures 0.00001      (0.00000)***
0.00007
      (0.00000)***
0.00001
      (0.00000)***
0.00073
      (0.00004)***
total expenditures2 0.00000015      (0.00000000)***
0.00006
      (0.00001)***
net impact, additional $1 fisc 0.005% 0.10%
critical tax change $460.80 $32.38
critical expenditure change -$234.15 -$5.98
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Table 3.9: Relative Changes in Total Taxes and Expenditures, Ages 25-60
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b)
Per Capita Per Capita Per Capita, Imputed Per Capita, Imputed
total taxes -0.00006      (0.000015)***
0.00004
      (0.00000)***
-0.00010
      (0.000016)***
-0.00004
      (0.00000)***
total taxes2 0.000002      (0.000000)***
-0.00000009
      (0.00000001)***
total expenditures 0.000170      (0.000007)***
0.00002
      (0.00000)***
0.000041
      (0.000008)***
-0.000011
      (0.000002)***
total expenditures2 0.0000009      (0.0000000)***
0.0000002
      (0.0000000)***
net impact of 
additional $1 per 
capita fiscal activity
0.011% -0.006%
optimal tax change -$8.71 -$189.96
optimal expenditure 
change -$9.57 $32.08
(5b) (6b) (7b) (8b)
Per Income Per Income Per Income, Imputed Per Income, Imputed
total taxes -0.00286      (0.000371)***
0.0018
      (0.0001)***
-0.00237
      (0.000392)***
-0.0010
      (0.0001)***
total taxes2 0.0026      (0.0000)***
-0.00004
      (0.00001)***
total expenditures 0.00383      (0.000166)***
0.0026
      (0.0000)***
0.00163
      (0.000175)***
0.0005
      (0.0000)***
total expenditures2 0.0006      (0.0000)***
0.00004
      (0.00000)***
net impact of 
additional $1 per 
income fiscal activity
0.10% -0.07%
optimal tax change -$0.35 -$11.78
optimal expenditure 
change
-$2.19 -$6.15
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Table 3.10: Full Sample, 2000 and 1990 Censuses
2000 Census (N=8,571,053) 1990 Census (N=7,628,856)
Variable Per Capita Per Income Mixed Per Capita Per Income
Δ Property Tax -0.0002      (0.0000)***
-0.0036
      (0.0003)***
-0.0044
      (0.0003)***
-0.00004
      (0.00001)***
-0.0010
      (0.0001)***
Δ General Sales Tax -0.00005      (0.00001)***
-0.0008
      (0.0002)***
0.0007
      (0.0002)***
-0.00004
      (0.00001)***
-0.0003
    (0.0001)**
Δ Selective Sales Tax -0.0004      (0.0000)***
-0.0087
      (0.0003)***
-0.0078
      (0.0003)***
-0.0007
      (0.0000)***
-0.0104
      (0.0003)***
Δ Individual Income Tax -0.00014      (0.00001)***
-0.0026
      (0.0001)***
-0.0024
      (0.0001)***
-0.0002
      (0.0000)***
-0.0032
      (0.0001)***
Δ Corporate Tax -0.0004      (0.0000)***
-0.0099
      (0.0006)***
-0.0047
      (0.0006)***
0.00013
      (0.00003)***
0.0060
      (0.0005)***
Δ Estate Tax 0.00022      (0.00006)***
0.0080
      (0.0015)***
0.0064
      (0.0015)***
-0.0011
      (0.0001)***
-0.0153
      (0.0017)***
Δ Interest on Debt -0.000022(0.000018)
-0.0016
      (0.0005)***
0.0008
(0.0005)
-0.0008
      (0.0000)***
-0.0137
      (0.0003)***
Δ Elementary Education 0.0003      (0.0000)***
0.0064
      (0.0001)***
0.0002
      (0.0000)***
0.0005
      (0.0000)***
0.0082
      (0.0001)***
Δ Higher Education 0.0003      (0.0000)***
0.0072
      (0.0003)***
0.0003
      (0.0000)***
-0.00011
      (0.00002)***
-0.0021
      (0.0003)***
Δ Safety -0.0003      (0.0000)***
-0.0078
      (0.0004)***
-0.0003
      (0.0000)***
-0.0005
      (0.0000)***
-0.0101
      (0.0004)***
Δ Health and Hospitals -0.00011      (0.00001)***
-0.0017
      (0.0002)***
-0.00008
      (0.00001)***
-0.00014
      (0.00001)***
-0.0019
      (0.0002)***
Δ Highways -0.00010      (0.00001)***
-0.0032
      (0.0003)***
-0.00008
      (0.00001)***
-0.00008
      (0.00001)***
-0.0009
      (0.0002)***
Δ Welfare -0.000004(0.000006)
-0.0007
      (0.0001)***
-0.00003
      (0.00001)***
0.0002
      (0.0000)***
0.0034
      (0.0002)***
Δ Utilities -0.0003      (0.0000)***
-0.0054
      (0.0003)***
-0.0003
      (0.0000)***
0.00012
      (0.00001)***
0.0014
      (0.0001)***
Δ Other Taxes -0.00011      (0.00001)***
-0.0039
      (0.0004)***
-0.0037
      (0.0004)***
0.0004
      (0.0000)***
0.0047
      (0.0002)***
Δ Other Expenditures 0.00009      (0.00001)***
0.0024
      (0.0001)***
0.00006
      (0.00001)***
0.00010
      (0.00001)***
0.0021
      (0.0001)***
Effect of Balanced Budget Changes on P(x)
Elementary Education       0.0116***       0.2804***       0.0154***       0.0356***       0.6413***
Higher Education       0.0105***       0.3564***       0.0229*** -0.0231 -0.3841
Safety       -0.0461***       -1.1431***       -0.0418***       -0.0659***       -1.1847***
Health and Hospitals       -0.0287***       -0.5308***       -0.0166*** -0.0262 -0.3657
Highways       -0.0275*** -0.6778       -0.0173***     -0.0204**       -0.2633***
Welfare       -0.0180***       -0.4257***       -0.0114*** 0.0032       0.1678***
Utilities       -0.0432***       -0.8958***       -0.0367***       -0.0004***       -0.0329***
Other Expenditures       -0.0088***       -0.1228***       -0.0026***       -0.0019***       0.0298***
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Table 3.11: Marginal Effect of Balanced Budget Changes in Fiscal Categories on P(x)
Individuals < 
60
Age<60, 
Bottom 20% 
Income
Age<60, 
Top 20% 
Income
Single Female 
w/Children, 
Bottom 20% 
College 
Educated 
Individuals < 
35
Less than 
High School High School Some College College
N 6,420,179 963,059 1,440,403 261,941 443,495 1,671,182 2,579,283 2,341,035 1,979,553
$1 Increase Per Capita
Elementary Education       0.0109***       -0.0055***       0.0304***       -0.0057***       0.0385***       0.000171***       -1.2E-05***       5.31E-05***       0.000113***
Higher Education       0.0106***       -0.0171***       0.0459***       -0.0187***       0.0472***       -0.00029***       -0.00029***       0.000188***       0.000192***
Police, Fire, Corrections       -0.0391*** -0.0704       0.0001*** -0.0757     0.0127**       -0.00043***       -0.00084***       -0.00068***       1.44E-05***
Health and Hospitals       -0.0289***       -0.0621***       0.0077***       -0.0690***       0.0116***       -0.00038***       -0.0007***       -0.00032***       6.35E-05***
Highways -0.0309       -0.0249***       -0.0237***       -0.0166***       -0.0446***       -5.9E-05***       -0.00027***       -0.00027***       -0.00013***
Welfare       -0.0161***       -0.0402***       0.0074***       -0.0354***     -0.0016**       -0.00023***       -0.00032***       -0.00018***       -6.3E-07***
Utilities       -0.0383***       -0.0637***       -0.0146***       -0.0580***       -0.0281***       -0.00054***       -0.00067***       -0.00035***       -0.00011***
Other Expenditures       -0.000071***       -0.0301***  0.0150       -0.0222***       0.0116***       -0.00022***       -0.00024***       -5.5E-05***       3.07E-05***
$1 Increase Per $1000 of Personal Income
Elementary Education       0.2412***       0.0346*** 0.5942       0.0325***       0.8253***       0.005567***       -0.00016***       0.000589***       0.002519***
Higher Education       0.3338***       0.0454***       0.7623***       -0.0146***       0.7509***       -0.00444***       -0.00236***       0.005885***       0.003582***
Police, Fire, Corrections       -1.0034***       -1.2243***       -0.4937*** -1.3134       -0.1802***       -0.00808***       -0.01859***       -0.0176***       -0.00102***
Health and Hospitals       -0.5698***       -1.3501***       0.3336***       -1.4409***       0.4538***       -0.00636***       -0.01558***       -0.00664***       0.002391***
Highways     -0.7710**       -0.4215***       -0.7539***       -0.2461***       -1.3591***       -0.00058***       -0.00499***       -0.00667***       -0.00408***
Welfare       -0.3991***       -0.8824***       0.1421***       -0.7308***       -0.0818***       -0.00464***       -0.0081***       -0.00475***       4.43E-05***
Utilities       -0.7828***       -1.5920***       -0.0604***     -1.3628**       -0.4496***       -0.01117***       -0.01561***       -0.00699***       -0.00181***
Other Expenditures       -0.1042***       -0.5088***       0.3536***       -0.2814***  0.2517       -0.00289***       -0.00433***       -0.00068***       0.000839***
Mixed Specification: $1 Increase Per Capita, Financed with Taxes as a Share of Personal Income
Elementary Education       0.000135***       0.000166***       0.000240***       0.000162***       0.000347***       0.000179***       0.0000003***       0.000062***       0.000105***
Higher Education       0.000215***       0.000208***       0.000431***       0.000188***       0.000509***       -0.000179***       -0.000128***       0.000298***       0.000203***
Police, Fire, Corrections       -0.000361***       -0.000534***       -0.000008***       -0.000578***       0.000161***       -0.000469***       -0.000856***       -0.000656***       0.000027***
Health and Hospitals       -0.000194***       -0.000066***       -0.000133***       -0.000137***       -0.000028***       -0.000124***       -0.000479***       -0.000262***       0.000023***
Highways       -0.000228***       0.000128***       -0.000363***       0.000204***       -0.000508***       0.000066***       -0.00011***       -0.000198***       -0.000148***
Welfare       -0.000117***       -0.000046***       -0.000053***       -0.000003***       -0.000104***       -0.00012***       -0.000231***       -0.000157***       -0.000021***
Utilities       -0.000326***       -0.000298***       -0.000214***       -0.000234***       -0.000342***       -0.000463***       -0.000588***       -0.000309***       -0.000129***
Other Expenditures       -0.000024***       0.000015***       0.000068***        0.00009***        0.000068***       -0.000139***       -0.000173***       -0.000022***        0.00002***
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Table 3.12: Simulated Distributional Effect, Average State, Balanced Budget Changes in Fiscal Categories, Mixed Specification
Migrant 
Population Age < 60
Age<60, 
Bottom 20% 
Income
Age<60, 
Top 20% 
Income
Single Female 
w/Children, 
Bottom 20% 
College 
Educated 
Individuals < 35
Less than High 
School High School Some College College
Mobile Population16 556,362 481,611 70,703 120,216 18,702 96,441 65,230 115,248 160,820 215,063
5-Year Effect of a $1 Annual Per Capita Relative Increase on the Population of the Average State
Elementary 
Education 64 52 9 23 2 25 10 0 8 18
Higher Education 98 82 12 41 3 37 -10 -12 38 35
Police, Fire and 
Corrections -193 -138 -30 -1 -9 12 -25 -81 -85 5
Health and Hospitals -80 -74 -4 -13 -2 -2 -7 -45 -34 4
Highways -83 -87 7 -34 3 -37 4 -10 -26 -25
Welfare -57 -45 -3 -5 0 -8 -6 -22 -20 -4
Utilities -170 -124 -17 -20 -3 -25 -25 -56 -40 -22
Other Expenditures -17 -9 1 6 1 5 -7 -16 -3 3
Individuals
25-37
Individuals
38-47
Individuals
48-61 Individuals >61 
Bottom Income 
Quartile
25%-50% Income 
Quartile
50%-75% Income 
Quartile
Top
 Income Quartile
Top Income 
Decile
Underlying 
Population 260,478 127,977 98,095 69,811 118,461 134,907 140,711 162,283 69,807
5-Year Effect of a $1 Annual Per Capita Relative Increase on the Population of the Average State
Elementary 
Education 22 8 8 0 -18 5 17 27 12
Higher Education 35 13 14 0 -22 15 19 48 27
Police, Fire and 
Corrections -41 -38 -40 0 -98 -64 -25 -5 2
Health and Hospitals -36 -16 -9 0 -43 -26 -28 -10 2
Highways -45 -17 -6 0 -21 -22 -22 -30 -14
Welfare -23 -6 -10 0 -42 -20 -8 -4 -1
Utilities -46 -26 -31 0 -71 -55 -49 -22 -7
Other Expenditures -4 -2 -5 0 -36 -11 -5 9 4
16 Total number of individuals 25 and over who migrated into the average state during the 5-year migration period as well as the number of individuals who left 
the average state during the migration period.  Fiscal policy can attract individuals, but can also reduce the probability that individuals will leave a state.  For 
the average state, the number of individuals who migrated into a state is identical to the number of individuals who migrated out of a state.
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Table 3.13: Simulated Distributional Effect in Florida, Balanced Budget Changes in Fiscal Categories, Mixed Specification
Total Population
10,251,119
Migrant 
Population Age < 60
Age<60, 
Bottom 20% 
Income
Age<60, 
Top 20% 
Income
Single Female 
w/Children, 
Bottom 20% 
College 
Educated 
Individuals < 35
Less than High 
School High School Some College College
Underlying 
Population17 2,120,495 1,605,068 264,602 346,071 65,534 206,905 294,741 542,704 651,363 631,687
5-Year Effect of a $1 Annual Per Capita Relative Increase on the Population of Florida
Elementary 
Education 243 172 35 66 8 54 43 0 32 53
Higher Education 372 274 44 117 10 80 -43 -57 156 102
Police, Fire and 
Corrections -736 -460 -114 -2 -30 25 -113 -382 -342 14
Health and Hospitals -305 -248 -14 -36 -7 -4 -30 -214 -137 12
Highways -317 -291 27 -99 11 -79 16 -49 -103 -74
Welfare -216 -149 -10 -15 0 -16 -29 -103 -82 -11
Utilities -648 -415 -63 -58 -12 -53 -111 -262 -161 -65
Other Expenditures -65 -32 3 19 5 11 -34 -77 -12 10
Individuals
25-37
Individuals
38-47
Individuals
48-61 Individuals >61 
Bottom Income 
Quartile
25%-50% Income 
Quartile
50%-75% Income 
Quartile
Top
 Income Quartile
Top Income 
Decile
Underlying 
Population 747,247 448,334 439,168 485,746 520,294 565,572 509,216 525,413 240,162
5-Year Effect of a $1 Annual Per Capita Relative Increase on the Population of Florida
Elementary 
Education 63 27 38 1 -81 20 60 87 41
Higher Education 99 45 62 1 -96 61 69 156 92
Police, Fire and 
Corrections -118 -135 -181 -2 -432 -266 -91 -18 7
Health and Hospitals -103 -56 -38 0 -190 -108 -100 -33 5
Highways -129 -59 -26 0 -92 -93 -80 -98 -47
Welfare -65 -20 -43 0 -184 -86 -28 -14 -4
Utilities -131 -91 -139 -2 -314 -229 -177 -71 -24
Other Expenditures -11 -6 -25 0 -158 -47 -17 29 15
17 Individuals 25 and over who migrated to Kentucky during the 5-year migration period
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Table 3.14: Simulated Distributional Effect in Nevada, Balanced Budget Changes in Fiscal Categories, Mixed Specification
Total Population
1,220,655
Migrant 
Population Age < 60
Age<60, 
Bottom 20% 
Income
Age<60, 
Top 20% 
Income
Single Female 
w/Children, 
Bottom 20% 
College 
Educated 
Individuals < 35
Less than High 
School High School Some College College
Underlying 
Population18 454,403 375,464 60,628 71,050 15,085 31,927 76,519 123,092 158,247 96,545
5-Year Effect of a $1 Annual Per Capita Relative Increase on the Population of  Nevada
Elementary 
Education 52 40 8 13 2 8 11 0 8 8
Higher Education 80 64 10 24 2 12 -11 -13 38 16
Police, Fire and 
Corrections -158 -108 -26 0 -7 4 -29 -87 -83 2
Health and Hospitals -65 -58 -3 -7 -2 -1 -8 -48 -33 2
Highways -68 -68 6 -20 2 -12 4 -11 -25 -11
Welfare -46 -35 -2 -3 0 -3 -8 -23 -20 -2
Utilities -139 -97 -15 -12 -3 -8 -29 -59 -39 -10
Other Expenditures -14 -7 1 4 1 2 -9 -18 -3 2
Individuals
25-37
Individuals
38-47
Individuals
48-61 Individuals >61 
Bottom Income 
Quartile
25%-50% Income 
Quartile
50%-75% Income 
Quartile
Top
 Income Quartile
Top Income 
Decile
Underlying 
Population 176,450 103,988 100,485 73,480 107,574 121,088 120,105 105,636 38,498
5-Year Effect of a $1 Annual Per Capita Relative Increase on the Population of  Nevada
Elementary 
Education 15 6 9 0 -17 4 14 17 7
Higher Education 23 10 14 0 -20 13 16 31 15
Police, Fire and 
Corrections -28 -31 -41 0 -89 -57 -22 -4 1
Health and Hospitals -24 -13 -9 0 -39 -23 -23 -7 1
Highways -30 -14 -6 0 -19 -20 -19 -20 -7
Welfare -15 -5 -10 0 -38 -18 -7 -3 -1
Utilities -31 -21 -32 0 -65 -49 -42 -14 -4
Other Expenditures -3 -1 -6 0 -33 -10 -4 6 2
18 Individuals 25 and over who migrated to Kentucky during the 5-year migration period
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Table 3.15: Simulated Distributional Effect in Kentucky, Balanced Budget Changes in Fiscal Categories, Mixed Specification
Total Population
2,534,431
Migrant 
Population Age < 60
Age<60, 
Bottom 20% 
Income
Age<60, 
Top 20% 
Income
Single Female 
w/Children, 
Bottom 20% 
College 
Educated 
Individuals < 35
Less than High 
School High School Some College College
Underlying 
Population19 357,550 316,221 59,277 58,250 16,596 50,899 51,771 87,777 105,541 65,203
5-Year Effect of a $1 Annual Per Capita Relative Increase on the Population of Kentucky
Elementary 
Education 41 34 8 11 2 13 8 0 5 5
Higher Education 63 54 10 20 2 20 -8 -9 25 11
Police, Fire and 
Corrections -124 -91 -25 0 -8 6 -20 -62 -55 1
Health and Hospitals -51 -49 -3 -6 -2 -1 -5 -35 -22 1
Highways -53 -57 6 -17 3 -19 3 -8 -17 -8
Welfare -36 -29 -2 -2 0 -4 -5 -17 -13 -1
Utilities -109 -82 -14 -10 -3 -13 -20 -42 -26 -7
Other Expenditures -11 -6 1 3 1 3 -6 -12 -2 1
Individuals
25-37
Individuals
38-47
Individuals
48-61 Individuals >61 
Bottom Income 
Quartile
25%-50% Income 
Quartile
50%-75% Income 
Quartile
Top
 Income Quartile
Top Income 
Decile
Underlying 
Population 170,467 83,370 65,837 37,886 92,718 95,433 88,844 80,565 30,449
5-Year Effect of a $1 Annual Per Capita Relative Increase on the Population of Kentucky
Elementary 
Education 15 6 6 0 -17 3 11 13 5
Higher Education 23 9 10 0 -20 10 12 24 12
Police, Fire and 
Corrections -27 -28 -30 0 -90 -45 -16 -3 1
Health and Hospitals -24 -12 -6 0 -40 -18 -18 -5 1
Highways -30 -12 -4 0 -19 -16 -14 -15 -6
Welfare -15 -4 -7 0 -38 -15 -5 -2 -1
Utilities -30 -19 -23 0 -66 -39 -32 -11 -3
Other Expenditures -3 -1 -4 0 -33 -8 -3 4 2
19 Individuals 25 and over who migrated to Kentucky during the 5-year migration period
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Chapter 4: Heterogeneity and Government Involvement in the Economy
While migration provides individuals an opportunity to “vote with their feet,” 
there are a limited number of jurisdictions for individuals to migrate to and some 
individuals will not be completely satisfied with the size and scope of the public sector. 
Some individuals will demand greater levels of provision, while others will demand less, 
and some preference heterogeneity will remain within jurisdictions.
Throughout history, heterogeneity has generated violent conflict, especially when 
preferences differ (or at least are perceived to differ) along ethnic and/or cultural lines. 
Perpetual ethnic conflict in the Balkans and the Caucasus provide a constant reminder. 
Fearon and Laitin (1996) point out that interethnic cooperation is actually more common 
than conflict primarily because individuals fear that any conflict between ethnic groups 
can quickly spiral out of control.  This provides strong incentives to avoid disputes, and 
allows a heterogeneous population to exist in a stable long run equilibrium.  
Page (2007) explains how individuals with different backgrounds and experiences 
can enhance the ability of organizations to solve problems.  On the other hand, Hall and 
Leeson (2010) find evidence that students in heterogeneous schools have lower test 
scores.  Putnam (1995) points out that heterogeneous groups are less likely to trust and 
cooperate with one another.  Easterly and Levine (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001) find 
an inverse relationship between heterogeneity and economic growth.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel claimed in Der Spiegel on October 16, 2010 
that the German approach to multiculturalism has “absolutely failed,” and that 
immigrants must begin to adopt the German language and culture.  Schuck (2003) 
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suggests that government activity should be restricted to promoting tolerance and 
preventing discrimination, since attempts to promote multiculturalism are unlikely to do 
anything but increase ethnic tension.  Similarly, Leeson (2007) suggests that interethnic 
cooperation arises spontaneously, and government efforts to promote this cooperation can 
be counterproductive.
In addition to affecting productivity in the private sector, the level of intergroup 
cooperation and preference heterogeneity can also affect the public sector.  Olson (1965) 
suggested that the costs of coming to a group consensus increases with the number of 
competing interests.  Dahl and Tufte (1973) theorize that preference heterogeneity 
produces a greater relative number of competing minority groups.  If a consensus is 
required for new policies to be implemented in a democracy, then an inverse relationship 
between the number of minority groups and government size could result.  
Cutler et al (1993) introduce this idea as the “community preference model,” and find 
that preference for public provision may depend on an individual's similarity to others 
within the jurisdiction.  Under this model, greater levels of provision should be expected 
in homogeneous jurisdictions.
Alesina and Spolaore (1997) present a formal model of country formation that 
suggests a tradeoff between heterogeneity and country size.  Large countries tend to have 
larger populations and benefit from economies of scale in public provision.  Large 
countries also suffer from increased preference heterogeneity, as transactions costs are 
higher and citizens are less likely to agree on the role of government in the economy.
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These  ideas  have  been  tested  empirically.   Many studies  have  documented  a 
relationship between certain types of spending and heterogeneity.  Easterly and Levine 
(1997)  find  that  ethnic  diversity  is  inversely  related  to  educational  attainment  and 
infrastructure.   LaPorta  et  al  (1999)  find  that  ethnic  diversity  is  associated  with 
government  corruption,  regulation,  and  a  lack  of  property  rights.   They  find  that 
budgetary  government  size  is  inversely  related  to  heterogeneity,  and  heterogeneous 
countries are more likely to have governments that perform poorly.  Alesina et al (1999) 
find an inverse relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and government spending on 
education, roads, sewers and sanitation among a sample of US metropolitan areas.  Kuijs 
(2000)  finds  that  ethnic  heterogeneity  is  inversely  related  to  health  and  education 
outcomes for a sample of countries from 1980.  
Other  empirical  studies  have  documented  an  inverse  relationship  between 
heterogeneity and levels of trust and cooperation, which would imply that heterogeneous 
groups would demand less public provision.  In one of the most interesting studies, Costa 
and Kahn (2003a) find that Union Army soldiers who served in the Civil War and were 
from fragmented  jurisdictions  or  were  serving in  fragmented  units  were  significantly 
more likely to desert, be arrested, or go AWOL.  Costa and Kahn (2003b) find that an 
increase  in  fragmentation  from  the  mid  1970s  to  1990  reduces  the  probability  of 
volunteering and group membership for older Americans.  Poterba (1997) and Goldin and 
Katz (1999) find an inverse relationship between education spending and heterogeneity, 
consistent with the idea that individuals care more about the education of members of 
their  own  group.   Swee  (2010)  finds  that  political  partitioning  from the  1992-1995 
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Bosnian War tended to homogenize the region.  As a result, ethnic majorities experienced 
an increase in the provision of education while ethnic minorities did not.  Luttmer (2001) 
finds that support for welfare spending in an area is higher among those living in areas 
with larger percentages of individuals from the their own ethnic group.  Vigdor (2004) 
finds a lower census response rate in fragmented counties, consistent with the idea that 
individuals  in  these  areas  have  a  lower  sense  of  civic  duty  and  are  less  likely  to 
cooperate.  Alesina and LeFerrara (2002), Leigh (2006a, 2006b), and Putnam (2007) find 
an inverse relationship between heterogeneity and survey measures of trust.  
The mechanism behind this relationship seems obvious.  In democracies, elections 
link demand for public provision to actual provision levels.  Under the assumption that 
self-interested politicians attempt to extract rent from the voting base, there are relatively 
few opportunities to do so, since unpopular politicians are easily removed from office. 
However, these constraints do not apply in non-democratic countries, and relationships 
between government spending and heterogeneity are less obvious.  Leaders have different 
levels of political control, and this control is affected by the number of competing citizen 
groups.  Heterogeneous populations may prefer less government, but if heterogeneity also 
affects  the  relationship  between  preferences  and  actual  provision,  the  net  effect  of 
heterogeneity is uncertain.  
In general, groups in non-democratic countries will affect political outcomes if 
they have grievances and the opportunity to exert pressure on the state (Sorens, 2010).  In 
order  to  “appease” the group, leaders can either  address the grievances  or attack the 
group's ability to exert political pressure.  For the leader, the former act is costly since 
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resources spent on the group's demands are no longer available to be captured as rent. 
The latter act is costly in the sense that political capital is spent whenever coercion is 
used on the population, and this increases the probability of a leadership change.  On the 
other hand, the latter act may yield benefits in terms of additional opportunities to extract 
rent in the future.
In  unstable  countries  where  a  monopoly  on  violence  has  not  developed, 
“governments”  can  closely  resemble  violent  non-state  actors  and  resort  to  highly 
repressive acts in order to establish and maintain control.  Countries such as Afghanistan, 
Chad, Somalia and Sudan provide contemporary examples. 
McGuire and Olson (1996) theorize that it is in everyone's best interest for one 
“bandit” to eventually monopolize theft, as a symbiotic relationship is formed between 
the bandit and the victims.  The bandit has an incentive to limit their extraction of rent 
and  provide  some  goods  in  order  to  secure  future  payments.   A similar  idea  was 
introduced earlier by Mises (1957), who suggested that public opinion controls public 
policy  in  democracies  as  well  as  in  dictatorships,  as  dictators  must  remain  popular 
enough to stay in power (Caplan, 2008).
However, in heterogeneous societies with competing interests, “public opinion” is 
not  well-defined,  and  would  be  less  likely  to  constrain  the  actions  of  a  dictator. 
Successful  dictators  in  these  countries  commonly  use  a  “divide-and-rule”  political 
strategy  to  maintain  power  (Acemoglu,  Robinson,  and  Verdier,  2004).   Under  this 
strategy, the ruler does not necessarily appease all groups, but must ensure that groups do 
not form the cooperative coalitions necessary to mount a successful challenge.  As the 
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population becomes more fragmented, leaders face fewer constraints.
Weingast's (1995) sovereign-constituency transgression game can be extended to 
illustrate this point.  In order for a citizen to support the sovereign, the sovereign cannot 
transgress that citizen's rights.  While this is necessary to retain that citizen's support, it is 
not sufficient, and citizens can still choose to oppose the sovereign.  A certain percentage 
of the population must be appeased, or else the sovereign loses power. 
A simplified  specification  suggests  that  there  are  only  two  groups,  and  the 
sovereign can transgress against one, both, or none of the groups.  The groups move next, 
and can choose to incur a cost and challenge the sovereign, even if the sovereign has not 
transgressed.  If both groups challenge, then the sovereign loses power. If only one group 
challenges, then the challenge fails and the sovereign's transgressions are successful.
Because  this  is  a  repeated  game,  the  folk  theorem dictates  that  groups  have 
incentives to cooperate.  If one group defects and allows the sovereign to exploit the other 
it can be punished in a future game if the other group decides to reciprocate.  In the event 
that one group decides to challenge the sovereign, the other group will also challenge if 
the  gains  from removing the  sovereign  from power  exceed  the  costs  of  challenging. 
Under this scenario, the sovereign has strong incentives to appease at least one group 
(i.e., half of the population) in order to remain in power.
If Weingast's model is modified by allowing additional (more than two) groups, 
these incentives may be reduced.  Heterogeneous societies consist of larger numbers of 
groups that are less interested about the welfare of other groups.  In these societies it  
would be more costly for multiple  groups to  organize and form a coalition.   Ceteris 
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paribus, the sovereign can choose to transgress the rights from small groups with relative 
impunity.  Due to a “Niemoller Effect,” they may find it easier to single out and extract 
resources  from small  groups.   Individuals  are  less  likely to  object  if  they  are  not  a 
member of the group that  the dictator is  currently extracting rent  from.  In addition, 
dictators  can  consolidate  their  power  by  paying  rent  to  a  small  loyal  subgroup  of 
“kingmakers” who are members of the same ethnic group in order to maintain hegemonic 
control over the other groups (Gallego and Pitchik, 2004).  Acemoglu et al (2007) show 
that the presence of raw materials and foreign aid tend to increase this power, as both 
provide resources that despots can use to placate opposition.  They also state that low 
levels of average productivity in the economy give kleptocrats more freedom to extract 
rent.
Dictators in homogeneous countries are more likely to be constrained by public 
opinion.  Autocratic rulers do not necessarily have to provide productive goods, but they 
likely do have to  take some actions  in  an attempt  to  address  public  opinion.   These 
actions  do not  necessarily include  productive  public  provision.   Investments  in  mass 
media, for example, can be used to increase the level of power held by the sovereign 
(Debs, 2007).  Some manage to establish a personality cult and directly manipulate public 
opinion by fiat.
There are relatively few studies on government activity in these non-democratic 
countries.  This is partly because data is misleading.  Schneider and Enste (2000) find that 
developing countries have significantly larger shadow economies.  Similarly, Dreher et al 
(2007) show that poor government institutions appear to reduce the size of the economy, 
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but only because a significant portion of economic activity is being driven underground. 
Johnson et al (1997) find that bribes and other forms of corruption act as substitutes for 
official taxation, and are used to extract resources from the shadow economy in much the 
same way that taxes can from the official economy.  Studies that examine the size of 
government  in  developing  countries  must  control  for  these  alternative  forms  of 
intervention.
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Chapter 5: Heterogeneity, Political Rights and the Public Sector
This study empirically explores the relationships between heterogeneity and the 
public sector.  Measures of ethnic heterogeneity are compared to various measures of 
government  intervention  in  the  economy  in  order  to  determine  the  extent  of  the 
relationship.   While previous studies generally find an inverse relationship,  this  study 
differs in that it assumes that these relationships depend upon the level of political rights 
in  a  jurisdiction.   Citizens  are  thought  to  have  relatively  more  political  power  in 
democracies, therefore changes in provision and government activity in these countries 
will reflect the will of the underlying population.  In countries where actions taken by 
leaders are not subject to the same level of citizen scrutiny, government activity is less 
likely to reflect the will of the population.  If heterogeneous groups do prefer lower levels 
of  government  activity,  then  inverse  relationships  should  be  more  apparent  in 
democracies.
This study also differs from previous research by including non-budgetary forms 
of government intervention in the analysis.  In developing countries, conventional taxes 
would  fall  on  a  relatively  small  base.  This  is  because  these  countries  have  large 
underground “shadow” economies.  A large portion of economic activity may happen on 
the black market, where individuals are paid cash in exchange for goods and services, and 
there  would  be  relatively  little  incentive  to  comply  with  income  and/or  sales  tax 
legislation.  In other cases, individuals barter for goods and services, and this activity 
would not be difficult to tax.  Governments in these developing countries must rely on 
other  methods to  extract  the resources  needed to finance operations.   In  some cases, 
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government officials elicit bribes as payment for their services.  In other cases, property 
is not well defined, and can be taken for public use.  As previous studies focus primarily 
on fiscal policy, they exclude countries with relatively large shadow economies that rely 
on conventional taxation to a lesser extent. 
In  order  to  examine  these  relationships,  the  effect  of  ethnic  heterogeneity  on 
measures of budgetary and non-budgetary government is estimated for a large panel of 
countries.  A limitation of this study is that cultural and political institutions can differ 
widely  between  countries.   Comparisons  of  countries  placed  into  the  categories  of 
dictatorships  and  democracies  are  not  straightforward  and  may  oversimplify  these 
differences.
Data
Data  was  taken  from  a  variety  of  sources.   The  most  common  index  of 
heterogeneity used in recent literature is that constructed by Alesina et al (2002).  This 
index  contains  measures  of  ethnic,  linguistic,  and  religious  fractionalization  for  215 
countries and territories.  These variables represent the probability that two randomly 
selected individuals are from different groups, and are calculated according to equation 
(5.1) below.
1−∑
i
racei
2
(5.1)
These probabilities are assumed to remain constant over time for each country. 
Table 5.2 lists 2007 GDP per capita and information on notable historical figures for the 
25 countries with the highest levels of ethnic fractionalization.  With the exception of 
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Qatar, each of these countries has a recent history of conflict.  In almost all cases, control 
of the country was won through a military coup.  In some cases, leaders were able to 
maintain a large degree of political power and control the country for an extended period 
of time.  In other cases, leadership changed hands a number of times over a very short 
period of time.
Table 5.3 lists the 25 countries with the lowest levels of ethnic fractionalization. 
With  few  exceptions,  these  countries  have  relatively  high  levels  of  economic 
development and are more likely to have democratic governments.  The average level of 
GDP per capita in 2007 for the most homogeneous countries is $14,281 higher than the 
most heterogeneous countries.  Homogeneity also appears to reduce conflict and increase 
the level of stability in a country.  However, the tendency of individuals in homogeneous 
groups to  be  less  suspicious  of  and less  likely to  question  the  actions  of  others  can 
backfire in certain cases.
North Korea is one of the most homogeneous countries in the world, and the only 
homogeneous country to remain under the control of a dictator.  Individuals are immersed 
in propaganda at a young age, and are taught that they are members of a superior race, 
and that their  leaders (i.e.,  Kim Il  Sung, Kim Jong Il  and Kim Jong Un) exhibit  the 
highest level of moral, cultural, and genetic purity.  Individuals monitor each other and 
report any behavioral infractions to the authorities.  Those suspected of violations are 
sent, along with their families, to forced-labor camps.  The stability of the North Korean 
regime depends on this race-based nationalism (Myers, 2010).  
François  “Papa  Doc”  Duvalier  is  another  relatively  well-known  despot  who 
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maintained a highly repressive regime in Haiti until his death in 1971.  He cultivated his 
reputation as a voodoo priest to maintain control over a homogeneous population with an 
overarching belief system.  A personality cult was established by the dictators in both 
North Korea and Haiti.  Both leaders managed to convince the population to support their 
autocratic rule.  This may have been more difficult with a heterogeneous population.
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 suggest that heterogeneous countries are generally more likely 
to be ruled by dictators, though perhaps less likely to be considered personality cults. 
Table 5.4 presents a list of countries of notable historical significance for comparison. 
Augusto  Pinochet  is  notable  because  he  managed to  maintain  control  of  a  relatively 
homogeneous Chile for over 25 years without establishing a personality cult.  Relatively 
high levels of economic growth may have contributed to political stability in this case.
Table  5.4 also  suggests  that  some of  the  world's  most  famous  dictators  ruled 
countries with average levels of heterogeneity.  Among these are Fidel Castro,  Nicolae 
Ceauşescu, Francisco Franco, Saddam Hussein, and Manuel Noriega.  One of the most 
interesting  characters  is  Saparmurat  Niyazov  of  Turkmenistan,  also  known  as 
“Turkmenbashi the Great.”  Niyazov is  notable for renaming airports,  cities,  calendar 
months,  and  passing  meteorites  after  himself  and  family  members,  writing  spiritual 
guidebooks, and building large gold-plated statues of himself, one of which would rotate 
to always face the sun.  He is also known for political purges, a 60 percent unemployment 
rate, and the closure of all hospitals outside the capital city, as they were deemed to be 
unnecessary (Steyn, 2007).
While  the  U.S.  has  a  reputation  as  a  “melting  pot,”  the  level  of  ethnic 
98
heterogeneity is 0.49, which is lower than those countries in Table 5.2.  This is partly due 
to  the  way that  ethnic  groups are  defined across  countries.   Ethnicity in  the  U.S.  is  
primarily determined by race, though it is determined by other characteristics, such as 
tribal affiliation in many other countries.  Due to the relatively large number of groups, 
some of these countries are considered to be more heterogeneous than the U.S. 
From these  tables,  an  inverse  relationship  between heterogeneity and political 
rights  is  apparent.   Lower  levels  of  GDP  per  capita  provide  evidence  that  these 
heterogeneous countries also have lower levels of economic development.  However, the 
shadow economy must be also considered.  While it seems unreasonable that individuals 
in Liberia, Somalia, and the DRC can survive on less than $500 per year, it is likely that 
most of these individuals produce a significant portion of their income via shadow wages. 
Government interference in the economy in these cases will be fundamentally different 
than in developed countries.
In order to measure non-budgetary government interference in the economy, data 
was collected from the Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World Index.  This 
dataset provides annual information on countries in each of 5 areas that include budgetary 
government,  legal  environment,  integrity  of  the  monetary  base,  freedom  to  trade 
internationally, and business freedom.  This study emphasizes the legal environment and 
business  freedom,  as  these  areas  most  closely  represent  non-budgetary  government 
activities that can act as “shadow taxes.”  
The legal  environment  represents  a  composite  of  similar  scores  for  individual 
categories such as judicial integrity, military influence in the courts, and restrictions on 
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the sale of private property.   Scores in these individual categories are generated from 
various sources.  One of these is the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness 
Report.   This  report  is  generated  from responses  to  surveys  that  are  administered  to 
approximately 13,000 business executives worldwide.  Respondents were asked to rate 
their country's legal institutions on a scale of 1 to 7 with specific questions asked about 
subtopics including legal protection of property rights, the independence of the judiciary, 
and the ability of private businesses to challenge the legality of government actions in 
court..  Another source used to calculate the legal environment score is the PRS Group's 
International Country Risk Guide.  This index produces risk scores using a proprietary 
econometric model.  A third source is the World Bank's Doing Business index, which 
provides  cross-sectional  comparisons  of  the  costs  and  time  required  to  undertake 
activities associated with running a private business.  Activities included in this index are 
the legal registration of property and the ability to enforce contracts.
Values for the Economic Freedom of the World's business freedom area represent 
a similar composite of measures of credit restrictions and business regulations.  Scores in 
this area were also constructed from categories within the World Bank's Doing Business 
index such as minimum wages, accessibility of credit, mandated costs of hiring and firing 
workers,  and licensing  restrictions.   In  addition,  survey response  categories  from the 
Global  Competitiveness  Report  were  included in areas  such as  bribes,  administrative 
regulations, costs of dealing with bureaucracy, and the determination of wages through 
collective bargaining.  
Population  data  was  taken  from the  World  Bank's  2010  World  Development 
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Indicators, and GDP per capita was taken from the Penn World Table.  Values for GDP 
per capita in 2008 were imputed using a Box-Jenkins ARMA model.  
Political rights are measured using Freedom House's Gastil Index.  This is a 7 
point  score  that  represents  the  level  of  political  rights  in  each  country.   Autocratic 
countries that received a 6 or 7 (the two lowest scores) in 2008 are listed in  Table 5.5, 
while  Table 5.6 lists the democratic countries that received a score of 1, indicating the 
highest  level  of  political  rights.   Though  there  is  an  inverse  relationship  between 
heterogeneity  and  political  rights,  there  is  a  positive  relationship  between  budgetary 
government  and political  rights.   Countries  with low political  rights  also have  lower 
levels of legal or business rights.     In many of the cases where government  data  is 
unavailable (i.e., North Korea, Somalia, Sudan), it is obvious that few legal or business 
freedoms exist.
Table  5.1 provides  summary  statistics  and  correlation  tables  for  each  of  the 
measures of government activity broken down by the level of political rights.  Countries 
with  lower  levels  of  political  rights  have  lower  levels  of  budgetary government,  but 
higher  levels  of  non-budgetary  activity.   Because  the  measures  of  non-budgetary 
government activity are based on a 1-10 scale, with 1 being the highest and 10 being the 
lowest level of government activity, positive correlations between budgetary and non-
budgetary measures suggest that the actual activities are inversely related.  All categories 
of  non-budgetary  government  activity  are  therefore  inversely  related  to  budgetary 
activity.   This is consistent with Boettke (2001) and Brennan's (2002) suggestion that 
“subsidy  and  regulation  are  alternative  technologies  for  securing  the  same  policy 
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objective is familiar to those who make international comparisons of public sector size.”20
From  the  correlation  tables,  heterogeneity  is  inversely  related  to  budgetary 
government in countries with high levels of political rights.  Heterogeneity is positively 
related  to  non-budgetary government  in  countries  with  low levels  of  political  rights. 
Heterogeneity  is  inversely  related  to  government  ownership  of  private  industry  in 
democracies, and restrictions on the sale of private property is positively associated with 
heterogeneity in countries with low political rights.  Also consistent with this finding, the 
freedom  to  operate  private  business  is  positively  associated  with  heterogeneity  in 
countries with high political rights, but not in other countries.
Results
The central contribution of this chapter is to document the relationship between 
heterogeneity  and  government  in  countries  with  low  levels  of  political  rights,  while 
considering the fact that these countries may rely heavily on shadow taxes to “finance” 
activity.  Table 5.7 presents results of a random-effects model that is estimated for each of 
the three measures of government activity by level of political rights for a panel of 139 
countries from 2005-2008.  Heterogeneity is found to have a strong negative effect on 
budgetary  governments  in  democracies,  consistent  with  predictions  in  the  literature. 
Heterogeneity is also found to have a positive effect on the level of business freedom in 
democracies.
Other  than  transfer  payments,  heterogeneity  has  little  effect  on  budgetary 
government  in  non-democratic  countries.   Heterogeneity is  positively related  to  non-
budgetary government in non-democratic countries.  If heterogeneity has no effect on 
20 p.21
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budgetary government, but is found to positively affect non-budgetary government, then 
heterogeneity will  have an overall  positive relationship with government  size in  non-
democratic countries.  This is consistent with theories by Sorens (2010) that suggest that 
official ethnic discrimination depends upon political institutions.
For  this  sample,  a  fixed-effects  specification  was  also  estimated  with 
heterogeneity absent from the model.   Hausman tests were performed to examine the 
extent  to  which  country-specific  characteristics  impact  these  results.   In  most  cases, 
results from fixed effects specifications were not significantly different from the random 
effects  specification.   One  notable  exception  is  transfer  payments,  where  estimates 
produced with fixed and random effects specifications differ regardless of the level of 
political rights.  In addition, there are significant differences between fixed and random 
effects estimates for budgetary government measures in democracies.   In these cases, 
countries likely have unique characteristics that explain fiscal policy in addition to those 
being captured by the random effects specifications.
One concern is that splitting the data by the level of political rights introduces 
endogeneity.  If countries that have lower levels of political rights also have lower levels 
of legal and economic rights, then the effect of heterogeneity may be biased.  In addition, 
bias  will  be  introduced  if  the  level  of  GDP per  capita  depends  upon  the  level  of 
government  intervention  in  the  economy.   This  is  likely  if  individuals  reduce  their 
economic activity or move activity into a shadow economy in response to taxation.  In 
this  case,  estimates  of  the  effect  of  GDP  per  capita  on  the  level  of  government 
involvement in the economy would be downwardly biased.  More importantly, this biases 
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estimates of the effect of heterogeneity on government.  Ideally, instruments could be 
found to proxy for the initial  value of GDP per capita.   However,  the availability of 
reliable instruments is limited, especially for such a large panel of countries.
Table 5.8 presents the results of a random effects specification that omits GDP per 
capita.   In  most  cases,  the  estimated  coefficients  on  ethnic  heterogeneity  are  more 
negative than those found in Table 5.7.  This suggests that the estimates in Table 5.7 tend 
to understate the effect of heterogeneity on government involvement in the economy.
Another concern is that the level of political  rights in countries does not vary 
much over  time between 2005 and 2008.   To address  this,  a  larger  panel  of  data  is 
constructed for 122 countries dating back to 1985 from the same sources.  Due to the 
limitations  of the Economic Freedom of the World dataset,  observations are  included 
once  every 5  years  for  1985,  1990,  1995,  and 2000.   Annual  data  exists  from 2000 
through 2008.  Some countries, such as former members of the Soviet Union have no 
observations  prior  to  1995.   Values  for  population,  GDP  per  capita,  or  budgetary 
government values were imputed for countries that were missing one observation for one 
of these variables.  Data limitations exclude the categories of government enterprises and 
investment, and legal restrictions on the sale of private property in this sample.
Included in this larger sample are countries that experienced significant changes 
in  political  rights  over time.   Some of  these,  such as  Albania,  Hungary,  Poland,  and 
Romania, transitioned from a communist government to a democracy after the fall of the 
Iron Curtain.  From 1985 to 1990, the average level of budgetary government activity in 
these countries jumped from an average of 28.8% of GDP to 45.67% of GDP.  Over the 
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same period of time the level of legal and property rights rose from 5.6 to 7.1, suggesting  
non-budgetary government intervention in the economy fell.
Table 5.9 provides the average values for budgetary government, population, and 
real gross national income per capita measures for each of the 122 countries in this larger 
sample.   Table  5.10 provides  summary  statistics  and  correlations.   Heterogeneity  is 
inversely  correlated  with  budgetary  government  and  positively  correlated  with  non-
budgetary government  regardless of the level  of  political  rights.   Table 5.11 presents 
results from a random effects model estimated for this larger panel.  Results are generally 
similar.   In  all  cases,  heterogeneity  is  inversely  related  to  transfer  payments. 
Heterogeneity  is  only  inversely  related  to  budgetary  government  consumption  in 
democracies with high political rights.  The inverse relationship between heterogeneity 
and  total  budgetary  government  is  approximately  10  percentage  points  higher  in 
democracies, primarily because of the effect on government consumption.
  Heterogeneity is  found to have an inverse effect  on legal  and property rights. 
While  the  effect  is  of  larger  magnitude  in  countries  with  low  political  rights,  and 
heterogeneity may have a larger effect on non-budgetary government activity in non-
democratic countries, the result for democracies is unexpected.  Perhaps additional legal 
measures are  needed to reduce conflict,  or special  interest  lobbying in  heterogeneous 
democracies produces higher levels of intervention.  Perhaps the legal system is more 
developed in democracies and therefore produces lower scores on the surveys used to 
generate the legal environment variable.  In addition, survey responses may take time to 
change  while  information  on  political  institutions  changes  instantaneously  with 
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institutional changes.  Because of this, transitional economies may continue to receive 
low survey scores for years after becoming a democracy.  
While the effect of heterogeneity in democracies on legal freedom is negative in 
both panels, it is only significant in the larger panel.  Similarly, the effect of heterogeneity 
in democracies on business freedom is positive in both panels, but only significant in the 
smaller panel.  Because of the subjective nature of non-budgetary measures, the net effect 
of heterogeneity on overall government size in democracies remains unclear.
In  non-democratic  countries,  heterogeneity  does  not  reduce  government 
consumption,  but  does  increase  regulation  and  non-budgetary  interference  in  the 
economy.  If transfer payments are excluded, the net effect of heterogeneity in this case is 
to increase the overall size of government.  It is interesting to note that in both Table 5.7 
and  Table 5.11, positive relationships between government consumption and GDP per 
capita are consistent with “Wagner's Law.”
Conclusion
This  chapter  explores  the relationships  between heterogeneity and government 
size.   Inverse  relationships  between  budgetary  government  consumption  and  transfer 
payments are confirmed, at least for democracies.  This is consistent with prior research 
that suggests that heterogeneity of preferences reduces public provision and individuals 
have less taste for redistribution in heterogeneous communities.  
This study considers non-budgetary government as well, as developing countries 
with  large  shadow  economies  frequently  rely  on  regulation  and  other  forms  of 
intervention  in  the  economy.   When  these  alternative  forms  of  government  are 
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considered, the standard relationship between heterogeneity and government size does 
not hold.   This study finds that the relationship may depend upon the level of political 
rights.  
Perhaps  individuals  in  heterogeneous  groups  do  prefer  lower  levels  of  public 
provision.  However, in non-democratic countries, preferences for government activity do 
not necessarily materialize.  No relationship between budgetary government consumption 
and  heterogeneity  is  found  for  these  non-democratic  countries,  though  a  positive 
relationship between non-budgetary government and heterogeneity is found.
In  democratic  countries,  an  inverse  relationship  between  heterogeneity  and 
budgetary  consumption  is  found.   Unexpectedly,  a  positive  relationship  between 
heterogeneity and non-budgetary intervention through the legal system is also found for 
democratic countries, though this may be due to the way the variable is constructed.  In 
general, heterogeneity does reduce the size of budgetary government, but the effect of 
heterogeneity on regulation and economic freedom is not clear.
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Table 5.1: Summary Statistics, 2008 (N=139)
Variable
Means by Level of Political Rights
Low Political Rights Med Political Rights High Political Rights
Government Consumption
(% of GDP) 20.96 17.13 24.34
Transfer Payments (% of GDP) 4.22 6.02 15.51
Total Government (% of GDP) 25.18 23.15 39.85
Government-Owned Enterprises 3.8 5.4 8.6
Legal and Property Rights 4.9 4.9 7.2
Freedom to Transfer Property 6.9 6.9 7.8
Business Freedom 6.2 6.7 7.3
Population (millions) 80.5 46.3 25.0
Real GDP Per Capita (2008 US$) $6,725.7321 $5,831.35 $22,276.24
Ethnic Heterogeneity 0.51 0.54 0.26
Correlations Between Measures of Government Activity
Total Budgetary 
Government
Government 
Enterprises
Legal and 
Property Rights
Freedom to 
Transfer Property
Government Enterprises 0.37***
Legal and Property Rights 0.62*** 0.47***
Freedom to Transfer 
Property 0.26*** 0.23*** 0.56***
Business Freedom 0.25*** 0.37*** 0.63*** 0.38***
Variable
Correlations with Ethnic Heterogeneity by Level of Political Rights
Low Political Rights Med Political Rights High Political Rights
Government Consumption
(% of GDP) -0.01 -0.05     -0.30***
Transfer Payments (% of GDP)       -0.62*** -0.12     -0.43***
Total Government (% of GDP) -0.22 -0.10     -0.42***
Government-Owned Enterprises -0.03     -0.29**       -0.31**   
Legal and Property Rights       -0.66*** -0.09  -0.26*
Freedom to Transfer  Property       -0.73***   -0.21*   0.00  
Business Freedom   -0.15  -0.14   0.30*
Population (millions) -0.30 -0.05 0.02
Real GDP Per Capita (2008 US$) -0.10 -0.18     -0.11***
21 Oman and UAE have relatively high GDP per capita.
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Table 5.2: Heterogeneous Countries
Country Fractionalization GDP Per Capita22 Notable Figures
Uganda 0.93 $1,299 Idi Amin (1971-1979)*Yoweri Museveni (1986- )
Liberia 0.91 $409 Samuel Doe (1980-1990)*Charles Taylor (1990?-2003)*
Madagascar 0.88 $918 Didier Ratsiraka (1975-1993, 1997-2002)*
DRC (Zaire) 0.87 $414 Mobuto (1965-1997)*
Congo-Brazzaville 0.87 $3,965 Denis Sassou Nguesso (1979-1992, 1997- )*
Cameroon 0.86 $2,938 Paul Biya (1982- )*
Chad 0.86 $2,830 Idriss Déby (1990- )*
Kenya 0.86 $2,191 Daniel arap Moi (1978-2002)*
Nigeria 0.85 $2,520
Yakubu Dan-Yumma Gowon (1966-1975)*
Murtala Ramat Mohammed (1975-1976)*
Olu ẹgun Ọbasanjọ (1976-1979, 1999-2007)*ṣ
Sani Abacha (1993-1998)*
CAR 0.83 $924 Jean-Bédel Bokassa (1966-1979)*François Bozizé (2003- )*
Cote d'Ivoire 0.82 $2,377 Félix Boigny (1960-1993)*
Sierra Leone 0.82 $1,988 Siaka Stevens (1967-1985)*
Somalia 0.81 $491
Mohamed Siad Barre (1969-1991)*
Mohamed Farrah Aidid (1995-1996)*
Hussein Mohamed Farrah (1996-1997)
Yugoslavia 0.81 N/A Josip Broz Tito (1953-1980)*Slobodan Milošević  (1989-2000)*
Guinea-Bissau 0.81 $658 Luís Cabral (1973-1980)João Vieira (1980-1999, 2005-2009)*
Djibouti 0.80 $4,650 Hassan Aptidon (1977-1999)*
Libya 0.79 $24,281 Mu'ammar Al-Qadhafi (1969- )*
Benin 0.79 $1,491 Mathieu Kérékou' (1972-1991)*
Angola 0.79 $5,449 José Eduardo dos Santos (1979- )*
Gambia 0.79 $1,554 Yahya Jammeh (1994- )*
Zambia 0.78 $2,297 Kenneth Kaunda (1964-1991)*
Afghanistan 0.77 $797
Gabon 0.77 $9,179 Omar Bongo (1967-2009)*
South Africa 0.75 $11,307
Qatar 0.75 $104,707 Sheikh Hamad bin Kalifa Al Thani (1995- )
Average - $7,901
* leaders who seized power in a military coup or imposed legal restrictions on political competition.
22 Penn World Table, 6.3
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Table 5.3: Homogeneous Countries
Country Fractionalization GDP Per Capita Notable Figures
Comoros 0.00 $1,808.31 Bob Denard
South Korea 0.00 $24,949.65
Japan 0.01 $32,063.24
North Korea 0.04 $1,900.00 (est.) Kim Il Sung (1972-1994)*Kim Jong Il (1994- )*
Tunisia 0.04 $10,641.26 Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (1987- )*
Vanuatu 0.04 $5,929.65
Malta 0.04 $23,006.44
Bangladesh 0.05 $2,470.90 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1972-1975)*
Portugal 0.05 $21,526.84 António de Oliveira Salazar (1932-1968)*
Kiribati 0.05 $1,915.07
Swaziland 0.06 $7,746.05 King Mswati III (1986- )
Norway 0.06 $53,964.52
Sweden 0.06 $35,270.78
Marshall Islands 0.06 $7,649.58
Iceland 0.08 $40,907.56
Denmark 0.08 $36,198.32
Tonga 0.09 $6,075.81 King Tāufa āhau Tupou IV (1965-2006)ʻ
Australia 0.09 $39,694.06
Cyprus 0.09 $26,780.39
Haiti 0.10 $1,669.38 François (“Papa Doc”) Duvalier (1957-1971)*
France 0.10 $31,446.69
Netherlands 0.11 $36,394.13
Austria 0.11 $38,302.66
Italy 0.11 $30,505.24
Poland 0.12 $15,447.54
Average - $22,182
* leaders who seized power in a military coup or imposed legal restrictions on political competition.
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Table 5.4: Other Notable Countries
Country Fractionalization GDP Per Capita Notable Figures
Cape Verde 0.42 $8,266.29 Aristides Pereira (1975-1991)*
Chile 0.19 $21,548.43 Augusto Pinochet (1974-1990)*
Cuba 0.59 $11,762.46 Fulgencio Batista (1940-1944, 1952-1959)*Fidel Castro (1959-2008)*
Equatorial Guinea 0.35 $17,680.07 Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo (1979- )*
Guinea 0.74 $3,794.40
Lansana Conté (1984-2008)*
Moussa Dadis Camara (2008-2009)*
Sékouba Konaté (2009- )*
Ethiopia 0.72 $1,203.68 Meles Zenawi (1991- )*
Indonesia 0.74 $5,468.30 Suharto (1967-1998)*
Iraq 0.37 $5,103.17 Saddam Hussein (1979-2003)*
Mozambique 0.69 $2,306.26 Samora Machel (1975-1986)*
Panama 0.55 $9,480.51 Manuel Noriega (1983-1989)*
Romania 0.31 $10,506.91 Nicolae Ceauşescu (1965-1989)*
Rwanda 0.32 $1,216.32 Juvénal Habyarimana (1973-1994)*
São Tomé & 
Príncipe N/A $5,020.66 Manuel Pinto da Costa (1975-1991)*
Spain 0.42 $33,615.80 Francisco Franco (1939-1975)*
Sudan 0.71 $2,569.71 Gaafar Nimeiry (1969-1985)*Omar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir (1989- )*
Tanzania 0.74 $944.89 Julius Nyerere (1964-1985)*
Togo 0.71 $951.65 Gnassingbé Eyadéma (1967-2005)
Turkmenistan 0.39 $12,118.94 Saparmurat Niyazov (1990-2006)*
United States 0.49 $45.597.07
Zimbabwe 0.39 $2,448.50 Robert Mugabe (1987- )*
* leaders who seized power in a military coup or imposed legal restrictions on political competition.
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Table 5.5: Countries With Low Political Rights, 2008
Country Ethnic Heterogeneity
Budgetary 
Government Legal Rights
Business 
Freedom
Algeria 0.34 43.32% 4.5 5.2
Angola 0.79 45.48% 3.3 5.1
Armenia 0.13 22.44% 5.5 6.8
Azerbaijan 0.20 26.99% 6.4 6.9
Cambodia 0.21 - - -
Cameroon 0.86 19.60% 3.5 6.4
Congo, Rep. Of 0.87 28.48% 2.9 5.7
Cote d'Ivoire 0.82 12.06% 3.1 6.1
DRC (Zaire) 0.87 13.01% 2.1 4.3
Egypt 0.18 24.94% 5.4 5.6
Fiji 0.55 30.84% 6.0 8.8
Gabon 0.77 21.14% 4.3 6.9
Iran 0.67 27.15% 6.1 5.4
Iraq 0.37 - - -
Kazakhstan 0.62 26.18% 6.0 7.5
Mauritania 0.62 23.19% 4.7 7.2
Oman 0.44 32.16% 7.4 7.9
Qatar 0.75 - - -
Russia 0.25 39.59% 5.7 5.9
Rwanda 0.32 13.22% 5.8 7.4
Tajikistan 0.51 - - -
Unit. Arab Em. 0.63 18.54% 7.2 7.6
Belarus 0.32 - - -
Chad 0.86 16.10% 2.2 5.7
China 0.15 34.11% 6.4 5.6
Cuba 0.59 - - -
Equatorial Guinea 0.35 - - -
Eritrea 0.65 - - -
Guinea 0.74 - - -
Laos 0.51 - - -
Libya 0.79 - - -
Myanmar 0.51 4.49% 3.2 3.7
North Korea 0.04 - - -
Saudi Arabia 0.18 - - -
Somalia 0.81 - - -
Sudan 0.71 - - -
Swaziland 0.06 - - -
Syria 0.54 16.96% 4.7 4.5
Tunisia 0.04 29.13% 6.6 7.0
Turkmenistan 0.39 - - -
Uzbekistan 0.41 - - -
Vietnam 0.24 8.38% 6.0 6.3
Zimbabwe 0.39 52.08% 3.7 4.9
Average 0.49 25.18% 4.9 6.2
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Table 5.6: Countries with High Political Rights, 2008
Country Ethnic Heterogeneity
Budgetary 
Government Legal Rights
Business 
Freedom
Australia 0.09 35.55% 8.3 8.2
Austria 0.11 52.46% 8.4 7.4
Bahamas 0.42 20.66% 7.1 8.8
Barbados 0.14 44.21% 7.8 7.1
Belgium 0.56 56.70% 6.9 7.5
Belize 0.70 21.26% 5.7 8.8
Canada 0.71 37.30% 8.3 8.3
Chile 0.19 27.10% 7.1 7.8
Costa Rica 0.24 18.16% 6.6 6.8
Cyprus 0.09 34.16% 6.8 6.9
Czech Rep. 0.32 53.91% 6.4 7.5
Denmark 0.08 53.63% 8.7 8.1
Estonia 0.51 39.16% 7.2 7.6
Finland 0.13 50.07% 8.7 7.2
France 0.10 53.54% 7.3 7.0
Germany 0.17 50.73% 8.2 6.3
Ghana 0.67 21.99% 5.4 6.6
Greece 0.16 39.22% 6.1 5.9
Hungary 0.15 32.93% 6.3 7.3
Iceland 0.08 39.40% 8.4 8.2
Ireland 0.12 42.75% 7.9 7.8
Israel 0.34 40.10% 5.9 6.3
Italy 0.11 47.71% 5.7 6.5
Japan 0.01 42.78% 7.5 7.7
Korea, South 0.00 33.00% 6.8 6.4
Lithuania 0.32 36.44% 6.6 6.8
Luxembourg 0.53 55.16% 8.4 7.3
Malta 0.04 44.23% 7.5 7.0
Mauritius 0.46 20.56% 6.4 8.0
Netherlands 0.11 57.95% 8.2 7.5
New Zealand 0.40 35.95% 9.0 8.8
Norway 0.06 49.49% 8.8 6.9
Panama 0.55 19.85% 5.4 6.8
Poland 0.12 42.34% 5.9 6.7
Portugal 0.05 44.81% 6.8 6.2
Slovak Rep 0.25 42.64% 6.2 7.7
Slovenia 0.22 46.10% 6.0 6.8
Spain 0.42 41.95% 6.6 6.7
Sweden 0.06 57.46% 8.5 7.2
Switzerland 0.53 30.46% 8.4 7.9
United Kingdom 0.12 39.57% 8.1 7.9
United States 0.49 32.87% 7.5 7.9
Uruguay 0.25 27.09% 5.6 6.4
Average 0.26 39.85% 7.2 7.3
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Table 5.7: Political Rights, Ethnic Heterogeneity, and Government, 2005-2008
Budgetary Government Non-Budgetary Government (Shadow Taxes)
Government 
Consumption
(% of GDP)
Transfer 
Payments
(% of GDP)
Total 
Consumption and 
Transfers
(% of GDP)
Government 
Enterprises and 
Investment (0-10)
Legal Rights
(0-10)
Restrictions on 
the Sale of Private 
Property (0-10)
Business Freedom
(0-10)
Low Political 
Rights
(N=101, 31 
countries)
Constant 15.68% 8.52% 24.02% 5.3 5.3 7.0 6.2
Ethnic 
Heterogeneity
1.21
(6.51)
-7.99
       (3.49)***
-6.68
(8.21)
-0.10 
(2.30)
-2.53
       (0.72)***
-3.38
      (1.45)**
-0.77
 (0.73)
Population
(millions)
0.006
(0.007)
0.0002
(0.004)
0.006
(0.009)
-0.003
 (0.003)
0.0004
(0.0008)
0.0011
(0.0016)
-0.0008 
(0.0008)
GDP Per Capita   
(thousands)
0.35
(0.20)
0.02
(0.11)
0.35
(0.25)
-0.08
 (0.07)
0.12
      (0.02)***
0.15
      (0.05)***
0.07
(0.02)
Hausman X2(2) (1.65)     (7.37)** (0.72) (0.61) (1.72) (0.71) (2.32)
Medium Political 
Rights
(N=273, 75 
countries)
Constant 16.72% 6.97% 19.20% 7.0 4.5 7.3 6.7
Ethnic 
Heterogeneity
4.04
(3.23)
-3.26 
(2.77)
1.13 
(4.80)
-3.68 
      (1.41)***
-0.41
(0.57)
-2.20
     (1.10)**
-0.59
(0.47)
Population
(millions)
0.0020
(0.0051)
0.0005
(0.0044)
-0.001
 (0.008)
-0.001
 (0.002)
0.0008
(0.0009)
0.0001
(0.0017)
0.0006
 (0.0007)
GDP Per Capita   
(thousands)
0.43
      (0.10)***
0.08
(0.08)
0.57
      (0.14)***
0.01
(0.00)
0.10
      (0.02)***
0.10
      (0.03)***
0.04
      (0.01)***
Hausman X2(2) (1.47)       (12.01)*** (0.88) (0.34) (4.53) (2.39) (0.31)
High Political 
Rights
(N=179, 47 
countries)
Constant 22.09% 15.44% 37.75% 8.1 6.0 7.8 6.6
Ethnic 
Heterogeneity
-5.94
   (3.52)*
-14.33
       (4.10)***
-20.38
       (6.38)***
-2.85
     (1.27)**
-0.97
   (0.54)*
-0.53
(1.23)
1.13
    (0.49)**
Population
(millions)
0.014
(0.015)
0.009
(0.018)
-0.005
 (0.028)
-0.001
(0.005)
0.002
(0.002)
0.0068
(0.0053)
0.0003
(0.0022)
GDP Per Capita   
(thousands)
0.17
      (0.06)***
0.14
  (0.08)*
0.29
    (0.12)**
0.06
    (0.02)**
0.07
      (0.01)***
0.009
(0.023)
0.019
    (0.009)**
Hausman X2(2)       (14.38)***     (6.38)**       (14.73)*** (0.25) (0.13) (0.87)     (6.90)**
* , **, and *** indicate p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01, respectively.
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Table 5.8: Political Rights, Ethnic Heterogeneity, and Government, 2005-2008 (GDP pc omitted)
Budgetary Government Non-Budgetary Government (Shadow Taxes)
Government 
Consumption
(% of GDP)
Transfer 
Payments
(% of GDP)
Total 
Consumption and 
Transfers
(% of GDP)
Government 
Enterprises and 
Investment (0-10)
Legal Rights
(0-10)
Restrictions on 
the Sale of Private 
Property (0-10)
Business Freedom
(0-10)
Low Political 
Rights
(N=101, 31 
countries)
Constant 18.35% 8.40% 26.69% 4.7 6.1 8.2 6.7
Ethnic 
Heterogeneity
0.24
(6.59)
-7.95  
    (3.33)**
-7.64  
(8.33)
0.12
(2.30)
-2.82
       (0.98)***
-3.78
     (1.68)**
-0.96
 (0.81)
Population
(millions)
0.0054
(0.0073)
0.0002
(0.0037)
0.0057
(0.0092)
-0.0034
 (0.0026)
0.0004
(0.0011)
0.0009
(0.0019)
-0.0009 
(0.0009)
Medium Political 
Rights
(N=273, 75 
countries)
Constant 16.72% 7.75% 24.45% 7.6 5.4 8.2 7.1
Ethnic 
Heterogeneity
1.38
(3.46)
-3.78  
(2.77)
-2.37  
(5.19)
-4.09 
      (1.40)***
-1.01 
(0.69)
-2.81
     (1.13)**
-0.87 
(0.49)
Population
(millions)
0.0037
(0.0055)
0.0002
(0.0044)
-0.0034
 (0.0083)
-0.0013
 (0.0022)
0.0004
(0.0011)
0.0003
(0.0018)
0.0007
(0.0008)
High Political 
Rights
(N=179, 47 
countries)
Constant 26.02% 18.69% 44.71% 9.4 7.7 7.5 7.1
Ethnic 
Heterogeneity
-7.73  
    (3.90)**
-15.80
       (4.23)***
-23.53
       (7.02)***
-3.40
       (1.30)***
-1.72 
     (0.72)**
-0.42
(1.19)
0.92
  (0.49)*
Population
(millions)
0.0060
(0.0172)
0.0152
(0.0186)
-0.0094
 (0.0309)
-0.0013
(0.0056)
0.0015
(0.0032)
0.0064
(0.0052)
0.0011
(0.0022)
* , **, and *** indicate p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01, respectively.
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Table 5.9: Countries
Country Government Consumption
Transfer 
Payments
Total Gov't 
Share of GDP
Population
(Millions)
Real GDP Per 
Capita,
2008 US $
Total Number 
of Observations
Albania 11.28% 6.85% 17.24% 3.1 $3,599.86 12
Algeria 25.83% 8.37% 32.80% 30.6 $5,786.63 12
Argentina 15.65% 9.03% 24.68% 36.9 $12,460.84 12
Australia 23.45% 11.99% 35.44% 19.4 $30,635.71 12
Austria 25.03% 26.25% 51.28% 8.1 $31,048.22 12
Bahamas 17.50% 3.68% 21.17% 0.3 $24,449.19 12
Bahrain 32.09% 3.40% 35.50% 0.7 $22,105.97 12
Bangladesh 6.05% 2.28% 7.75% 142.0 $1,944.11 12
Barbados 24.86% 4.80% 29.66% 0.3 $22,691.78 12
Belgium 26.77% 24.71% 51.48% 10.3 $29,169.77 12
Belize 17.38% 1.56% 18.94% 0.3 $8,095.72 10
Benin 13.79% 1.11% 14.45% 6.9 $1,364.84 12
Bolivia 16.74% 4.68% 21.42% 8.4 $3,397.99 12
Botswana 41.79% 9.13% 50.92% 1.7 $7,389.17 12
Brazil 23.91% 12.76% 36.67% 175.0 $8,672.19 12
Bulgaria 19.90% 16.89% 36.80% 8.0 $7,513.22 12
Burundi 18.24% 2.21% 20.45% 6.8 $760.08 12
Cameroon 13.07% 1.98% 15.05% 16.1 $2,690.67 12
Canada 26.15% 12.56% 38.70% 30.9 $31,253.94 12
Central Afr. Rep. 11.09% 0.00% 11.09% 3.8 $948.33 12
Chad 9.34% 0.67% 10.08% 8.8 $1,859.44 12
Chile 15.91% 11.06% 26.97% 15.4 $14,006.51 12
China 25.03% 6.82% 29.01% 1,250.0 $4,778.93 12
Colombia 21.51% 6.51% 28.02% 40.1 $6,797.42 12
Congo, Dem. R. 8.72% 0.65% 9.37% 52.5 $132.50 12
Congo, Rep. Of 28.70% 3.25% 31.44% 3.1 $3,793.24 12
Costa Rica 18.34% 5.20% 23.54% 4.0 $9,671.50 12
Cote d'Ivoire 13.82% 2.27% 15.71% 17.3 $2,577.80 12
Croatia 26.76% 20.24% 47.00% 4.5 $10,534.56 10
Cyprus 21.43% 12.44% 33.87% 0.8 $20,138.65 12
Czech Rep. 30.35% 27.87% 57.13% 10.3 $18,151.78 12
Denmark 34.69% 22.40% 57.09% 5.3 $29,683.18 12
Dominican Rep. 8.64% 4.13% 12.78% 8.9 $7,271.96 12
Ecuador 13.76% 1.73% 15.49% 12.2 $5,439.84 12
Egypt 14.12% 6.58% 20.70% 71.1 $4,667.85 12
El Salvador 10.17% 1.74% 11.91% 5.9 $5,061.63 12
Estonia 25.79% 13.42% 39.21% 1.4 $12,672.31 10
Fiji 23.85% 4.22% 28.07% 0.8 $5,429.55 10
Finland 29.40% 19.63% 49.03% 5.2 $26,829.02 12
France 29.09% 25.45% 54.54% 59.5 $26,860.10 12
Gabon 22.98% 1.33% 24.30% 1.2 $8,823.04 12
Germany 24.64% 26.08% 50.71% 81.7 $27,234.27 12
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Country Government Consumption
Transfer 
Payments
Total Gov't 
Share of GDP
Population
(Millions)
Real GDP Per 
Capita,
2008 US $
Total Number 
of Observations
Ghana 14.88% 1.50% 16.38% 19.8 $1,428.18 12
Greece 17.91% 18.34% 36.25% 10.9 $22,200.99 12
Guatemala 8.11% 3.34% 11.45% 11.5 $5,566.17 12
Guinea-Bissau 12.88% 0.00% 12.88% 1.3 $634.75 12
Guyana 25.71% 0.00% 25.71% 0.8 $2,263.99 12
Haiti 11.52% 1.21% 12.73% 8.7 $1,686.00 12
Honduras 15.38% 2.37% 17.74% 6.3 $3,301.61 12
Hungary 13.67% 21.88% 35.56% 10.2 $14,072.73 12
Iceland 28.54% 8.40% 36.94% 0.3 $31,842.76 12
India 15.97% 5.52% 21.49% 1,020.0 $2,815.15 12
Indonesia 11.71% 7.51% 19.22% 206.0 $4,257.52 12
Iran 20.69% 4.92% 25.61% 64.3 $8,247.55 12
Ireland 23.16% 17.82% 40.98% 4.0 $30,690.89 12
Israel 33.14% 15.01% 48.15% 6.3 $20,906.90 12
Italy 23.84% 22.82% 46.66% 57.8 $26,434.91 12
Jamaica 17.52% 0.98% 18.50% 2.6 $7,901.50 12
Japan 21.80% 14.70% 36.50% 126.0 $28,125.52 12
Jordan 22.54% 5.93% 28.48% 4.8 $4,954.15 12
Kenya 19.42% 2.25% 21.67% 32.1 $1,985.02 12
Korea, South 19.17% 9.09% 28.26% 46.7 $18,281.54 12
Kuwait 34.79% 10.53% 44.45% 2.3 $36,483.96 12
Latvia 23.62% 13.39% 37.01% 2.3 $9,887.67 10
Lithuania 22.39% 12.33% 34.72% 3.5 $10,198.65 10
Luxembourg 28.51% 22.61% 49.17% 0.4 $60,832.59 12
Madagascar 9.38% 0.88% 10.18% 15.7 $929.60 12
Malawi 16.89% 2.19% 19.09% 12.2 $1,091.43 12
Malaysia 22.10% 5.62% 27.71% 23.4 $13,655.06 12
Mali 14.13% 0.59% 14.66% 10.8 $1,113.68 12
Malta 23.90% 16.23% 40.13% 0.4 $17,530.33 12
Mauritius 16.39% 5.48% 21.87% 1.2 $15,312.43 12
Mexico 13.82% 7.42% 21.24% 97.3 $10,047.36 12
Morocco 22.50% 5.84% 28.34% 28.8 $4,866.92 12
Myanmar 8.42% 0.00% 8.42% 46.2 $214.50 12
Namibia 30.10% 3.34% 33.44% 1.9 $5,549.81 11
Nepal 11.08% 0.00% 11.08% 26.1 $1,688.62 10
Netherlands 30.13% 24.68% 54.81% 15.9 $30,267.97 12
New Zealand 22.86% 13.45% 36.31% 3.9 $22,125.66 12
Nicaragua 18.19% 6.29% 24.48% 5.1 $2,261.70 12
Niger 14.79% 0.79% 15.06% 11.5 $868.77 12
Nigeria 11.62% 0.11% 11.73% 128.0 $1,718.09 12
Norway 31.49% 20.04% 51.53% 4.5 $40,577.05 12
Oman 38.05% 2.40% 40.45% 2.4 $23,139.64 12
Pakistan 12.47% 2.66% 15.13% 141.0 $2,902.79 12
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Country Government Consumption
Transfer 
Payments
Total Gov't 
Share of GDP
Population
(Millions)
Real GDP Per 
Capita,
2008 US $
Total Number 
of Observations
Panama 19.23% 5.95% 25.18% 3.0 $7,281.20 12
Pap. New Guinea 21.59% 2.64% 24.17% 5.5 $2,142.01 12
Paraguay 12.01% 3.18% 15.18% 5.4 $4,763.64 12
Peru 12.59% 3.12% 15.71% 26.0 $5,301.55 12
Philippines 12.96% 2.40% 15.36% 78.5 $3,890.80 12
Poland 22.85% 20.98% 43.84% 38.1 $10,968.16 12
Portugal 23.44% 17.88% 41.32% 10.3 $18,008.36 12
Romania 14.87% 13.18% 28.05% 22.1 $3,265.83 12
Russia 25.18% 12.84% 38.02% 144.0 $9,669.73 10
Rwanda 11.95% 2.20% 14.15% 8.5 $987.05 10
Senegal 13.35% 2.70% 16.05% 10.1 $1,849.54 12
Sierra Leone 13.25% 2.04% 15.29% 4.6 $2,011.38 12
Singapore 20.49% 3.38% 23.86% 4.0 $32,728.01 12
Slovak Rep 25.61% 20.17% 43.72% 5.4 $12,691.25 10
Slovenia 26.51% 22.09% 48.60% 2.0 $19,834.21 10
South Africa 23.88% 5.20% 29.08% 43.7 $9,004.32 12
Spain 22.68% 16.01% 38.70% 41.8 $25,160.68 12
Sri Lanka 12.43% 5.03% 17.47% 18.8 $4,592.51 12
Sweden 35.49% 24.27% 59.75% 8.9 $27,774.18 12
Switzerland 16.82% 14.28% 31.10% 7.2 $34,513.85 12
Syria 17.23% 0.00% 17.23% 17.1 $2,491.44 12
Taiwan 18.44% 3.27% 21.71% 18.1 $20,194.72 12
Tanzania 17.38% 0.43% 17.82% 35.0 $753.57 12
Thailand 16.86% 2.48% 19.34% 62.9 $7,393.46 12
Togo 11.27% 2.13% 12.36% 5.4 $979.87 12
Trinidad & Tob. 19.66% 8.39% 28.05% 1.3 $16,985.83 12
Tunisia 20.13% 8.88% 29.01% 9.5 $7,831.60 12
Turkey 15.50% 5.56% 21.07% 66.7 $6,315.05 12
Uganda 14.11% 6.94% 21.05% 25.3 $1,038.86 12
Ukraine 25.56% 18.36% 42.01% 48.0 $7,018.26 10
Unit. Arab Em. 24.00% 1.48% 25.38% 3.4 $45,135.52 12
United Kingdom 24.54% 14.78% 39.32% 59.3 $27,118.53 12
United States 18.79% 12.83% 31.62% 283.0 $37,927.73 12
Uruguay 14.51% 14.94% 29.45% 3.3 $10,487.70 12
Venezuela 17.29% 11.25% 28.54% 24.5 $10,687.34 12
Zambia 16.75% 2.72% 19.47% 10.6 $1,450.29 12
Zimbabwe 27.12% 8.43% 35.55% 11.9 $3,484.93 12
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Table 5.10: Summary Statistics, 1985-2008 (N=1436)
Variable
Means by Level of Political Rights
Low Political Rights Med Political Rights High Political Rights
Government Consumption
(% of GDP) 18.52 17.61 23.72
Transfer Payments (% of GDP) 4.00 5.33 15.66
Total Government (% of GDP) 22.02 22.80 39.33
Government-Owned Enterprises 3.6 5.0 7.6
Legal and Property Rights 4.5 4.8 7.5
Freedom to Transfer Property 6.0 6.6 7.6
Business Freedom 5.4 6.1 6.9
Population (millions) 78.6 44.8 24.4
Real GDP Per Capita (2008 US$) $6,365.70 $6,656.05 $23,011.88
Ethnic Heterogeneity 0.54 0.52 0.27
Total Budgetary Government Legal and Property Rights
Legal and Property Rights 0.64***
Business Freedom 0.32*** 0.49***
Variable
Correlations with Ethnic Heterogeneity by Level of Political Rights
Low Political Rights Med Political Rights High Political Rights
Government Consumption
(% of GDP)      -0.19*** 0.02      -0.28***
Transfer Payments (% of GDP)      -0.44***     -0.27***     -0.39***
Total Government (% of GDP)      -0.33***     -0.12***     -0.40***
Legal and Property Rights      -0.31***   -0.09**     -0.27***
Business Freedom  -0.08  -0.05       0.18***
Population (millions)      -0.31*** -0.06  0.02
Real GDP Per Capita (2008 US$)   -0.10*     -0.20***     -0.16***
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Table 5.11: Political Rights, Ethnic Heterogeneity, and Government, 1985-2008
Budgetary Government Non-Budgetary Government 
(Shadow Taxes)
Government 
Consumption
(% of GDP)
Transfer Payments
(% of GDP)
Total Consumption and 
Transfers
(% of GDP)
Legal Rights
(0-10)
Business Freedom
(0-10)
Low Political 
Rights
(N=268, 50 
countries)
Constant 14.89% 14.26% 25.39% 5.4 4.6
Ethnic 
Heterogeneity
-1.21
 (3.44)
-15.89
       (3.28)***
-15.55
       (4.81)***
-2.15 
      (0.84)***
0.74
(0.75)
Population
(millions)
0.0062
(0.0044)
0.0018
(0.0038)
0.0043
      (0.0061)***
-0.0003 
(0.0011)
0.0018
  (0.0009)*
GDP Per Capita   
(thousands)
0.59
      (0.09)***
0.04
(0.06)
0.71
      (0.12)***
0.06
      (0.02)***
0.02
(0.02)
Medium Political 
Rights
(N=671, 88 
countries)
Constant 15.59% 11.94% 27.24% 4.8 5.6
Ethnic 
Heterogeneity
1.02
(2.85)
-12.09  
       (2.57)***  
-11.32  
       (4.50)***  
-0.80
(0.60)
0.33
(0.42)
Population
(millions)
0.0001
(0.0047)
0.0025
(0.0036)
0.0039
(0.0066)
0.0013
(0.0011)
0.0011
(0.0008)
GDP Per Capita   
(thousands)
0.29
      (0.06)***
0.056
(0.042)
0.325
      (0.078)***
0.052
      (0.013)***
0.006
(0.009)
High Political 
Rights
(N=497, 54 
countries)
Constant 24.54% 17.98% 41.33% 6.0 6.7
Ethnic 
Heterogeneity
-8.19  
       (3.34)***  
-15.82  
       (3.76)***  
-25.15  
       (5.96)***  
-1.34
       (0.51)***
0.34
(0.41)
Population
(millions)
0.0099
(0.0148)
0.0033
(0.0167)
-0.0063
 (0.0025)
-0.0031
(0.0024)
0.0048
    (0.0020)**
GDP Per Capita   
(thousands)
0.045
(0.040)
0.046
(0.046)
0.030
(0.061)
0.082
      (0.008)***
0.005
(0.007)
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Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusions
This study explores different topics related to preferences for public provision by 
heterogeneous groups.   While  the Tiebout  mechanism may not  produce a  completely 
efficient solution to the public goods problem, individual-level migration decisions may 
still provide information about preferences for public provision.  Chapter 3 tests this idea 
using 2000 census migration data to explore the extent to which migration decisions can 
be  used  to  estimate  demand  for  public  provision  of  goods  and  services.   Migration 
patterns for various demographic groups are compared to relative changes in balanced-
budget fiscal policy outcomes taken from the census of governments.
In general,  individuals are found to migrate in response to relative changes in 
fiscal policies.  However, the ability of provision to attract mobile individuals is limited 
to expenditures on education, as individuals appear to be migrating away from increases 
in other types of expenditures.  Young individuals with relatively high levels of income 
and/or education have more elastic migration responses to all types of fiscal policy.  In 
this analysis, each demographic subgroup is considered separately, and their underlying 
level  of  mobility  is  captured  in  the  estimated  constant  terms.   Estimated  differences 
between each subgroup's  migration responses in  reaction to relative changes  in fiscal 
policy represent differences in preference intensity.  
If, after controlling for their higher propensity to migrate, young  college-educated 
individuals are still  more likely to move in response to relative changes in education 
spending than individuals of retirement age, it must be the case that these young have a 
higher preference intensity for education spending.  While individuals of retirement age 
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may still feel strongly about education spending, they are less likely to consume publicly-
provided  educational  services.   This  contributes  to  the  public  finance  literature  by 
providing a method to rank preference intensity for different types of public provision.  A 
detailed  analysis  using  information  at  the  local  jurisdictional  level  would  be  able  to 
provide information on more fiscal categories.  
One limitation of this study is that it does not control for tax progressivity at the 
state level.  A similar analysis using more detailed information on individual-level tax 
burdens could  be used to  find  the optimal  levels  of  tax progressivity,  and individual 
demand  for  public  provision  could  be  matched  to  individual  willingness-to-pay  for 
provision.  
While preference intensity among groups can be ranked using this method, the 
extent to which these policies can ultimately attract mobile individuals depends on the 
underlying level of mobility.  While migration outcomes are known, the overall level of 
mobility in the population remains unclear, since satisfied mobile individuals who choose 
not to move cannot be empirically separated from immobile, dissatisfied individuals.
Simulations provide upper and lower bound estimates of migration responses to 
fiscal policy under the respective assumptions that the entire population, and only those 
who actually migrated are mobile.  Results indicate that an individual can be attracted to 
a  jurisdiction  with  an  expenditure  of  somewhere  between  $479.11  and  $6493.22  on 
higher education.
One goal of this study was to create a revealed-preference method that can be 
used  to  estimate  demand  for  publicly  provided  goods  and  services.   Quadratic 
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specifications are estimated in order to search for “bliss points.”  If, for example, relative 
changes in  jurisdiction B are twice that  of  jurisdiction A,  we might  expect  a  greater 
migration  response  with  respect  to  jurisdiction  B.   Due  to  diminishing  returns,  this 
migration response in jurisdiction B should be less than twice that in jurisdiction A, and 
the estimated point where the migration response would be zero would be considered the 
bliss point.  
However, diminishing returns to relative changes do not regularly appear in the 
aggregate fiscal data.  This may be due to aggregation bias or policy convergence and 
low levels of variation among jurisdictions.  Individuals may be less aware of relatively 
small fiscal changes, and there may initially be an increasing response to fiscal changes. 
Because  extreme  fiscal  changes  do  not  appear  in  the  data,  we  do  not  observe  the 
diminishing responses.  Because of this, the quadratic specifications estimated in  Table
3.7 are not concave with respect to the origin, and maxima (i.e., bliss points) cannot be 
found.
This  also  provides  insight  into  the  race-to-the-bottom literature.   Low-income 
individuals are found to actually migrate away from balanced-budget increases in welfare 
spending, inconsistent with welfare migration.  Also inconsistent with the theory, college-
educated and high-income individuals do not appear more averse to welfare spending 
than other groups.  Brueckner (2000) finds that states most likely are competing with one 
another in a race to lower welfare benefits, but in the absence of welfare migration these 
actions would require additional justification.   In addition, if  welfare migration is not 
widespread,  then  federal  programs  (e.g.,  matching  grants)  intended  to  address  this 
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phenomenon would be counterproductive.  This study shows that all individuals appear to 
demand less provision of welfare, and that a reduction in provision reflects the underlying 
preferences of the entire population. 
Both  the  race-to-the-bottom literature  and  the  Tiebout  hypothesis  suggest  that 
policies  have  the  ability  to  change  the  demographic  makeup  within  a  jurisdiction. 
Though certain fiscal policies may be more attractive to some individuals, the ability of 
policy to  have  an  affect  on  the  population  is  limited  in  the  short-run  because  fiscal 
policies will attract individuals from many different demographic groups.  Because of the 
pre-existing level of demographic heterogeneity in the overall economy, some level of 
demographic heterogeneity will remain within each jurisdiction.
Chapter  5 explores  the  relationship  between  heterogeneity  and  the  size  of 
government,  while considering the possibility that non-budgetary intervention through 
regulation can also exist in addition to fiscal policy.  Because there is relatively little 
variation in heterogeneity in the U.S., this chapter explores this idea in an international 
context.  In general, heterogeneous countries are found to have lower levels of transfer 
payments, consistent with predictions in the literature.
Additionally,  the  relationships  between heterogeneity and government  size  are 
found to be dependent upon the level of political rights in a country.  In countries with 
high levels of political rights, heterogeneous jurisdictions are found to have lower levels 
of budgetary government consumption.  In countries with low levels of political rights, 
heterogeneity does not appear to have an effect on government consumption.
The  effect  of  heterogeneity  on  non-budgetary  government  is  unclear  in 
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democracies.  Heterogeneity is found to increase the size of non-budgetary government in 
non-democratic countries.    Also,  the  effect  of  heterogeneity  on  non-budgetary 
government  appears  to  be  larger  in  countries  with  low levels  of  property  rights.   If 
transfer payments are excluded, heterogeneity increases the overall size of government in 
non-democratic countries.
A  future  study  will  explore  the  relationships  between  fiscal  policy  and 
centralization  in  a  federal  system  while  explicitly  controlling  for  this  demographic 
heterogeneity.  If more centralized jurisdictions are larger than decentralized jurisdictions, 
they are likely to have more heterogeneous populations.  If these heterogeneity affects 
preferences for public provision, then previous tests of the “Leviathan” theory that do not 
consider  heterogeneity  may  be  biased.   The  inclusion  of  non-budgetary  government 
activity in such a study may yield insightful results.
In  addition,  previous  research  has  found  evidence  of  “Wagner's  Law”  in 
industrialized nations, but little evidence in developing countries (Akitoby et al, 2006). 
Future research will examine the extent to which these non-budgetary measures can be 
used to explain this difference.
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